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     There is a recent strand of corporate finance literature that explores the impact of executives 
and directors’ social connections on firm value, performance, and governance. Those studies 
document that such social connections could be beneficial when they enhance the sharing of 
information and knowledge, but could also be detrimental when associated with CEOs, as they 
could provide the CEO with a source of influence that makes her more entrenched and powerful. 
     In the first essay, I use four common measures of network centrality to compute the position 
of the CEO within the social network of all executives and directors of US public companies. 
This differentiates this study from previous research as it focuses on the overall connectedness of 
CEOs rather than studying the effect of bilateral social connections across executives, directors, 
or firms. Furthermore, I investigate the determinants of such CEO network centrality. I find that 
graduating from an “elite” university, having a prior career path in a publicly listed firm, serving 
on the board of directors of other S&P firms, and being successful in the past career path 
positively increases a CEO’s position in the social network. However, spending a longer period 
of time in the career prior to holding the CEO position, and being more optimistic decreases the 
CEO’s position in the social network. Finally, I investigate the impact of such CEO network 
centrality on the firm’s overall valuation, performance, and CEO compensation. I find that 
increases in CEO network centrality after holding the CEO position increases the firm’s value 
when measured by market to book ratio, doesn’t significantly increase the firm’s accounting 
performance when measured by ROA, and significantly increases the CEO’s compensation.    
     In the second essay, I examine the impact of CEO network centrality on M&As which are 
considered to be one of the most important events that adversely impact the value of firms, and 
in which the CEO plays a crucial role in exploiting any power that she could have as a result of 
 
 
her influential central position in the social network. I find that in the specific context of M&A’s, 
higher CEO network centrality increases the frequency of mergers, and not only creates losses to 
the acquirer shareholders but also decreases total expected synergies. This evidence is consistent 
with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis; more centrally positioned bidder CEOs are 
insulated from both the disciplinary market for corporate control and the executive managerial 
labor market.  
    Finally, in the third essay, I study the M&A’s from a different angle, to examine how external 
governance acts when the internal governance fails to act. Shareholder activism is an excellent 
area to do such investigation, as numerous studies document evidence regarding the relevance of 
shareholder activism to internal governance, but only a few studies explore the impact of 
shareholder activism on external governance. I find that shareholder activism, measured by the 
presence of shareholder proposals, shareholder votes in favor of a proposal, and the participation 
of shareholders in voting on the proposal, significantly increases the probability of a firm 
becoming a target of a subsequent completed acquisition. At the same time, target companies 
with previous shareholder proposals earn significantly less cumulative abnormal returns around 
the merger announcement compared to targets with no proposals. One potential channel that 
facilitates such functioning of the market for corporate control when internal governance fails to 
act is the common share ownership. I find the highest effect of takeover probability when the 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
     During the past decades, a vast amount of research in the corporate governance field has been 
conducted to explain the famous agency problem, and to suggest ways to mitigate such problem. 
One important line of literature in that stream investigates mechanisms that help improve the 
governance of firms and reduce the conflict of interest between the management and the 
shareholders. Those mechanisms are either through improved monitoring from independent 
boards (see for example Gordon, 2007), institutional holders (see for example La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999), activist shareholders (see for example Gillan and Starks, 2000), 
or by alignment of executives’ and shareholders’ interests through incentive compensation 
arrangements(see for example Murphy, 1999). The other line of research deals with examining 
the consequences of such agency problem and poor governance. Those consequences include 
increased levels of executive compensation (see for example Bebchuk and Fried, 2004),  
suboptimal investment and merger decisions (see for example Masulis et al., 2007), and 
significant managerial power and entrenchment that results in overall shareholder value 
destruction( see for example Bebchuk et al., 2009). 
     However, in the recent years, an emerging line of research discovers that there has been 
another element missing from all those previous studies, and which is important in understanding 
and resolving any agency or governance problems. This missing element is the existence and 
importance of social connections across executives and directors. In order to have effective 
monitoring through directors, institutional holders, or even activist shareholders, there is a 
critical need for information. How executives, directors, and shareholders receive and utilize 




several researchers have provided evidence on how social connections impact board monitoring 
(for example Coles et al., 2010; Fracassi and Tate, 2012), executive compensation and turnover 
performance sensitivity (for example Hwang and Kim, 2009; Engelberg et al., 2009), mutual 
funds and venture capitals (for example Cohen et al., 2008; Hochberg at al., 2007), and corporate 
takeovers (for example Cai and Sevillier, 2012; Ishii and Xuan, 2010).   
      In my dissertation, I also focus on the impact of social networks on firm’s valuation, 
performance, executive compensation, and merger outcomes. However my study is different in 
that I focus on the CEO’s overall connectedness to all directors and executives of US public 
firms, rather than studying bilateral social connections between executives and directors within a 
firm or across firms. Moreover, to document the importance of information in the world of 
corporate governance, I also study the impact of shareholder activism on mergers and 
acquisitions to investigate how the external market for corporate control acts when there are 
internal governance problems. I find that information channels do facilitate the functioning of the 
market for corporate control when internal governance fails, and this mechanism acts through 










II. CEO NETWORK CENTRALITY   
Abstract: I use data about prior and current employment of all directors and executives of US 
public firms as reported in BoardEx to construct social networks and compute four common 
measures of CEO network centrality: Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector. 
Furthermore, I utilize the data provided in BoardEx on past education, career path, and board 
memberships in listed, unlisted and other non-profit organizations, along with S&P 1500 board 
membership data, compensation data, and data representing the personal traits of CEOs, to 
explain the determinants of CEO network centrality. I find that graduating from an Ivy League 
university, working in a publicly listed firm, serving on public or S&P 1500 boards, and being 
successful in the prior career path increases CEO network centrality. In contrast, staying in the 
career for a long time before getting appointed as a CEO, being overconfident, and being 
optimistic, decreases CEO network centrality. After understanding the sources of CEO network 
centrality, I examine the impact of CEO network centrality on firm’s market to book ratio, ROA, 
and CEO’s compensation. I report that higher CEO network centrality is associated with higher 
market to book ratio but insignificantly higher ROA. These results support the theory that 
predicts positive benefits from CEO network centrality due to enhancement of information 
sharing and access to private information. However, I also document a positive relationship 
between CEO network centrality and CEO’s total compensation, equity compensation, and the 
CEO pay slice. This positive relationship could be attributed to the benefits of information 
advantages gained by the CEO, or to the entrenchment effects that result from the CEO’s power 





1. Introduction  
     A recent stream of research is emerging in the corporate finance literature related to studying 
the impact of different kinds of social connections across executives and directors of US public 
firms on the firm’s governance, policies, and performance. Those studies document evidence that 
supports the relevance and significance of such social connections in explaining firm’s practices 
and corporate decisions, but there is mixed evidence on whether such social connections are 
beneficial or destructive. For example, there are studies that show how social connections 
between the CEO and directors of the same firm tend to weaken board monitoring (Fracassi and 
Tate 2012). Other studies show how CEO-director connections results in higher CEO 
compensation, lower pay-performance sensitivity and lower turnover performance sensitivity 
(Hwang and Kim 2009; Coles et al. 2010). On the other hand, there are studies that highlight the 
benefits of socially connected firms in facilitating information flow and how those benefits are 
translated to higher stock returns and improved accounting performance (Fracassi 2009;  
Larcker, So, and Wang 2010), reductions in costs of borrowing and improvements in credit 
rating (Engelberg et al. 2011), better fund performance in venture capitals (Hochberg et al. 2007) 
or mutual funds (Cohen et al. 2008), and better merger performance (Cai and Sevillier 2012; 
Schonlau and Singh 2009).
1
   
       In this line of literature, several methods have been used to examine the influence of social 
connections (for example if there are common directorships, education ties, employment ties, 
                                                           
1
 There are studies that document the negative impact of social connections on merger 
performance, for example, Ishii and Xuan (2010) show that when the acquirer and target are 
socially connected, this results in value destroying acquisitions. El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik 
(2012) document that higher acquirer CEO network centrality is associated with lower acquirer 




and memberships in social clubs), but in all of those papers, the emphasis is on the bilateral 
connections between the CEO and directors in one firm or across different firms. I utilize 
measures of the CEO’s overall connectedness to all other executives and directors of US public 
firms. Those measures of CEO network centrality represent the CEO’s position in the social 
network of all other executives and directors. Hence, I begin by creating a social network of all 
US public executives and directors based on their common prior and current employment, and 
then calculate four measures of network centrality that are commonly used in the social networks 
literature; Degree Centrality, Closeness Centrality, Betweenness Centrality, and Eigenvector 
centrality. Using those measures, I not only focus on the size of the CEO’s social network 
through the number of social connections she has (Degree), but I also capture the importance of 
the CEO’s position in the social network by looking at how efficiently she gets information from 
the network (Closeness), how she can control the information flow across other members in the 
network (Betweenness), and how she is connected to other important members in the network 
(Eigenvector).      
    Social science studies consider centrality as a source of power (e.g. Mizruchi and Potts 1998; 
Brass and Burkhardt 1992; Padgett and Ansell 1993), yet there is limited knowledge on the 
sources of such power. Therefore the objectives of my paper include first understanding the 
determinants of CEO network centrality, and then investigating the impact of CEO network 
centrality on market valuation, firm accounting performance, and CEO compensation.  
     From prior literature on social connections, it is reasonable to assume that education and work 
experiences impact the social connectedness of individuals. Hence my first hypothesis towards 




path of the CEO prior to becoming a CEO significantly determines CEO network centrality. I 
measure career path by including proxies for: the degree of social elitism of the university or 
college attended during undergraduate and graduate education; whether the CEO had experience 
in a publicly listed firm; whether the CEO had experience in any S&P 1500 firm; the total 
number of years of experience in any listed or S&P 1500 firm; if the CEO served on public, 
private, or non-profit boards; if the CEO served on important boards indicated by being  S&P 
1500 boards; and finally as a measure of the overall success of the CEO in her career path I use 
the first full year salary for her as CEO.  
      In addition to career path, personal characteristics can impact the social connectedness of 
individuals and thus be a significant determinant of CEO network centrality. A recent strand of 
literature examines the impact of CEO personal characteristics on managerial decisions and CEO 
compensation.
2
 Hence, in addition to CEO age, I utilize two of those common measures; CEO 
overconfidence and CEO optimism, to study how those personal traits could influence CEO 
network centrality. CEO overconfidence and CEO optimism are both related to CEO’s 
overestimation of either stock returns (overconfidence as in Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008, 
2011) or overestimation of earnings forecasts (Otto 2012). Because a central CEO will be 
exchanging information and receiving feedback from her social peers and members of the social 
network, I assume that overconfident or optimistic individuals will not be communicating as 
frequently as others, thus reducing their CEO network centrality. Consequently, my second 
hypothesis follows that age will increase CEO network centrality while overconfidence and 
optimism will decrease CEO network centrality.      
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           CEO network centrality can increase the market valuation and accounting performance of 
the firm if the CEO leverages the private information that she receives from the social network of 
executives and directors (see for example Freeman 1979; Tsai 2001; Cohen et al. 2008 on the 
benefits of network centrality through facilitation of information exchange). But it can also 
decrease market valuation and the accounting performance of the firm if the CEO becomes 
powerful and entrenched due to her central position in the social network and if she exploits such 
power to maximize her own wealth objectives by making poor managerial decisions that could 
be detrimental to the shareholders (see for example Bebchuck et al. 2011 on how CEO power 
destroys value). Hence the effect of CEO network centrality on market valuation is an empirical 
matter, and my third hypothesis is related to whether higher CEO network centrality increases or 
decreases firm’s market valuation and accounting performance. Furthermore, following the same 
logic used to formulate hypothesis 3, CEO compensation is expected to increase with higher 
levels of CEO network centrality. However, CEO compensation can increase due to the positive 
benefits of CEO network centrality, or due to the negative entrenchment effects of the CEO that 
are present in an environment of poor monitoring and governance. I will not attempt to 
disentangle those two effects in this study, but I study the general effect of CEO network 
centrality on CEO compensation and assume in my fourth hypothesis that there is a positive 
relationship between CEO network centrality and CEO compensation. 
     Utilizing data from BoardEx to construct social networks of all publicly listed firms’ 
executives and directors, I compute the CEO network centrality for all S&P 1500 CEOs who 
started their jobs as CEOs during or after 1997, and then estimate the determinants of CEO 
network centrality using a cross section of 3012 CEOs. I find that attending an Ivy League 




experience in S&P 1500 firm, serving on a public board, serving on S&P 1500 board, and 
receiving a higher salary from the first CEO job, significantly increases the CEO network 
centrality. However, being overconfident or optimistic significantly decreases the CEO network 
centrality.  
     To study the impact of CEO network centrality on the firm’s valuation, accounting 
performance, and CEO compensation, I conduct panel OLS regressions with robust standard 
errors that are clustered at the firm, representing all S&P 1500 CEOs during the period 2000-
2009. Those panels are restricted to include years where the CEO acts in full, and CEOs who are 
the same in the following year. To deal with the possible endogeneity between CEO network 
centrality and measure’s of firm valuation, accounting performance, and CEO compensation, I 
use the cross section models of CEO determinants to predict the CEO network centrality before 
the CEO starts the CEO position, and then control for this predicted CEO network centrality in 
the panel regressions. Using data on 3230 different S&P 1500 CEOs in 2130 firms and 13082 
firm year observations, I find the following patterns: First, higher CEO network centrality is 
associated with higher firm valuation measured by Tobin’s Q. This relationship remains 
significant even after controlling for predicted CEO network centrality based on the CEO 
determinants before she starts the CEO job, and after controlling for variables measuring 
effective governance like intensive monitoring boards, small board of directors, separation of the 
CEO and Chairman positions, low entrenchment measured by Bebchuck, Cremer, and Peyer’s 
(2009) entrenchment index, and presence of block ownership. Second, higher CEO network 
centrality is associated with better firm accounting performance measured by ROA. This 
relationship is no longer significant after controlling for predicted CEO network centrality, but 




accounting performance. This could be a result of the delays in accounting measures to 
incorporate relevant and valuable information. Third, higher CEO network centrality is 
associated with higher CEO compensation measured by total or incentive compensation. 
Moreover, higher CEO network centrality results in the CEO receiving a higher proportion of the 
overall compensation paid to the five top executives in the firm. Finally, higher CEO network 
centrality results in lower sensitivity of the CEO’s pay to firm’s performance. 
     The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2 I discuss the CEO network centrality measures 
and formulate the key hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data sources and sample construction. 
Section 4 presents the empirical tests and results. Section 5 concludes.  
2. CEO Network Centrality  
2.1. The Measures of CEO Network Centrality 
     I develop a social network based on all common prior and current employment connections 
between the CEOs and all other executives and directors of publicly listed firms. Then I 
construct four common measures of CEO network centrality: Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, 
and Eigenvector (Proctor and Loomis 1951; Sabidussi 1966; Freeman 1977; Bonacich 1972). 
Degree simply reflects the size of the CEO’s social network. It represents the number of direct 
social relationships the CEO has within the social network. Having a higher Degree implies that 
the CEO has a wider access to other executives and directors within the network, and hence she 
is considered to be more popular in the social network. The three other measures, Closeness, 
Betweenness, and Eigenvector consider the importance of the CEO’s position in the social 
network. Those measures capture more of the power and the influence that the CEO gains 




the significance of using centrality measures to present the CEO’s overall connectedness to all 
other executives and directors, compared to simply relying on the number of bilateral social 
connections as done in the previous research. Closeness represents how easily a CEO can reach 
other executives and directors within the social network. It is measured by the inverse of the sum 
of shortest path between the CEO and all other executives and directors in the network. 
Betweenness measures the control over information flow that the CEO has in the network when 
she lies on the shortest path between other executives and directors of the network. Hence 
Betweenness indicates that two other members of the social network will not be able to 
communicate unless they go through the CEO. Finally, Eigenvector not only measures the 
number of relationships that the CEO has in the network as in Degree, but also shows how 
important the CEO is with respect to how important his connections are. 
2.2 The Determinants of CEO Network Centrality  
2.2.1 CEO Career Path as Determinants of CEO Network Centrality  
     It is generally assumed that elite college attendees are more successful across their careers 
(Brand and Halaby, 2005). Moreover, common education ties play an important role in 
information transfer and sharing.
3
 Hence, it is reasonable to assume that attending an elite 
college will significantly impact the centrality of the CEO within the social network. In addition, 
a CEO could achieve a high position in the social network of business leaders through her long 
experience in the business world which enables her to develop numerous and important social 
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 Cohen et al. (2010) show that security analysts that share an educational link with the company 
achieve significant premiums associated with their stock recommendations. Shue (2011) reports 
that CEOs’ compensation increase to match with their peers after attending alumni social events 
at Harvard. Chidambaran, Kedia, and Prabhala (2010) document that social connections formed 
by education ties between CEO and board members significantly increase the probability of 






 However, one might expect that the more central individuals will get appointed to 
a CEO position faster than the less central individuals. Thus to investigate the impact of the past 
career path of the CEO prior to becoming a CEO, I use the information about her past job 
experience to indicate whether she had experience in a publicly listed firm or an unlisted private 
firm, in addition to the total number of years worked prior to becoming a CEO, if she ever 
worked in any S&P 1500 firm, and the total number of years worked in the S&P 1500 firm. 
Furthermore, multitasking in board positions at many firms can improve one’s network 
connections and network centrality. Thus, I investigate whether sitting on publicly listed boards, 
private firms, and other non-profit organizations impact the CEO network centrality, and I 
capture the importance of the board positions by specifically examining whether the CEO served 
as a member on any S&P 1500 boards. Finally, I use the first full year salary for the CEO on the 
job as an overall measure of the success of her past career path.
5
 Consequently, the first 
alternative hypothesis tested in my study is: 
H1: A successful career path measured by attending an elite university, the prior work 
experience at a public or S&P 1500 firm, the number and type of boards that the CEO sits on, 
and the first salary on the CEO job, significantly increases the CEO network centrality.  
2.2.2 CEO Personal Characteristics as Determinants of CEO Network Centrality  
     A CEO’s network position depends on the size and importance of her social connections 
which will ultimately be influenced by her personal characteristics and her ability to connect to 
others within the social network. Thus I expect that the CEO’s age will significantly help in 
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 Kaplan, Martel, and Stromberg (2004) suggest that work experience could be one possible 
explanation for how venture capital networking improves the performance of the firms. 
5
 Engelberg et al. (2009) suggest that the value created through the CEO’s social network should 




gaining CEO centrality because the older the CEO, the more connections the CEO will have due 
to her long experience and time spent in the business world.  
   Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008, and 2011) argue that overconfidence which arises from 
personal traits cause CEOs to overestimate the means of returns to their investment projects. 
They measure overconfidence by examining the option exercise decisions of CEOs. 
Overconfident CEOs tend to hold their highly in-the-money vested options rather than optimally 
sell them. Moreover, Otto (2012) documents that optimism in CEOs, which is also due to 
personal characteristics, drives CEOs to overestimate the value of their compensation claims that 
depend on positive outcomes. Those CEOs are more likely to release earnings forecasts that are 
higher from the analysts’ forecasts, and Otto (2012) uses this as a proxy for the CEO’s optimism. 
A central CEO will be able to communicate with other members of the social  network and will 
be able to discuss her decisions, which could provide the CEO with feedback and peer opinions 
that keep her informed and thus minimizes the possibility of overestimating returns to a project 
or earnings forecasts. Similarly, an overconfident or optimistic CEO may be reluctant to 
frequently connect with other executives and directors due to her own beliefs on how she expects 
to outperform the market, and hence her unwillingness to hear the other executives’ and 
directors’ more conservative opinions. Consequently, the second alternative hypothesis in my 
study is: 
H2: Personal characteristics will significantly determine the position of the CEO in the social 
network. An older CEO will gain higher CEO centrality position, while an overconfident or 




2.3 The Effect of CEO Network Centrality on Firm Valuation and Accounting 
Performance 
     Numerous studies report the positive role of firm or board network centrality in facilitating 
the access to and sharing of information about the general market and industry, and in reducing 
the information asymmetry across different connected parties within the social network.
6
 This 
enhancement in information flow will result in better managerial and corporate decisions, and 
hence will translate into better firm economic performance and higher market value.
7
 Thus, CEO 
network centrality could enhance the value of the firm and its accounting performance if the 
CEO leverages those information advantages that she gains from her central position in the social 
network.  
     On the other hand, being central in a social network could lead to gaining more power and 
influence (Mizruchi and Potts 1998; Brass and Burkhardt 1992), which could cause her to 
become more entrenched, and hence, adversely impact the quality of her corporate decisions (see 
for example Bebchuk et al. 2011; Masulis et al. 2007).
8
 Such evidence of value destruction and 
poorer board monitoring has been documented in previous research that studies the impact of 
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 Freeman (1979) and Tsai (2001) show how the importance of central positions in a network 
helps gain better access to information and knowledge transfer. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 
(2008) suggest that personal connections facilitate the information exchange among investment 
professionals.   
7
 Larcker, So, and Wang (2010) find improved economic performance in terms of higher stock 
returns and ROA when the board of the firm is highly central. Fracassi (2009) also supports the 
evidence of better accounting performance of highly central firms. Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 
(2011) document that social connections between firms and their lenders provides positive 
benefits in terms of reduced borrowing costs, improved credit ratings, and higher stock returns. 
Cai and Sevilir (2012) show that social connections across acquirers and targets in M&A’s 
reduces information asymmetries and hence results in better merger performance.   
8
 There could be other negative effects associated with information diffusion, for example Bizjak, 
Lemmon, and Whitby (2009) document negative impacts of board interlocks through the spread 




director centrality or CEO-director within firm social connections on firm’s policies and 
governance (see for example Fracassi and Tate 2012; Hwang and Kim 2009; Barnea and Guedj 
2009).  
   Ultimately, whether CEO network centrality creates or destroys the value of the firm, and 
improves or adversely impacts the accounting performance is an empirical matter, and my third 
hypothesis is as follows:
 9
 
H3: CEO network centrality will significantly impact the value of the firm and its accounting 
performance:  
H3a- Increases in CEO network centrality will increase the value of the firm and its accounting 
performance 
H3b- Increases in CEO network centrality will decrease the value of the firm and its accounting 
performance  
2.4 CEO Network Centrality and CEO Compensation  
     Based on the information advantage that the CEO possesses due to her central position in the 
social network and her ability to leverage such private information, it is reasonable to expect that 
increases in CEO network centrality will be accompanied by increases in CEO compensation. In 
fact, Engelberg et al. (2009) and Liu (2010) document such positive relation between the effect 
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 Another reason why the accounting performance may decline could be due to the busyness of 
the central CEO in serving on other boards or performing other non-profitable and social 
activities. See for example, Fich and Shivdasani (2006); Core et al. (1999) on how busy board 
members adversely impact the performance of their firms. However, Field et al. (2011) argue 




of social connections and compensation, and they explain that it doesn’t necessarily indicate that 
such increases in CEO compensation are attributed to poorer governance.  
   However, other researchers (for example Bebchuk et al. 2011) suggest that increases in CEO 
compensation when the CEO is viewed as powerful or influential, is due to the CEO’s 
entrenchment.
10
 In both cases, whether the reason behind the increase in CEO compensation is 
justifiable due to her skills, information advantage and improved performance, or unjustifiable 
because it only represents the power and influential effects of the CEO that causes her to become 
more entrenched, I expect that increases in CEO network centrality will be accompanied by 




H4: Increases in CEO network centrality are associated with increases in CEO total 
compensation.  
3. Data Sources and Sample Construction 
    I use BoardEx to obtain information about the common prior and current employment 
connections between CEOs and all executives and directors of US public firms to create the 
social network based upon which I compute the four CEO network centrality measures as 
explained in section 2.1. This network of public companies contains 12 million links formed in 
the period spanning from 1938 to 2010. The CEO network centrality measures are computed 
starting from 1996 to 2010. Then in each year, I compute percentile rankings based on the entire 
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 Bebchuk et al. (2011) measure CEO power by calculating the ratio of CEO compensation to 
the compensation of the highest 5 paid executives in the firm.  
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 In this study I do not attempt to show whether the positive relationship between CEO network 




network, but I only focus on S&P 1500 CEOs in my study due to the necessity of merging the 
data with other data sets that only covers S&P 1500 firms (for example Risk Metrics and 
Execucomp). 
     In the cross section models of determining CEO centrality, I only study CEOs who started 
their position as a CEO in S&P 1500 firms during or after 1997. This restriction is due to the 
availability of data for computing centrality measures from 1996. In those models, I use BoardEx 
to gather information about the graduate education of those CEOs, their education experience 
prior to becoming a CEO in either public or private firms, and if they ever served on public, 
private, or other (non-profitable) boards. I also use Risk Metrics to search for whether the CEOs 
sat on other S&P 1500 firm boards. Another restriction in such cross section models of 
determining CEO centrality is to keep the CEO’s first S&P 1500 job, i.e. if the CEO moves to 
another CEO position during the sample period, I only keep the first CEO position.  Finally I use 
Execucomp to get data about the first full year salary on the CEO job. This cross section analysis 
contains data about 3033 different CEOs in 1964 firms.     
     In panel regressions where I study the impact of CEO centrality on firm value, accounting 
performance, and CEO compensation, I utilize the sample of all S&P 1500 CEOs during the 
period spanning from 2000-2009, and I use Compustat to get the firms’ financial data. I also 
restrict the sample to only include years when the CEO acted in full, and when the CEO 
remained the same in the next year, due to the necessity of using time lags in the models. My 
final sample used in those panel regressions consist of 3230 different S&P 1500 CEOs, in 2130 
firms, and 13082 firm year observations. Table 1 displays statistics on the centrality variables, 




observations. It is noticeable that S&P 1500 CEOs are considered highly central in the network 
of all US publicly listed executives and directors. The median of CEO network centrality when 
expressed in percentiles is 73, 79, 84, and 78 when using Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and 
Eigenvector as measures of CEO Network centrality, respectively. Furthermore, the 25
th
 
percentile is about 59 and the 75
th
 percentile is about 91.  
4. Empirical Evidence 
4.1 Determinants of CEO Network Centrality  
4.1.1 Career Path  
     To test the first hypothesis related to the impact of CEO career path on determining CEO 
network centrality, I run cross section regressions of CEOs, where the dependent variable is the 
CEO’s centrality, and the independent variables include measures of CEO prior career path. 
Those cross sections include CEOs who started their job as CEOs in S&P 1500 firms during or 
after 1997. If the CEO switched her job during the sample period to another S&P 1500 firm, I 
only keep the first time she became a CEO. All independent variables are measured one year 
before the CEO started her first job. The results of this model are presented in Table 2. CEO 
network centrality is measured by Closeness in panel A, Degree in panel B, Betweenness in 
panel C, and Eigenvector in panel D. In each of the models 1 – 8, I study the effect of each of the 
elements of the prior career path individually on CEO network centrality, and then in model 9, I 
include all the elements together. In column 1, I include the variable Elite as a measure of the 
prestigious status of the university or college that the CEO attended during undergraduate and 




League universities and zero otherwise.
12
 Using all measures of centrality, Elite is highly 
significant and positive i.e. if the CEO attended one of those Elite schools, then she will have 
higher centrality in the social network. In model 2, I include the variable Listed Work 
Experience, which is a dummy that equals 1 if the CEO had prior work experience in any 
publicly listed firm and zero otherwise, and I include the variable Yrs Work Experience which is 
a variable that presents the total number of years of experience in the listed firm. Using all 
centrality measures, Listed Work Experience is positive and significant, while Yrs Work 
Experience is negative and significant. This suggests that having experience in a publicly listed 
firm indeed increases the possibility of developing social connections with other executives and 
directors of public firms, hence will increase the centrality of the CEO in the social network. But 
the longer it takes for this individual to start her first job as a CEO, the less socially connected 
this individual could be. To measure the relative importance of the past job experience, in 
column 3, I include the variable S&P Work Experience, which is a dummy that equals 1 if the 
CEO had prior work experience in any S&P 1500 firms, and zero otherwise, and Yrs S&P Work 
Experience which is the total number of years worked in S&P 1500 firms prior to becoming a 
CEO. The results show that having specific S&P 1500 work experience is not so significant in 
determining CEO centrality (only significant when using Degree in panel B, and Betweenness in 
panel D), but similar to the results of experience in any listed firm, the longer the time spent in 
S&P firm before becoming a CEO, the less central the CEO is. In models 4, 5, and 6, I use the 
variables Public Board Seats, Private Board Seats, and Non-Profit Board Seats to measure the 
total number of any public, private, and other non-profit boards that the CEO served on. Using 
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 The Ivy League members are: Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University, 
Dartmouth College, Harvard University, Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, and 




all centrality measures, serving on more public, private, and non-profit boards, is associated with 
an increase in CEO network centrality. Furthermore, to measure the importance of the board that 
the CEO served on before becoming a CEO, I use the dummy variable S&P Board Seat, which 
equals 1 if the CEO served on any S&P 1500 board seat and 0 otherwise, and the variable Total 
S&P Board Seats, to present the total number of other S&P 1500 board seats. Both variables are 
significant and positive indicating the importance of sitting on S&P 1500 board in determining 
CEO network centrality. In model 8, I use the variable Salary which is the log of the CEO’s total 
compensation for the first full year on the CEO job to measure her overall success in the prior 
career path. Salary is significant and positive in all specifications, indicating that indeed, the 
success in prior career path increases the CEO’s position in the network. Finally, in column 9, I 
include all the elements of the career path and I find that attending an elite school during 
education (Elite) , having experience in a publicly listed firm (Listed Work Experience), serving 
on the board of a publicly listed firm (Public Board Seats), serving on the board of S&P 1500 
firms (S&P Board Seat), and receiving a high total compensation for the first year acting on the 
CEO job (Salary) are all positive and significant determinants of CEO network centrality. This 
confirms the first hypothesis; CEO career path significantly determines CEO network centrality. 
Moreover, the longer the time it takes for the CEO to become a CEO, the less central this CEO 
is, and this is significant when using Degree, Betweenness and Eigenvector as measures of CEO 
network centrality.   
4.1.2 Personal Characteristics 
     To test hypothesis 2 regarding the impact of personal characteristics on determining CEO 




but I use measures of personal characteristics as independent variables. The results are presented 
in Table 3. Centrality is measured using Closeness in Panel A, Degree in Panel B, Betweenness 
in Panel C, and Eigenvector in Panel D. In columns 1–3, I study the impact of each of the 
personal characteristics separately, and in model 4, I include them all in one specification. In 
column 1, I use the Age of the CEO, one year before she gets appointed as a CEO, and I find that 
the coefficient is positive using all measures of centrality, and significant in 3 out of 4 measures. 
In column 2, I follow Campbell et al. (2010) methodology in computing Malmendier and Tate’s 
(2005) measure of CEO overconfidence based on her stock option holding and exercising 
decisions, and use a dummy variable M&T Overconfidence that equals 1 if the CEO is 
overconfident and zero otherwise. In column 3, I employ Otto’s (2012) measure of optimism, 
which compares the earnings per share that were forecasted by the CEO and the earnings per 
share that were eventually realized. Ottos’s optimism represents a fraction of the earnings 
forecasts that were higher than the actual EPS during the year. This variable takes the value 
between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates that all EPS forecast were lower than the actual EPS and 1 
represents the more optimistic view of earnings forecasts that are higher than the actual EPS. 
Both measures of overconfidence and optimism are highly significant and negative, providing 
evidence supporting the second hypothesis. Finally, in column 4, I include all measures of 
personal characteristics and they remain to be significant with the expected sign (except for Age 
in Panel D, which becomes insignificant when using Eigenvector as a measure of CEO network 






4.1.3 CEO Career and Personal Characteristics 
     In Table 4, I include the entire career and personal independent measures that were tested 
separately in Tables 2 and 3 in one model to test for the overall determinants of CEO network 
centrality. The results are displayed when using Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and 
Eigenvector as measures of centrality in Columns 1-4, respectively. In this specification, 
attending an Elite college, having prior experience in a listed firm, serving on the boards of 
public firms, serving specifically on a board of S&P firm, and having a higher salary indicating 
an overall more successful prior career, significantly positively increases CEO network 
centrality. The longer the time spent in the career path working in S&P firms before getting 
appointed as CEO for S&P 1500 firm, and the more overconfident or optimistic the individual is, 
the less central she is in the social network of all executives and directors of public US 
companies.  
4.2 The Effect of CEO Network Centrality on Firm Valuation and Accounting 
Performance 
4.2.1 The Effect on Firm Valuation  
     To examine the effect of CEO network centrality on firm valuation, I use Tobin’s Q as a 
measure of the market valuation and I run the following panel of OLS regressions using robust 
standard errors that are clustered at the firm level, and including year fixed effects: 
      TQt = a + B1Centralityt-1 + B2TQt-1 + B3Sizet-1 + B4Profitabilityt-1 + B5Leveraget-1 + B6Capital 




     The dependent variable TQt is the industry adjusted Tobin’s Q, calculated by subtracting the 
industry median Tobin’s Q based on four digits SIC industry code for all Compustat firms. 
Tobin’s Q is the market to book ratio of the firm ,where the market value is measured by 
multiplying the stock price at the end of the fiscal year by the number of shares outstanding, plus 
the book value of total asset, less the book value of equity, and less the amount of deferred taxes 
, Centralityt-1 is the CEO network centrality expressed in percentiles and as defined in section 
2.1, Profitabilityt-1 is the operating income divided by total assets, Sizet-1 is the log of total assets, 
Leveraget-1 is the ratio of total debt to total equity, Capital Investmentt-1 is the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets, and Investment in Innovationt-1 is the ratio of research and 
development expenses to total assets. When the R&D expense is missing, the Investment in 
Innovation is set to zero, and a dummy R&D Missing is set to equal 1. This panel only includes 
CEOs who remain to be the same in the following year due to using time lags; all independent 
variables are lagged one year.  
   The results of this model are included in Table 5. CEO network centrality is measured using 
Closeness in models 1 and 2, Degree in models 3 and 4, Betweenness in models 5 and 6, and 
Eigenvector in models 7 and 8. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 display the results of running model (1). 
Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 display the results of model (1) but after controlling for Centrality^ which 
is the predicted value of centrality as determined in the model of CEO determinants (computed 
using models presented in Table 4 section 4.1.3). The reason why I include Centrality^ is 
because I want to control for the CEO network centrality that is determined one year before 
starting the CEO job and hence is not directly related to the company related factors effecting 
CEO network centrality, and then studying the impact of current CEO network centrality on 




centrality for the CEOs who were CEOs in their companies before 1997, I predict the CEO 
network centrality for them based on one year before the sample starts.  
   In all models 1-8, CEO network centrality is significant and positive indicating that increases 
in CEO network centrality, increases the firm’s market to book ratio. This evidence supports 
alternative hypothesis H3a. The CEO can leverage on the information advantages gained through 





  Next, I repeat the analysis of Table 5 but after controlling for governance factors that are known 
in the literature to impact the firm’s valuation. Faleye et al. (2011) show that intensive 
monitoring boards (when the majority of the board is represented by independent members that 
serve on at least two of the three principal monitoring committees) could adversely impair 
corporate innovation and hence adversely impact the firm’s success and value. Yermack (1996) 
documents that smaller boards are generally associated with higher market valuation. Bebchuk et 
al. (2009) show that firms with higher entrenchment index (constructed by adding 1 for the 
following six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison 
pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments ) 
are value destructive , higher ownership concentration in the form of block holdings (above 5%) 
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 Another possible reason could be due to the increased in riskiness of CEO investment 
strategies which results in higher Tobin’s Q that proxies for investment and growth 
opportunities. Currently I do not specifically test for this assumption.  
14
 El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik (2012) show that CEO network centrality in bidders lead to 
value-destroying acquisitions, hence supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. 
However, it is important to note that the authors first show how those bidders are extremely 
highly central, so they do not represent the average normal CEO network centrality.  Moreover, 
in M&A context, the general outcome for bidders is negative, and hence the CEOs who are 
conducting those acquisitions are self selecting themselves to being bidders knowing the ultimate 
negative outcome of bidders. Thus this evidence relates to excessive centralities that are 




or greater share of CEO ownership is generally associated with improved monitoring and hence 
improved market valuation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), though high CEO ownership can also 
facilitate entrenchment thus reducing market valuation (Morck et al., 1988). On the other hand, 
CEO-Chairman duality leads to greater extraction of rents from shareholders (Bebchuk and 
Cohen, 2005) thus reducing market valuation. CEO age can have both positive (Milbourn, 2003) 
or detrimental (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998) effect on the quality of managerial decisions and 
market values.  
     The results are reported in Table 6. In those models where I control for governance, the 
sample drops to 2780 different CEOs, in 1913 different firms, and 10951 firm year observations 
due to some missing data items.
15
 Intense_Monitoring is a dummy variable that equals 1 if more 
than 50% of the board directors are classified as intense monitors and zero otherwise. An 
intensive monitor is an independent director who serves on both the audit and compensation 
committee (Faleye et al., 2011). Small_Board is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the board size 
is less than 8 and zero otherwise. CEO_not_Chairman is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
CEO is not the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. Low_Eindex is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell’s entrenchment index (2009)
 
 is less than 3 and zero 
otherwise. Older_CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO’s age is above the sample 
median and zero otherwise. Block_Ownership is a dummy variable that equals one if there is at 
least one block holder that owns 5% or more of the common shares outstanding and zero 
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 I use a name matching algorithm to match the CEOs as reported in BoardEx to names of 
executives and directors in Risk Metrics and obtain the governance data. Furthermore, I 
manually search for any unmatched CEOs to ensure the accuracy of the matching program. I 
finally fill in any missing values if available in Execucomp (for example title of CEO to 




otherwise. High_CEO_Ownership is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the percentage of shares 
owned by the CEO is higher than the sample median.  
     The results of Table 6 confirm the positive effect of CEO network centrality on Industry 
adjusted Tobin’s Q after controlling for governance, although when using Eigenvector as a 
measure of centrality in columns 7 and 8, the CEO network centrality loses its statistical 
significance.  
4.2.2 The Effect on Accounting Performance 
     To study the effect of CEO network centrality on the firm’s accounting performance, I use 
return on assets as a measure of the accounting performance and I run the following panel of 
OLS regressions using robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm level, and including 
year fixed effects: 
      ROAt = a + B1Centralityt-1 + B2Sizet-1 + B3Leveraget-1 + B4Capital Investmentt-1 + 
B5Investment in Innovationt-1 + B6R&D Missing + et                                                               (2) 
ROAt is the industry adjusted ROA that is formed by subtracting the industry median based on 
the four digits SIC code for all Compustat firms. Return on assets is the operating income 
divided by total assets. All other variables are as previously defined and are lagged one period.  
     The results of this model are presented in Table 7. CEO network centrality is measured by 
Closeness in columns 1 and 2, Degree in columns 3 and 4, Betweenness in columns 5 and 6, and 
Eigenvector in columns 7 and 8. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 display the results of model (2) but after 
controlling for Centrality^ which is as previously explained in section 4.1.2. In models 1, 3, 5, 




However, the coefficient on CEO network centrality loses significance when controlling for 
Centrality^ in models 2, 4 , 6, and 8. Centrality^ on the other hand is positive and significant in 
all those models. This evidence can be explained by the fact that the accounting data, compared 
to market stock prices, does not timely reflect the values of  current information possessed by the 
central CEOs, and it just picks up the initial values of CEO network centrality.
16
 Hence after 
controlling for those initial values, the CEO network centrality loses its statistical significance.  
     Table 8 repeats the analysis presented in Table 7 but with additional controls for governance. 
The results are very similar to the ones in Table 7. The Coefficient on CEO Network Centrality 
remains positive and statistically significant in models 1, 3, 5, and 7, and loses statistical 
significance after controlling for Centrality^ except when using Degree in column 4, the 
Centrality variable remains to be significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on 
Intense_Monitoring is positive and significant while it was negative and significant in Table 6 
when studying the impact on Tobin’s Q. This suggests that intensive monitors improve the 
accounting performance of the firms due to their effective monitoring but this also reduces the 
firm’s innovation and growth opportunities, thus reducing Tobin’s Q. Moreover, other effective 
controls like separating the CEO from the Chairman position and having block ownership 
improves the accounting performance as well. While higher CEO ownership decreases 
accounting performance indicating that high CEO ownership could result in sub-optimal 
decisions due to managerial entrenchment.  
4.3 The Effect of CEO Network Centrality on CEO Compensation 
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 Another possible reason that could mitigate the positive impact of CEO network centrality on 
ROA is that the CEOs could be busy in trying to maintain their social networks and fulfilling 
their social obligations, hence this might be an opportunity cost that impairs their corporate 




4.3.1 Total Compensation  
        To explore the effect of CEO network centrality on CEO total compensation, I use the log 
of the sum of salary, bonus, and restricted stock grants (data item tdc1as reported in Execucomp) 
and I run the following panel of OLS regressions using robust standard errors that are clustered 
at the firm level, and including year and industry dummies: 
      Total Compensationt = a + B1Centralityt-1 + B2Sizet-1 + B3Profitabilityt-1 + B4Leveraget-1 + 
B5Capital Investmentt-1 + B6Investment in Innovationt-1 + B7R&D Missing + et                      (3) 
     The results of this estimation are reported in Table 9. CEO network centrality is measured 
using Closeness in models 1 and 2, Degree in models 3 and 4, Betweenness in models 5 and 6, 
and Eigenvector in models 7 and 8. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 display the results of testing the 
model (3) above. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 display the results of model (3) but after controlling for 
Centrality^ which is the predicted value of centrality as estimated in the model of CEO 
determinants (Table 4 section 4.1.3) but without using Salary as one of the determinants of CEO 
network centrality. The coefficient on CEO network centrality is highly significant (at the 1% 
level) and positive in all models. This evidence supports hypothesis H4. An increase in CEO 
network centrality is associated with increases in CEO total compensation. All other control 
variables that impact CEO total compensation have the expected sign and are statistically 
significant. CEOs who run larger, more profitable, capital intensive and innovated firms 
command statistically higher CEO total compensation. While CEO’s total compensation is 
insignificantly related to the degree of firm’s leverage. The results of CEO centrality and 
controls hold after controlling for governance in Table 10. Furthermore, more effective 




entrenchment as measured by the entrenchment index (Low_Entrenchment), presence of 
ownership of more than 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares (Block_Ownership) significantly 
decrease the CEO total compensation.  
    4.3.2 Incentive Compensation  
     To present more evidence related to the effect of CEO network centrality on CEO 
compensation, I repeat the analysis done in (4) using equity compensation as the dependent 
variable.  If the CEO command higher compensation due to the information advantages that she 
possesses from being central in the social network, then this positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and CEO network centrality should be significant also when using only the equity 
component of the CEO compensation as a measure of incentive compensation. To study such 
relationship, I use the ratio of the sum of the value of restricted shares granted (rstkgrnt in 
Execucomp) and the Black-Scholes value of options granted ( option_award_blk in Execucomp) 
to the total compensation as a measure of equity compensation. The results are presented in 
Table 11. Using Closeness in columns 1 and 2, Degree in columns 3 and 4, Betweenness in 
columns 5 and 6, and Eigenvector in columns 7 and 8, increases in CEO network centrality, 
significantly increases the CEO’s equity compensation. The difference in the results between 
using CEO total compensation and CEO incentive compensation lies in Centrality^. Centrality^ 
is positive and statistically significant in 2 out of the 4 models when using equity compensation 
compared to being statistically insignificant in models of total compensation (Tables 9 and 10). 
This is an indication of how the centrality that comes from determinants that are not related to 
the CEO’s current job (prior education ties, career paths, and personal traits) command high 




information that is not company specific. However, increases in CEO network centrality after 
becoming a CEO is related to both performance and social factors that commands an increase not 
only in equity compensation, but also in total compensation. The results reported in Table 11 are 
robust and very similar to the results in Table 12 after including controls for measures of 
effective governance. The measures of effective governance also have similar impact on 
incentive compensation as on total compensation. 
4.3.3 CEO Pay Slice     
      Bebchuck et al. (2011) compute how much of the total compensation that is paid to the top 
five executives in the firm is awarded to the CEO and refer to it as the CEO pay slice. They 
argue that the higher CEO pay slice is not only a consequence of the higher importance of the 
CEO, but also the higher entrenchment of that CEO and thus indicates presence of agency 
problems in the firm. To investigate whether the CEO network centrality is related to such 
measure of CEO pay slice, I utilize a model similar to model (3) and use the CEO pay slice as 
the dependent variable. The results of this estimation are presented in Table 13. CEO network 
centrality is computed using Closeness in models 1 and 2, Degree in models 3 and 4, 
Betweenness in models 5 and 6, and Eigenvector in models 7 and 8. The coefficient on CEO 
network centrality is positive and significant in all 8 models. Hence, higher CEO network 
centrality commands higher CEO pay slice.
17
 Results of Table 13 are robust and similar after 
controlling for measures of effective governance in Table 14. Moreover, Intense_Monitoring, 
CEO_not_Chairman, Low_Entrenchment, and Block_Ownership have the expected significant 
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 This could be due to the importance of the CEO due to her social status and information 
advantages, or due to the entrenchment of the CEO, but I currently do not disentangle those two 





negative sign. Hence, effective governance mechanisms decrease the share of the total 
compensation that goes to the CEO, and distributes it more evenly across the top 5 executives.  
4.3.4 Pay-Performance Sensitivity  
     As a final investigation of the impact of CEO network centrality on compensation, I model 
the impact of CEO network centrality on the CEO’s pay sensitivity to performance. I employ 
Edman’s et al. (2009) scaled measure of pay-performance sensitivity which measures the dollar 
change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value scaled by total compensation.
18
 A 
positive coefficient on CEO network centrality will suggest that higher CEO network centrality 
is associated with CEO’s pay that is more sensitive to performance. 
     The results are presented in Table 15. This panel of OLS regressions include 12272 firm year 
observations representing 3041 different CEOs in 2050 different firms due to the matching of the 
data with Edman’s et al. (2009) scaled measure of pay-performance sensitivity.
19
 I use the log of 
the scaled measure of pay for performance sensitivity as the dependent variable. CEO network 
centrality is measured using Closeness in columns 1 and 2, Degree in columns 3 and 4, 
Betweenness in columns 5 and 6, and Eigenvector in columns 7 and 8. In all models, the impact 
of CEO network centrality on the scaled measure of pay-performance sensitivity is negative and 
statistically significant. This effect also applies to the Centrality^ which is measured before the 
CEO starts her job as CEO. This could refer to the power that the CEO in fact gains from being 
central in the social network and hence makes her wealth insensitive to performance. When 
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 There are other ways of computing pay for performance sensitivity, see for example Jensen and 
Murphy (1990), Hall and Liebman (1998). I use this measure because it is independent of firm 
size. 
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controlling for effective governance measure in Table 16, the results are very similar. The 
governance mechanisms that seem to be effective in making the CEO more sensitive to 
performance are small board size and block ownership. Ultimately, the pay of a CEO who has 
lower entrenchment index will be more sensitive to performance, as well as the CEO that has 
high common stock ownership.  
5. Conclusion 
    Using data provided in BoardEx on the common prior and current employment connections of 
executives and directors of US public companies, I first compute four measures of CEO network 
centrality: Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector, and then utilize the other data  
provided by BoardEx on education; experience in listed, unlisted, and S&P 1500 firms; board 
memberships in public, private, and non-profit boards; and CEO age, as well as data in Risk 
Metrics on memberships in boards of S&P 1500 firms, data in Execucomp related to the first full 
salary of the CEO on the job, and common measures of CEO overconfidence and CEO optimism 
to identify the determinants of CEO network centrality.  
     I find that attending one of the “elite” universities, having prior experience in publicly listed 
firms, serving on the boards of publicly listed firms, serving on the boards of S&P 1500 firms, as 
well as being more successful in the past career path, measured by the first salary received by the 
CEO on the job, increases CEO network centrality. Conversely, spending longer period in the 
career path before being appointed as CEO, being overconfident or optimistic, reduces the CEO 
network centrality. 
     After understanding the main determinants of CEO network centrality before the CEO starts 




market to book ratio, the accounting performance measured by ROA, and the CEO compensation 
measured by total compensation, equity based compensation, the CEO pay slice, and the scaled 
measured of pay-performance sensitivity. I find that higher CEO centrality is associated with 
significantly higher firm market values, insignificantly higher ROA, and significantly higher 
CEO compensation. Furthermore, higher CEO network centrality reduces the sensitivity of the 
CEO’s pay to performance.  
        Overall this paper is considered one of the few studies that focus on computing CEO 
network centrality rather than simply focusing on bilateral social connections within or across 
executives and directors of US firms. Those measures of CEO network centrality provide an 
indication of the CEO’s overall connectedness to the entire social network of executives and 
directors. Moreover, this research is considered one of the first studies that analyze the 
determinants of CEO network centrality and then explores the impact of such CEO network 
centrality on firm’s valuation and performance. Areas for future research include investigation of 
the possible costs arising from CEO network centrality when the CEO rise in network power;  
such as exploring changes in operating performance, spending on innovation, and different 
investment patterns. Finally, another area for future research includes studying the effect of 
board constraints and corporate governance such as board size, block ownership, intensive board 
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Table 1 : Summary Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for key variables used in the panel regressions. Those panel 
regressions represent 3230 different S&P 1500 CEOs, in 2130 firms, and 13082 firm year obs. The 
statistics are presented for the centrality variables in panel A, and centrality percentiles in panel B (as 
defined in section 2.1). Panel C includes statistics on key financial variables. TQ industry adjusted is the 
four digit SIC industry adjusted Tobin’s Q formed by subtracting the industry median for all Compustat 
firms. Tobin’s Q is the market to book ratio of the firm, where the market value is measured by 
multiplying the stock price at the end of the fiscal year by the number of shares outstanding, plus the book 
value of total assets, less the book value of equity, and less the amount of deferred taxes . ROA industry 
adjusted is the four digit SIC industry adjusted ROA formed by subtracting the industry median for all 
Compustat firms. ROA is the ratio of operating income to average total assets. Size is the log of total 
assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity. Capital Investment is the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets. Investment in Innovation is the ratio of research and development expenses to 
total assets. Panel D includes statistics on compensation variables; Log Total Compensation is the log of 
total compensation (tdc1 in Execucomp) which includes salary, bonus, and value of restricted stock 
grants. Equity Based Compensation is the ratio of total equity compensation to total compensation. Total 
equity compensation is the sum of the value of the restricted shares granted (rstkgrnt in Execucomp) and 
the Black-Scholes value of options granted (option_awards_blk in Execucomp). CEO Pay Slice is 
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer’s (2011) ratio of CEO total compensation to the sum of 5 top executives’ 
total compensation, where total compensation is TDC1 as reported in Execucomp.   
 







Panel A : Centrality Variables 
Closeness 0.2901 0.2884 0.0379 0.2685 0.3098 
Degree 0.0006 0.0003 8.32E-04 0.0001 0.0007 
Betweenness 0.0001 1.56E-05 1.99E-04 7.71E-07 0.0001 
Eigenvector 5.73E-04 7.99E-06 0.0038 9.50E-07 0.0001 
Panel B: Centrality Percentiles 
Closeness 68 73 21.7995 54 86 
Degree 72 79 24.0320 55 93 
Betweenness 76 84 24.6391 66 94 
Eigenvector 74 78 21.3088 60 92 
Panel C: Financial Variables 
    
TQ industry adjusted 1.3851 1.2567 0.4610 1.0603 1.5911 
ROA industry adjusted 0.0303 0.0445 0.0790 0.0180 0.0723 
Size 7.6317 7.5006 1.6912 6.4093 8.7634 
Leverage 0.7915 0.4842 0.9310 0.1008 1.0630 
Capital Investment 0.2258 0.1867 0.1683 0.1107 0.3036 
Investment in 
Innovation 
0.0257 0.0000 0.0481 0.0000 0.0297 
Panel D : Compensation Variables 
Log Total 
Compensation 
7.986238 8.008774 1.210514 7.259635 8.739785 
Equity Based  
Compensation 
.2594974 0 .460023 0 .5233691 








Table 2 : Determinants of CEO Network Centrality – CEO Career 
Table 2 reports results of cross sectional regressions of CEO centrality on variables capturing CEO career paths, past success, and other work 
related determinants. This sample includes S&P 1500 CEOs who started their job as a CEO during or after 1997. CEO centrality is measured using 
Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector centrality in panels A, B, C, and D, respectively. Independent variables include Elite, a dummy 
equal to 1 if a CEO attended Ivy League universities and 0 otherwise ; Listed Work Experience, a dummy equal to1 if the CEO had experience in a 
publicly listed firm and 0 otherwise; Yrs Listed Work Experience, the total number of years a CEO had worked in listed firms; S&P Work 
Experience, a dummy equal to 1 if a CEO had work experience in an S&P 1500 firm and 0 otherwise; Yrs S&P Work Experience, the total number 
of years a CEO had worked in any S&P 1500 firms; Public Board Seats, the total number of directorship in listed companies; Private Board Seats, 
the total number of directorship in unlisted companies; Non-Profit Board Seats, the total number of directorship in non-profit organizations; S&P 
Board Seat, a dummy equal to 1 if the CEO sat on an S&P 1500 board and 0 otherwise; Total S&P Board Seats, the total number of directorships in 
S&P 1500 companies. All work experience measures are taken one year before the CEO receives her first CEO appointment. Lastly, as an overall 
measure of CEO’s prior career success, Salary is the log of the cash salary for her first full year on the CEO job. P-values are in parentheses. 
Panel A – Closeness (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Elite 0.0591*** 




       
(0.005) 
Listed Work Experience 
 
0.0881*** 




      
(0.089) 
Yrs Listed Work Experience 
 
-0.0061*** 




      
(0.288) 
S&P Work Experience 
  
0.0295 
     
-0.0126 
   
(0.551) 
     
(0.783) 
Yrs S&P Work Experience 
  
-0.0028** 
     
-0.0037 
   
(0.027) 
     
(0.174) 
Public Board Seats 
   
0.0440*** 
    
0.0309*** 
    
(0.000) 
    
(0.000) 
Private Board Seats 
    
0.0131*** 
   
-0.0009 
     
(0.000) 
   
(0.591) 
Non-Profit Board Seats 








S&P Board Seat 








Total S&P Board Seats 
















       
0.0319*** 0.0248*** 
        
(0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.6508*** 0.6822*** 0.6295*** 0.5723*** 0.5723*** 0.5723*** 0.6433*** 0.5195*** 0.4777*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 
Adjusted R
2
 0.008 0.017 0.008 0.090 0.026 0.007 0.089 0.040 0.166 
             Panel B- Degree                          (1)                      (2)                      (3)                     (4)                     (5)                     (6)                     (7)                      (8)                    (9)  
Elite 0.0770*** 0.0494*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Listed Work Experience 0.1089*** 0.0302** 
(0.000) (0.028) 
Yrs Listed Work Experience -0.0058*** -0.0005 
(0.000) (0.853) 
S&P Work Experience 0.0883 0.0300 
(0.170) (0.616) 
Yrs S&P Work Experience -0.0018 -0.0062** 
(0.159) (0.017) 
Public Board Seats 0.0504*** 0.0274*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Private Board Seats 0.0159*** 0.0007 
(0.000) (0.617) 
Non-Profit Board Seats 0.0727*** 0.0106 
(0.001) (0.584) 
S&P Board Seat 0.1645*** 0.1424*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Total S&P Board Seats 0.0363*** 0.0147*** 
(0.000) (0.009) 









Constant 0.6904*** 0.7194*** 0.6105*** 0.5889*** 0.5889*** 0.5889*** 0.6520*** 0.4913*** 0.3751*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 
Adjusted R
2
 0.008 0.019 0.006 0.099 0.032 0.008 0.133 0.057 0.214 
 
Panel C - Betweenness (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Elite 0.0822*** 0.0544*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Listed Work Experience 0.1455*** 0.0618*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Yrs Listed Work Experience -0.0047*** 0.0012 
(0.009) (0.567) 
S&P Work Experience 0.1722** 0.1143* 
(0.017) (0.091) 
Yrs S&P Work Experience 0.0007 -0.0070*** 
(0.713) (0.004) 
Public Board Seats 0.0553*** 0.0321*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Private Board Seats 0.0170*** 0.0003 
(0.000) (0.835) 
Non-Profit Board Seats 0.0666*** 0.0026 
(0.004) (0.887) 
S&P Board Seat 0.1795*** 0.1581*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Total S&P Board Seats 0.0282*** -0.0000 
(0.000) (0.998) 
Salary 0.0224*** 0.0146*** 
(0.001) (0.005) 
Constant 0.7039*** 0.7264*** 0.5338*** 0.6221*** 0.6221*** 0.6221*** 0.6654*** 0.5358*** 0.3457*** 








N 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 
Adjusted R
2
 0.006 0.027 0.006 0.089 0.026 0.004 0.104 0.024 0.163 
 
Panel D - Eigenvector (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Elite 0.0565*** 0.0400*** 
(0.000) (0.002) 
Listed Work Experience 0.0735*** 0.0185 
(0.000) (0.147) 
Yrs Listed Work Experience -0.0054*** -0.0015 
(0.000) (0.494) 
S&P Work Experience 0.0018 -0.0380 
(0.971) (0.432) 
Yrs S&P Work Experience -0.0027** -0.0046** 
(0.024) (0.047) 
Public Board Seats 0.0324*** 0.0178*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Private Board Seats 0.0086*** -0.0017 
(0.000) (0.275) 
Non-Profit Board Seats 0.0570*** 0.0182 
(0.002) (0.295) 
S&P Board Seat 0.1178*** 0.1041*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Total S&P Board Seats 0.0263*** 0.0146*** 
(0.000) (0.005) 
Salary 0.0214*** 0.0152*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Constant 0.7289*** 0.7510*** 0.7352*** 0.6863*** 0.6863*** 0.6863*** 0.7150*** 0.5920*** 0.5870*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 
Adjusted R
2




Table 3  : Determinants of CEO Network Centrality - Personal Characteristics 
 
Table 3 reports cross sectional regressions of CEO centrality on variables capturing the personal 
characteristics of CEOs. CEO centrality is measured using Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and 
Eigenvector centrality in Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively. Independent variables include Age, 
CEO’s age one year before her first CEO appointment; M&T Overconfidence, the Malmendier and 
Tate (2005) measure, Otto Optimism, the Otto (2012) measure. Both M&T Overconfidence and Otto 
Optimism measures are explained in section 4.1.2. P-values are in parentheses. 
Panel A - Closeness (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.002*** 0.001** 
(0.001) (0.012) 
M&T Overconfidence -0.051*** -0.050*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Otto Optimism -0.048*** -0.047*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.572*** 0.620*** 0.638*** 0.538*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 
Adjusted R
2
 0.004 0.023 0.033 0.047 
Panel B : Degree (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.003*** 0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
M&T Overconfidence -0.034*** -0.034*** 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Otto Optimism -0.032** -0.033** 
(0.022) (0.022) 
Constant 0.568*** 0.652*** 0.678*** 0.533*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 
Adjusted R
2
 0.007 0.020 0.024 0.039 
Panel C - Betweenness (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.004*** 0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
M&T Overconfidence -0.034** -0.036** 
(0.023) (0.016) 
Otto Optimism -0.015 -0.015 
(0.367) (0.365) 
Constant 0.524*** 0.672*** 0.698*** 0.496*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 
Adjusted R
2





Panel D - Eigenvector (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.001 0.000 
(0.162) (0.563) 
M&T Overconfidence -0.040*** -0.038*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Otto Optimism -0.048*** -0.048*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.703*** 0.696*** 0.713*** 0.670*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 
Adjusted R
2
 0.001 0.021 0.031 0.042 
 












































Table 4 : Determinants of CEO Network Centrality – 
CEO Career and Personal Characteristics 
Table 4 reports cross sectional regressions of CEO centrality on variables capturing both the 
CEO career and personal characteristics. CEO centrality is measured using Closeness, Degree, 
Betweenness, and Eigenvector centrality in models 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. All independent 
variables are as previously defined. P-values are in parentheses.  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Elite 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.055*** 0.041*** 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Listed Work Experience 0.022* 0.029** 0.061*** 0.018 
 
(0.093) (0.031) (0.000) (0.149) 
Yrs Listed Work Experience -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.000 
(0.570) (0.808) (0.368) (0.994) 
S&P Work Experience -0.037 0.006 0.099 -0.066 
(0.426) (0.919) (0.143) (0.173) 
Yrs S&P Work Experience -0.005* -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005** 
(0.082) (0.006) (0.003) (0.014) 
Public Board Seats 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.016*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Board Seats -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
(0.712) (0.495) (0.828) (0.440) 
Non-Profit Board Seats 0.021 0.008 -0.001 0.016 
 
(0.236) (0.678) (0.976) (0.383) 
S&P Board Seat 0.099*** 0.141*** 0.157*** 0.103*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total S&P Board Seats 0.010 0.018*** 0.002 0.019*** 
(0.106) (0.002) (0.791) (0.001) 
Salary 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.012** 0.012*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.004) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001** 
(0.295) (0.300) (0.900) (0.017) 
M&T Overconfidence -0.039*** -0.023** -0.034** -0.031*** 
(0.000) (0.034) (0.013) (0.003) 
Otto Optimism -0.041*** -0.025** -0.006 -0.043*** 
(0.001) (0.049) (0.696) (0.000) 
Constant 0.533*** 0.429*** 0.354*** 0.681*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 
Adjusted R
2
 0.188 0.225 0.167 0.157 






Table 5: Effect of CEO Network Centrality on Firm Valuation 
Panel regressions of industry adjusted Tobin’s Q on CEO centrality levels are presented in Table 5. Industry adjusted Tobin’s Q is the four digit SIC industry 
adjusted Tobin’s Q formed by subtracting the industry median for all Compustat firms. Centrality is measured by Closeness in models 1 and 2, Degree in models 
3 and 4, Betweenness in models 5 and 6, and Eigenvector in models 7 and 8. Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 include Centrality
^ 
which is the predicted value of centrality as 
a result of running the cross regression of all CEO determinants (models 1-4 in Table 4) on CEO centrality one year before her first appointment as CEO. If the 
CEO was appointed before 1997, then her centrality and all independent variables are measured one year before the sample starts. All other variables are as 
previously defined and are lagged one period. All models include year dummies. P-values are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm level.  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Centrality 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.032** 0.031* 
 




















TQ Industry Adjusted t-1 0.653*** 0.653*** 0.654*** 0.654*** 0.654*** 0.654*** 0.654*** 0.654*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Profitability 0.072 0.072 0.070 0.070 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.067 
 
(0.100) (0.100) (0.108) (0.108) (0.114) (0.114) (0.121) (0.121) 
Leverage -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) 
Capital Investment -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 
 
(0.377) (0.352) (0.442) (0.421) (0.495) (0.480) (0.427) (0.424) 
Investment in Innovation 0.625*** 0.624*** 0.623*** 0.622*** 0.643*** 0.643*** 0.631*** 0.632*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Missing -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.577*** 0.583*** 0.585*** 0.590*** 0.576*** 0.581*** 0.581*** 0.577*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 
Adjusted R
2
 0.621 0.621 0.621 0.621 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620 






Table 6: Effect of CEO Network Centrality on Firm Valuation after Controlling for Governance  
 
This table includes the same panel regressions of industry adjusted Tobin’s Q on CEO centrality level as presented in Table 5 but after controlling 
for firm governance. Intense_Monitoring is a dummy variable that equals 1 if more than 50% of the board directors are classified as intense 
monitors and zero otherwise, Small_Board is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the board size is less than 8 and zero otherwise, CEO_not_Chair is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO does not hold the Chairman position and zero otherwise, Low_Eindex is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell’s (2009) entrenchment index is lower than 3 and zero otherwise, Older_CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the CEO is older than the sample median and zero otherwise, Block_Ownerhsip is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is at least one block 
holder that owns 5% or more of the common shares outstanding and zero otherwise, High_CEO_Ownership is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the CEO’s percentage ownership of firm’s common stock is higher than the sample median and zero otherwise, and all other variables are as 
previously defined. All independent variables are lagged one year. All models include year dummies. P-values are in parentheses. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level.  
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Centrality 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.025 0.024 
 




















TQ Industry Adjusted t-1 0.674*** 0.674*** 0.675*** 0.674*** 0.674*** 0.674*** 0.675*** 0.676*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Profitability 0.066 0.066 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.063 0.063 
 
(0.112) (0.112) (0.121) (0.121) (0.118) (0.118) (0.125) (0.127) 
Leverage -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(0.287) (0.296) (0.270) (0.271) (0.250) (0.250) (0.244) (0.244) 
Capital Investment -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 
 
(0.212) (0.202) (0.226) (0.220) (0.254) (0.249) (0.252) (0.255) 
Investment in 
Innovation 
0.567*** 0.566*** 0.560*** 0.559*** 0.576*** 0.576*** 0.573*** 0.574*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Missing -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.044*** 
 






Intense_Monitoring -0.011** -0.011** -0.010** -0.010** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
Small_Board 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.775) (0.807) (0.715) (0.735) (0.885) (0.916) (0.875) (0.860) 
CEO_not_Chairman -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Low_Entrenchment -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.633) (0.629) (0.673) (0.673) (0.679) (0.682) (0.610) (0.612) 
Older_CEO -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 
 
(0.206) (0.202) (0.185) (0.193) (0.143) (0.177) (0.211) (0.214) 
Block_Ownership 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.008 
 
(0.142) (0.148) (0.124) (0.125) (0.128) (0.128) (0.192) (0.184) 
High_CEO_Ownership -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 
(0.232) (0.215) (0.214) (0.206) (0.148) (0.141) (0.147) (0.165) 
Constant 0.584*** 0.590*** 0.588*** 0.592*** 0.581*** 0.588*** 0.591*** 0.586*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 
Adjusted R
2
 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662 







Table 7 : Effect of CEO Network Centrality on Accounting Performance 
 
Panel regressions of industry adjusted ROA on CEO centrality levels are presented in Table 7. Industry adjusted ROA is the four digit SIC industry adjusted 
ROA formed by subtracting the industry median for all Compustat firms. Centrality is measured by Closeness in models 1 and 2, Degree in models 3 and 4, 
Betweenness in models 5 and 6, and Eigenvector in models 7 and 8. Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 include Centrality
^ 
which is the predicted value of centrality as a result 
of running the cross regression of all CEO determinants (models 1-4 in Table 4) on CEO centrality one year before her first appointment as CEO. If the CEO was 
appointed before 1997, then the centrality and all independent variables are measured one year before the sample starts. All other variables are as previously 
defined and are lagged one period. All models include year dummies. P-values are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Centrality 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.009 0.002 
 




















Size -0.002** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.002* -0.003** -0.002** -0.003*** 
 
(0.032) (0.010) (0.023) (0.007) (0.055) (0.016) (0.039) (0.009) 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.326) (0.355) (0.338) (0.335) (0.373) (0.369) (0.326) (0.355) 
Capital Investment -0.017** -0.015** -0.017** -0.015** -0.016** -0.015** -0.017** -0.016** 
 
(0.024) (0.036) (0.026) (0.038) (0.030) (0.040) (0.021) (0.033) 
Investment in Innovation -0.756*** -0.752*** -0.757*** -0.752*** -0.751*** -0.749*** -0.758*** -0.754*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Missing -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.681) (0.792) (0.667) (0.787) (0.549) (0.668) (0.653) (0.795) 
Constant 0.061*** 0.047*** 0.063*** 0.049*** 0.062*** 0.049*** 0.061*** 0.038*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
N 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 
Adjusted R
2
 0.224 0.226 0.224 0.226 0.224 0.225 0.224 0.226 






Table 8: Benefits of CEO Network Centrality on Accounting Performance after Controlling for Governance 
 
 
This table includes the same panel regressions of industry adjusted ROA on CEO centrality level as presented in Table 7 but after controlling for 
firm governance. All variables are as previously defined. All control variables are lagged one year. All models include year dummies. P-values are 
in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
         
Centrality 0.015* 0.006 0.015* 0.007 0.009 0.003 0.015* 0.006 
 




















Size -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.377) (0.436) (0.396) (0.396) (0.445) (0.438) (0.369) (0.403) 
Capital Investment -0.017** -0.016** -0.017** -0.016** -0.016** -0.016* -0.018** -0.016** 
 
(0.031) (0.045) (0.034) (0.046) (0.042) (0.050) (0.027) (0.041) 
Investment in Innovation -0.775*** -0.769*** -0.776*** -0.771*** -0.769*** -0.767*** -0.779*** -0.773*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Missing 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 
(0.997) (0.851) (0.962) (0.882) (0.809) (0.971) (0.975) (0.848) 
Intense_Monitoring 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 
 
(0.029) (0.035) (0.026) (0.033) (0.036) (0.037) (0.027) (0.031) 
Small_Board -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
 
(0.211) (0.339) (0.228) (0.338) (0.173) (0.253) (0.197) (0.317) 
CEO_not_Chairman 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.304) (0.444) (0.287) (0.346) (0.306) (0.295) (0.326) (0.383) 
Low_Entrenchment -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 






Older_CEO 0.004* 0.005* 0.004* 0.004 0.004* 0.003 0.005* 0.005** 
 
(0.079) (0.068) (0.086) (0.113) (0.096) (0.196) (0.071) (0.039) 
Block_Ownership 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 
(0.362) (0.268) (0.339) (0.294) (0.382) (0.371) (0.364) (0.254) 
High_CEO_Ownership -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.217) (0.575) (0.204) (0.425) (0.149) (0.229) (0.201) (0.471) 
Constant 0.066*** 0.043*** 0.067*** 0.049*** 0.068*** 0.050*** 0.066*** 0.031** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) 
N 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 
Adjusted R
2
 0.233 0.236 0.233 0.236 0.232 0.234 0.233 0.236 
































Table 9 : Effect of CEO Network Centrality on CEO Total Compensation 
 
Panel regressions of CEO total compensation on CEO centrality levels are presented in Table 9. CEO total compensation is measured by log of total 
compensation as reported by Execucomp (tdc1). This includes salary, bonus and restricted stock grants. Centrality is measured by Closeness in models 1 and 2, 
Degree in models 3 and 4, Betweenness in models 5 and 6, and Eigenvector in models 7 and 8. Models 2, 4, 6, and 8 include Centrality
^ 
which is the predicted 
value of centrality as a result of running the regression of  all CEO determinants except for salary (models 1-4 in Table 4) on CEO centrality one year before her 
first appointment as CEO. If the CEO was appointed before 1997, then the regression is based on the Centrality and all independent variables measured one year 
before the sample starts. All other variables are as previously defined. All independent and control variable are lagged one period. All models include year and 
industry dummies. P-values are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  *, **, *** Denotes statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Centrality 0.824*** 0.816*** 0.693*** 0.694*** 0.562*** 0.562*** 0.743*** 0.702*** 
 




















Size 0.389*** 0.388*** 0.388*** 0.388*** 0.416*** 0.416*** 0.401*** 0.397*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Profitability 1.110*** 1.111*** 1.076*** 1.076*** 1.058*** 1.058*** 1.088*** 1.091*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.015 -0.015 -0.018 -0.018 -0.021 -0.021 -0.015 -0.016 
 
(0.403) (0.398) (0.306) (0.306) (0.245) (0.245) (0.400) (0.377) 
Capital Investment 0.608*** 0.609*** 0.631*** 0.631*** 0.645*** 0.645*** 0.599*** 0.603*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Investment in Innovation 1.643*** 1.645*** 1.648*** 1.647*** 1.929*** 1.929*** 1.596*** 1.604*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Missing -0.078* -0.078* -0.085** -0.085** -0.096** -0.096** -0.086** -0.085** 
 
(0.054) (0.056) (0.035) (0.036) (0.019) (0.019) (0.036) (0.038) 
Constant 4.265*** 4.244*** 4.368*** 4.369*** 4.243*** 4.243*** 4.234*** 4.076*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 
Adjusted R
2







Table 10 : Effect of CEO Network Centrality on CEO Total Compensation after Controlling for Governance 
 
 
This table includes the same panel regressions of CEO total compensation on CEO centrality level as presented in Table 9 but after controlling for 
firm governance. All variables are as previously defined. All control variables are lagged one year. All models include year dummies. P-values are 
in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Centrality 0.712*** 0.690*** 0.586*** 0.569*** 0.484*** 0.470*** 0.633*** 0.587*** 
 




















Size 0.383*** 0.382*** 0.384*** 0.383*** 0.403*** 0.401*** 0.393*** 0.389*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Profitability 1.082*** 1.082*** 1.052*** 1.051*** 1.051*** 1.051*** 1.070*** 1.069*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.025 -0.025 -0.027 -0.027 -0.029 -0.029 -0.024 -0.025 
 
(0.176) (0.161) (0.134) (0.130) (0.117) (0.113) (0.189) (0.164) 
Capital Investment 0.632*** 0.634*** 0.652*** 0.653*** 0.662*** 0.663*** 0.626*** 0.631*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Investment in Innovation 1.609*** 1.617*** 1.618*** 1.624*** 1.822*** 1.819*** 1.565*** 1.574*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) 
R&D Missing -0.093** -0.093** -0.101** -0.101** -0.110*** -0.109*** -0.098** -0.098** 
 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017) 
Intense_Monitoring 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.010 0.010 0.019 0.019 
 
(0.570) (0.582) (0.575) (0.587) (0.772) (0.772) (0.565) (0.573) 
Small_Board -0.004 -0.003 -0.000 0.001 -0.016 -0.015 -0.009 -0.005 
 
(0.915) (0.947) (0.996) (0.981) (0.698) (0.716) (0.831) (0.891) 
CEO_not_Chairman -0.148*** -0.151*** -0.145*** -0.146*** -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.153*** -0.156*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 







(0.032) (0.032) (0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.029) (0.029) 
Older_CEO -0.012 -0.012 -0.016 -0.017 -0.022 -0.025 -0.007 -0.004 
 
(0.706) (0.706) (0.601) (0.562) (0.464) (0.387) (0.815) (0.887) 
Block_Ownership -0.228*** -0.226*** -0.228*** -0.227*** -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.232*** -0.227*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High_CEO_Ownership -0.024 -0.020 -0.032 -0.030 -0.046 -0.044 -0.031 -0.024 
 
(0.614) (0.691) (0.498) (0.537) (0.329) (0.347) (0.514) (0.621) 
Constant 4.647*** 4.580*** 4.736*** 4.687*** 4.681*** 4.630*** 4.639*** 4.430*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 
Adjusted R
2
 0.345 0.345 0.343 0.343 0.342 0.342 0.343 0.343 






Table 11 : Effect of CEO Network Centrality on CEO Incentive Compensation 
 
Panel regressions of CEO equity based compensation on CEO centrality levels are presented in Table 11. CEO equity based compensation is the ratio of total 
equity compensation to total compensation. Total equity compensation is the sum of the value of the restricted shares granted (rstkgrnt in Execucomp) and the 
Black-Scholes value of options granted (option_awards_blk in Execucomp). Centrality is measured by Closeness in models 1 and 2, Degree in models 3 and 4, 
Betweenness in models 5 and 6, and Eigenvector in models 7 and 8. All other variables are as previously defined. All independent and control variable are lagged 
one period. All models include year and industry dummies. P-values are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.   
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Centrality 0.098*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.084*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.106*** 0.089*** 
 




















Size 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Profitability 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) 
Leverage -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.007** -0.007** -0.006* -0.006* 
 
(0.070) (0.062) (0.053) (0.052) (0.044) (0.044) (0.079) (0.065) 
Capital Investment 0.102*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.099*** 0.101*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Investment in 
Innovation 
0.477*** 0.481*** 0.472*** 0.474*** 0.508*** 0.508*** 0.457*** 0.460*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Missing -0.016* -0.016* -0.017** -0.017** -0.018** -0.018** -0.016** -0.016* 
 
(0.052) (0.056) (0.042) (0.044) (0.027) (0.028) (0.048) (0.052) 
Constant -0.279*** -0.311*** -0.267*** -0.280*** -0.284*** -0.285*** -0.287*** -0.351*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 
Adjusted R
2
 0.491 0.492 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.492 0.492 








Table 12 : Effect of CEO Network Centrality on CEO Incentive Compensation after Controlling for Governance 
 
 
This table includes the same panel regressions of CEO equity based compensation on CEO centrality level as presented in Table 11 but after 
controlling for firm governance. All variables are as previously defined. All control variables are lagged one year. All models include year and 
industry dummies. P-values are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Centrality 0.085*** 0.078*** 0.082*** 0.078*** 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.092*** 0.082*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Centrality
^
 0.046 0.025 0.025 0.080* 
 (0.197) (0.420) (0.431) (0.052) 
Size 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Profitability 0.074** 0.074** 0.071** 0.071** 0.071** 0.071** 0.074** 0.074** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.027) (0.027) 
Leverage -0.006 -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.007* -0.007* -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.103) (0.092) (0.088) (0.085) (0.081) (0.079) (0.120) (0.103) 
Capital Investment 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Investment in Innovation 0.476*** 0.478*** 0.468*** 0.470*** 0.494*** 0.494*** 0.458*** 0.460*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Missing -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 
 (0.200) (0.204) (0.175) (0.179) (0.140) (0.146) (0.196) (0.198) 
Intense_Monitoring 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.968) (0.983) (0.927) (0.940) (0.909) (0.910) (0.906) (0.916) 
Small_Board 0.015** 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.014** 0.014** 0.015** 0.015** 
 (0.031) (0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.047) (0.043) (0.034) (0.026) 
CEO_not_Chairman -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 






Low_Entrenchment -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.831) (0.832) (0.901) (0.895) (0.882) (0.873) (0.806) (0.810) 
Older_CEO -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.031*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Block_Ownership -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.051*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High_CEO_Ownership -0.011 -0.009 -0.012* -0.011 -0.013** -0.013* -0.011* -0.010 
 
(0.105) (0.165) (0.086) (0.108) (0.047) (0.052) (0.093) (0.154) 
Constant -0.249*** -0.271*** -0.241*** -0.253*** -0.250*** -0.263*** -0.255*** -0.302*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 
Adjusted R
2
 0.505 0.505 0.505 0.505 0.505 0.505 0.505 0.506 






























Table 13 : Effect of CEO Network Centrality on CEO Pay Slice 
 
Panel regressions of CEO Pay Slice on CEO centrality levels are presented in Table 13. CEO Pay Slice as defined by Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer 
(2011) is the ratio of CEO total compensation (tdc1 in Execucomp) to the sum of the 5 top executives’ total compensation. Centrality is measured 
by Closeness in models 1 and 2, Degree in models 3 and 4, Betweenness in models 5 and 6, and Eigenvector in models 7 and 8. All other variables 
are as previously defined. All independent and control variable are lagged one period. All models include year and industry dummies. P-values are 
in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Centrality 0.049*** 0.043*** 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.035*** 
 




















Size 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.265) (0.386) (0.610) (0.718) (0.101) (0.144) (0.107) (0.283) 
Profitability 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Leverage 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.438) (0.457) (0.465) (0.470) (0.509) (0.514) (0.439) (0.483) 
Capital Investment -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.047*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Investment in Innovation -0.061 -0.059 -0.070 -0.069 -0.053 -0.053 -0.064 -0.062 
 
(0.291) (0.305) (0.226) (0.234) (0.360) (0.358) (0.271) (0.280) 
R&D Missing -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.691) (0.708) (0.685) (0.695) (0.598) (0.608) (0.634) (0.658) 
Constant 0.348*** 0.333*** 0.353*** 0.345*** 0.342*** 0.336*** 0.346*** 0.310*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 
Adjusted R
2
 0.039 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.043 0.038 0.040 









Table 14 : Effect of CEO Network Centrality on CEO Pays Slice after Controlling for Governance 
 
 
This table includes the same panel regressions of CEO Pay Slice on CEO centrality level as presented in Table 13 but after controlling for firm 
governance. All variables are as previously defined. All control variables are lagged one year. All models include year and industry dummies. P-
values are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Centrality 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.035*** 
 




















Size -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.857) (0.737) (0.605) (0.522) (0.897) (0.957) (0.922) (0.809) 
Profitability 0.054** 0.054** 0.053** 0.052** 0.053** 0.053** 0.053** 0.053** 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.676) (0.730) (0.707) (0.725) (0.740) (0.757) (0.659) (0.728) 
Capital Investment -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.050*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Investment in Innovation -0.081 -0.079 -0.088 -0.087 -0.073 -0.074 -0.085 -0.084 
 
(0.226) (0.237) (0.186) (0.191) (0.269) (0.263) (0.205) (0.209) 
R&D Missing 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.963) (0.951) (0.992) (0.980) (0.922) (0.948) (1.000) (0.995) 
Intense_Monitoring -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** 
 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.027) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.023) 
Small_Board 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007* 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 






CEO_not_Chairman -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Low_Entrenchment -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Older_CEO -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007* -0.005 -0.004 
 
(0.200) (0.200) (0.172) (0.144) (0.127) (0.087) (0.230) (0.288) 
Block_Ownership -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.023*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High_CEO_Ownership -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007* -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 
 
(0.168) (0.296) (0.151) (0.209) (0.089) (0.104) (0.139) (0.261) 
Constant 0.402*** 0.381*** 0.405*** 0.392*** 0.399*** 0.386*** 0.400*** 0.360*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 10,951 
Adjusted R
2
 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.063 0.065 





























Table 15: Effect of CEO Network Centrality on Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
 
Panel regressions of Scaled Pay-Performance Sensitivity measure on CEO centrality levels are presented in Table 15.  Scaled Pay-Performance Sensitivity is the 
log of Edman’s et al. (2009) measure of dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm value scaled by CEO annual pay. This measure is 
downloaded from Edman’s website.  Centrality is measured by Closeness in models 1 and 2, Degree in models 3 and 4, Betweenness in models 5 and 6, and 
Eigenvector in models 7 and 8. All other variables are as previously defined. All independent and control variable are lagged one period. All models include 
year and industry dummies. P-values are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
         
Centrality -1.218*** -0.704*** -0.855*** -0.558*** -0.546*** -0.483*** -1.147*** -0.744*** 
 




















Size 0.128*** 0.161*** 0.114*** 0.134*** 0.071*** 0.079*** 0.113*** 0.148*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Profitability 2.415*** 2.356*** 2.487*** 2.480*** 2.533*** 2.531*** 2.444*** 2.418*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.099*** -0.091*** -0.093*** -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.089*** -0.100*** -0.092*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
Capital Investment 0.754*** 0.684*** 0.708*** 0.665*** 0.677*** 0.668*** 0.772*** 0.718*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Investment in Innovation 1.728** 1.546* 1.578* 1.455* 1.149 1.149 1.853** 1.773** 
 
(0.042) (0.060) (0.067) (0.087) (0.179) (0.178) (0.029) (0.034) 
R&D Missing 0.001 -0.011 0.017 0.009 0.035 0.031 0.009 -0.001 
 
(0.992) (0.884) (0.828) (0.905) (0.661) (0.698) (0.908) (0.991) 
Constant 1.394*** 2.725*** 1.228*** 1.974*** 1.341*** 1.560*** 1.449*** 3.033*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 12,272 12,272 12,272 12,272 12,272 12,272 12,272 12,272 
Adjusted R
2
 0.146 0.173 0.139 0.149 0.134 0.135 0.144 0.163 








Table 16 : Effect of CEO Network Centrality on Pay-Performance Sensitivity after Controlling for Governance  
 
This table includes the same panel regressions of Scaled Pay-Performance Sensitivity measure on CEO centrality level as presented in Table 15 
but after controlling for firm governance. All variables are as previously defined. All control variables are lagged one year. All models include 
year and industry dummies. P-values are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Centrality -0.682*** -0.472*** -0.340*** -0.197 -0.364*** -0.318*** -0.635*** -0.468*** 
 




















Size 0.256*** 0.266*** 0.239*** 0.246*** 0.233*** 0.237*** 0.249*** 0.261*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Profitability 2.389*** 2.387*** 2.437*** 2.449*** 2.431*** 2.435*** 2.400*** 2.403*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.112*** -0.106*** -0.108*** -0.106*** -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.113*** -0.108*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital Investment 0.487*** 0.462*** 0.449*** 0.433*** 0.448*** 0.444*** 0.494*** 0.473*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Investment in Innovation 2.760*** 2.680*** 2.588*** 2.535*** 2.512*** 2.518*** 2.833*** 2.797*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
R&D Missing -0.017 -0.020 -0.003 -0.006 0.001 -0.002 -0.014 -0.015 
 
(0.775) (0.737) (0.956) (0.915) (0.991) (0.968) (0.822) (0.802) 
Intense_Monitoring 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.944) (0.877) (0.813) (0.753) (0.721) (0.726) (0.979) (0.959) 
Small_Board 0.103** 0.088* 0.106** 0.097** 0.115** 0.111** 0.108** 0.097** 
 
(0.031) (0.067) (0.028) (0.043) (0.017) (0.021) (0.025) (0.044) 
CEO_not_Chairman -0.127*** -0.099** -0.126*** -0.113** -0.129*** -0.127*** -0.123*** -0.109** 
 






Low_Entrenchment 0.145*** 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.147*** 0.145*** 0.146*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Older_CEO 0.057 0.057 0.061 0.071 0.066 0.076* 0.053 0.044 
 
(0.186) (0.184) (0.163) (0.101) (0.131) (0.081) (0.221) (0.311) 
Block_Ownership 0.869*** 0.848*** 0.881*** 0.873*** 0.880*** 0.878*** 0.869*** 0.850*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High_CEO_Ownership 1.042*** 0.999*** 1.056*** 1.035*** 1.064*** 1.059*** 1.048*** 1.021*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.818*** -0.157 -0.950*** -0.548** -0.888*** -0.714*** -0.802*** -0.035 
 
(0.001) (0.570) (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.909) 
N 10,288 10,288 10,288 10,288 10,288 10,288 10,288 10,288 
Adjusted R
2
 0.350 0.355 0.346 0.348 0.347 0.347 0.349 0.353 










III. CEO NETWORK CENTRALITY AND MERGER PERFORMANCE 
Abstract: We use director relational data from BoardEx to construct social networks of 
executives and directors of US public companies and calculate four measures of network 
centrality: Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector centrality for each individual 
connected into such network. CEOs with higher levels of network centrality may obtain more 
private information from their social contacts, which could translate to better decision-making on 
the job (private information hypothesis). On the other hand, more centrally positioned CEOs may 
derive influence and power from being well-connected and thus be more insulated from 
disciplinary actions brought about by the corporate control market and the executive labor 
market (managerial entrenchment hypothesis). By studying outcomes of M&A’s, we introduce 
evidence that supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. More centrally positioned CEOs 
are more likely to bid for other publicly traded firms, and these deals carry greater value losses to 
the acquirer, and greater losses to the combined entity. Stronger corporate governance in the 
form of intensive board monitoring, non-CEO Chairman, and block ownership at the bidder 
company can partially mitigate such effects. Following the CEOs and their firms five years after 
their first value-destroying deals, we find that firms run by more centrally positioned CEOs 
withstand the external threat from market discipline. Moreover, the managerial labor market is 
less effective in disciplining centrally positioned CEOs because they are more likely to find 
alternative, well-paid jobs. Ultimately, we show that CEO personal networks can have their 
“darker side” – well-connected CEOs may become powerful enough to pursue any acquisitions, 
regardless of the impact on shareholder wealth. 
1.  Introduction  





connections of corporate executives and board members of America’s publicly traded 
companies, and asks whether such connections are economically relevant and significant in 
affecting firm governance, financial contracting, and firm values. The findings have been 
substantial. For example, studying within-firm connections, Fracassi and Tate (forthcoming) 
show that CEOs have the incentive to appoint directors with ties to the CEO and that the CEO-
director connections weaken board monitoring and destroy corporate values. Hwang and Kim 
(2009) further show that firms with board members socially tied to the CEO award higher CEO 
compensations, and are associated with lower pay-performance sensitivity, as well as lower 
turnover-performance sensitivity. Coles et al. (2010) shows similarly lower turnover-
performance sensitivity and higher pay for boards where more members come after the CEO’s 
appointment, although they find board co-option to be value enhancing for high human capital 
intensity firms. 
We find these results enlightening. On the other hand, we contend that the above studies may 
have missed an important intermediate step, which ties the observation that directors and CEOs 
are “socially connected” to the ultimate outcome that “connected” directors become submissive 
to CEOs’ demands. This missing step should readily explain why social connections could 
generates costs of poor monitoring, firm value losses, or the implicit loss of CEO or directors’ 
reputation as guardians of shareholders’ interests.   
We therefore take a different view at the social networks of CEOs and directors: instead of 
checking whether a CEO is connected to a director on the board, we study the overall 
connectedness of CEOs and directors and use measures of network centrality to capture the 
status, influence, and power of a CEO with respect to the entire network he or she is linked to. 





executive and director positions, alumni educational network affiliation, or directorship in social 
clubs. We use four centrality measures commonly found in social network studies: degree, 
closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector centrality, to quantitatively gauge one’s position in a 
network, and argue that network centrality conveys power and influence, the key element driving 
the results in prior studies.   
In this paper, we apply the CEO network centrality measures to mergers and acquisitions. 
M&As are some of the most crucial corporate events for bidding firms and their CEOs. In 
addition, M&A events set the stage for CEOs to showcase their network influence both 
internally, when they persuade directors to support CEO decisions in initiating possibly value-
destroying deals, and externally, as well-networked CEOs may obtain and utilize private 
information from their network contacts to aid in bidding and negotiation. The broad, 
interdisciplinary literature on social network cannot distinguish “power and influence in 
bargaining and negotiation” and “power derived from better access to information” (Hanneman 
and Riddle, 2010, Chapter 10), and our approaches in focusing on M&A outcomes present 
convincing statistical evidence to separate the two hypotheses. 
We investigate not only the role of bidder CEO’s personal network size (the number of direct 
links between the CEO and other individuals) but also the impact of “importance” of the CEO’s 
network (how short a path the CEO has to other individuals, how often the CEO lies on the 
shortest path between two individuals, and how “relevant” the individuals linked to the CEO 
are)
20
. Social science research suggests that better-connected (i.e. more central) individuals are 
                                                           
20
 The focus on CEOs’ entire social network and the centrality of network positions also differs 
our study from other M&A papers, such as Cai and Sevilir (forthcoming) who show that cross-
firm social links can be valuable during mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Their study suggests 
that bidders and targets sharing a common board member negotiate deals with better merger 





more influential and/or powerful (e.g. Mizruchi and Potts 1998). We strive to link the potential 
bidder CEO influence and power to M&A outcomes in order to answer the following two 
research questions: Are bidder firms with well-connected CEOs associated with higher/lower 
frequency of M&A deals? Are M&A deals involving bidder firms with well-connected CEOs 
characterized by higher/lower takeover gains (especially to bidder shareholders) and by 
higher/lower total takeover synergies? Ultimately, we want to examine the potential “darker 
side” of CEO personal networks – that is, whether personal networks can make the CEO 
powerful enough to withstand internal and external monitoring, and to pursue acquisitions 
regardless of the shareholder wealth impact. 
The role of the CEO during merger negotiations is crucial, since M&A transactions can often 
lead to significant losses – both for the bidder shareholders and in terms of total takeover 
synergies (e.g. Andrade et al., 2001; Moeller et al., 2005, 2004). Equally importantly, personal 
networks are worth studying because it is not certain whether shareholders can benefit from the 
bidder CEO’s overall connectedness. Deals initiated by well-connected bidder CEOs can still 
lead to shareholder gains thanks to lower information asymmetry during M&A process, as 
argued by Cai and Sevilir (forthcoming). On the other hand, it is possible that well-connected 
CEOs can utilize their higher influence and/or power to increase their entrenchment by insulating 
themselves from the market for corporate control and the managerial labor market. Since 
entrenched managers are more likely to pursue corporate activities that will benefit themselves at 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Similarly, Schonlau and Singh (2009) find that better connected and networked boards are 
associated with superior post acquisition performance due to the easier access to information. On 
the other hand, Ishii and Xuan (2010) claim that social ties between the acquirer and the target 
could lead to poorer decision making resulting from weaker critical analysis, lower due 
diligence, and social conformity. Chikh and Filbien (2011) also show that French CEOs with 
sizable personal networks are more likely to complete acquisitions even if they are met with a 





the expense of shareholders (e.g. Bebchuck et al., 2011; Masulis et al., 2007; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989), well-connected bidder CEOs may get engaged in value-destroying M&A deals.
21
 
We expect that if more central bidder CEOs can shield themselves from the market for corporate 
control, then value-destroying bidder firms will not face a high chance of being subsequently 
acquired.
22
 Liu (2010) shows that more central CEOs are also less likely to be disciplined by 
managerial labor market – even though such CEOs are associated with more frequent turnover, 
they are also more likely to be quickly re-employed (without a decline in compensation). In 
addition, we test whether more central CEOs are able to use their influence and power to 
decrease the likelihood of forced turnover following bad performance – we expect to find lower 
sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to previous negative bidder abnormal acquisition returns.
23
 
We utilize BoardEx database to construct personal social networks of CEOs of US firms and 
find the following results describing the propensity of S&P1500 companies to acquire US public 
targets during the period from January 2000 to December 2009:  
• Higher acquirer CEO centrality is associated with more frequent acquisitions. Increasing 
CEO centrality from the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 percentile of the sample increases the relative 
                                                           
21
 There are many reasons why bidder CEOs may benefit from value-destroying M&A deals. 
Most importantly, due to separation of ownership and control, CEOs are likely to accrue the full 
value of private benefits of the acquisition, while bearing only partial value of the losses 
associated with the deal. The examples of private benefits include, for example: higher post-
merger managerial compensation due to the increase in firm’s asset base (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990), post-merger compensation packages insensitive to negative stock performance (Harford 
and Li, 2007) smoother post-merger earnings, leading to the lower likelihood of financial distress 
(especially in case of diversifying acquisitions – Berger and Ofek, 1996), and by pursuing 
mergers that involve manager-specific investments (making it costly for shareholders to replace 
the CEO – Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). 
22
 Our argument is based on results of Mitchell and Lehn (1990), who show that bidders involved 
in acquisitions destroying shareholder values are significantly more likely to be acquired during 
the five year following the completed M&A deal.  
23
 Lehn and Zhao (2006) find evidence of the disciplining effect of the managerial labor market 
on bidder CEOs– they show that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover substantially increases 





frequency of acquisitions by 25.3%, on average.  
• Acquisition abnormal returns to bidder shareholders are negative in deals initiated by 
bidder CEOs with above-median centralities. In addition, increasing CEO centrality from 
the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 percentile of the sample decreases the acquirer cumulative abnormal 
returns, on average, by 3.38%. 
• Total takeover synergies (measured by the weighted average of bidder and target 
shareholder abnormal returns) are negative in deals initiated by bidder CEOs with above-
median centralities. The total synergies from the acquisitions are negative. In addition, 




percentile of the sample, decreases total 
synergies, on average, by 3.04%. 
• Increasing bidder CEO centrality is positively associated with target shareholder 




percentile of the sample 
increases gains to the targets by 5.56%, on average. 
• More efficient bidder corporate governance (intense monitoring boards, presence of large 
blockholders, higher CEO ownership, older CEO managing the firm) can partially 
mitigate the high frequency of acquisitions by bidders with more central CEOs. 
• Whereas pursuing value-destroying deals increases the likelihood of the bidding firms 
being subsequently acquired within a 5 year period after the first value-destroying deal, 
high bidder CEO centrality significantly diminishes the strength of the link between past 
negative merger performance and subsequent bidder firm acquisition likelihood. 
• The managerial turnover for more central bidder CEOs is higher, regardless of the 
performance. However, well-connected CEOs (compared to CEOs with low centrality) 





bidder shareholder losses is unrelated to the likelihood of forced turnover within 5 years 
of their first value-destroying deal for well-connected CEOs, while the forced turnover is 
more likely after value destroying deals for CEOs with below-median centrality. 
 
Our findings are consistent with social science studies that view centrality as the source of 
influence and power (e.g. Mizruchi and Potts 1998; Brass and Burkhardt 1992). Well-connected 
bidder CEOs are able to insulate their firms from the market for corporate control and to 
withstand the external threat of being taken over. In addition, those CEOs are also unlikely to be 
disciplined by the managerial labor market. First, following their departure, they are more-likely 
to find another CEO position (our results are consistent with Liu, 2010). Second, the likelihood 
of their forced turnover is not significantly related to potential value destruction during past 
M&A deals – that is, they are unlikely to be fired due to completing a bad merger deal. 
Ultimately, more central bidder CEOs can achieve greater managerial entrenchment, which may 
lead to poorer decision making (more specifically, decisions benefiting managers at the expense 
of shareholders) and value-destroying deals (e.g. Masulis et al. 2007, Bebchuck et al. 2011), 
especially if the governance of their own firm is weak. We believe that our study is among the 
first to document the “darker side” of personal networks. That is, CEOs who achieve substantial 
power and influence thanks to their personal networks may withstand both internal (board) and 
external (the market for corporate control) monitoring. This will allow them to pursue 
acquisitions benefitting bidder CEOs (possibly in terms of higher compensation insensitive to 
value losses – Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Harford and Li, 2007), while the acquisitions may not 
benefit bidder shareholders and may fail to deliver positive takeover synergies.
24
 This effect 
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 We do not claim, though, that CEO personal networks are always facilitating value destruction. 





should be particularly strong in bidding firms characterized by weak corporate governance. 
Our finding survives a battery of robustness checks. For example, it is possible that higher 
acquisition frequency combined with the losses to bidder shareholders can also be in part 
explained by overconfidence/hubris (Roll, 1986) possibly displayed by well-connected bidder 
CEOs. However, it should be noted that the impact of the CEO centrality in all of our key results 
(the likelihood of acquisitions, the acquisition gains, the likelihood of subsequent firm takeover 
and the likelihood of CEO turnover) is virtually identical when we specifically control for the 
measures of CEO (over)confidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Campbell et al., 2011). Also, 
our findings of the absence of the link between bidder firm value destruction and the likelihood 
of subsequent acquisition or forced CEO turnover are all pointing to bidder CEO entrenchment 
as the primary explanation of value-destructive tendencies.
 
Last, since well-connected CEOs are 
likely able to compare/discuss their decisions with social peers in their personal networks
25
, the 
overconfidence/hubris tendencies (leading to overbidding or overpaying for the targets) may in 
fact be constrained for more central bidder CEOs. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we discuss social network centrality 
measures and why they should matter in corporate M&A transactions and outcomes. We then 
present our key hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and variable construction. Section 4 
presents the empirical results and various attempts to check robustness. Section 5 investigates 
whether the strength of internal corporate governance metrics and the efficiency of external 
corporate control market and executive labor market could mitigate the effect of CEO centrality 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the results of our paper may be influenced by the fact that we focus on the CEOs of S&P 1500 
firms. Our results show that S&P 1500 CEOs are more central compared to the “typical” U.S. 
executives. Furthermore, we also document that the centrality of S&P 1500 bidder CEOs is even 
higher than the centrality of the other (non-acquiring) S&P 1500 CEOs.    
25
 Shue (2011) shows that CEOs catch up to peers on salaries and bonuses after attending 





on merger performance.  Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Network Centrality and M&A Outcomes 
2.1.CEO Network Centrality 
In social networks, individuals (nodes) form links to other individuals, and the links and 
nodes form the network (Jackson, 2010). The position of each node in the network is not random 
(Jackson and Roberts, 2007) and some positions assume power when they (1) link to more 
individuals; (2) are close to all other individuals; (3) are on the shortest path connecting any 
other pairs of individuals; and (4) are more linked to other highly-linked-to individuals (Padgett 
and Ansell, 1993). “Power” in a network carries at least two different dimensions (Hanneman 
and Riddle, 2005, Chapter 10): First, a network-powerful individual may be better positioned for 
information, as her position allows her to reach other individuals most efficiently. Second, a 
well-networked individual may assume advantage in bargaining and negotiation, as her network 
positions allows more opportunities or fewer constraints. These two dimensions are not easily 
distinguishable conceptually, as we are not able to pinpoint the nature of relationships in each 
link. However, by observing the outcome of how individuals exert power in major events, we 
may be using the outcome of events to distinguish these dimensions.  
Our CEO network is constructed to include all known connections of a CEO through 
common, past and current, education, employment, and social activities. Four common measures 
of centrality are constructed: Degree centrality, Closeness centrality, Betweenness centrality, and 
Eigenvector centrality (Proctor and Loomis 1951; Sabidussi 1966; Freeman 1977; Bonacich 
1972). Degree centrality is the number of direct ties an individual has. It represents a count of the 
number of direct relations an individual has with other individuals in the network. The more 





centrality is the inverse of the sum of shortest distance between an individual and all other 
individuals in a network. Thus it presents how near an individual is from all other individuals 
and indicates how efficiently this individual can obtain information from everyone else in the 
network. Betweenness centrality measures how often and individual lies on the shortest path 
between any other members of the network. Hence, it indicates how much control an individual 
could have on the flow of information, because if an individual is between two other individuals, 
this person could either interrupt or facilitate the information flow between the other two 
individuals. Eigenvector centrality is a measure of the importance of an individual in the 
network. It takes into account the importance of the individuals that the individual is connected 
to in the network. 
2.2.Bidder CEO Centrality and the Likelihood of Acquisitions 
Mergers are one of crucial corporate events for bidding firms. The acquirers may gain, or 
lose, substantial value during and after the announcement of the merger (e.g. Andrade et al., 
2001, Moeller et al., 2004, 2005). The bidder CEO skills, attributes, and personal traits play a 
key role during the M&A process (e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Masulis et al., 2007; Harford 
and Li, 2007; Lehn and Zhao, 2006). Consequently, the size and importance of bidder CEO 
personal networks should affect the course of acquisitions.  
In the context of M&A, highly networked CEOs may either help or hurt the merger 
performance. On the one hand, Cai and Sevilir (forthcoming) show that cross-firm social links 
between the bidder and the target lead to better merger performance due to the reduction of 
information asymmetry. Similar information asymmetry-reducing benefits due to well-connected 
boards have also been documented by Schonlau and Singh (2009). The benefits of cross-





Engelberg et al. (2009) further show that CEOs command higher salaries if they are able to 
connect to executives or directors of other firms. Ultimately, since personal networks can be 
considered a union of all bilateral ties a person creates, well-connected CEOs can have better and 
easier access to valuable information about potential targets, leading to lower information 
asymmetry and more efficient acquisition decisions. 
On the other hand, social science research has identified connectedness – that is, high 
centrality – as the source of influence and power (e.g. Mizruchi and Potts 1998).
26
 For M&A this 
may imply that well-connected CEOs can utilize their social ties to entrench themselves and to 
mitigate monitoring of their activities. Fracassi and Tate (forthcoming) and Hwang and Kim 
(2009) show that CEO social ties to their firm’s board members reduce the effectiveness of board 
monitoring. Studying the direct impact of CEO networks on M&A outcomes, Chikh and Filbien 
(2011) show that French CEOs with sizable personal networks are less likely to cancel 
acquisitions even if they are met with a negative market reaction upon the announcement. Ishii 
and Xuan (2010) also claim that cross-firm bidder-target social ties lead to value losses due to 
weaker critical analysis, lower due diligence, and social conformity. Ultimately, increased 
entrenchment and insulation from monitoring can allow well-connected bidder CEOs to pursue 
frequent acquisitions, even at the expense of bidder shareholders. This may happen due to a 
variety of reasons – e.g. higher post-merger compensation due to higher post-merger asset base 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990), post-merger compensation insensitive to stock price declines 
(Harford and Li, 2007), lower chance of financial distress due to diminished earning fluctuation 
in case of diversifying acquisitions (Berger and Ofek, 1996), or increased costs of CEO 
replacement in case of mergers creating entities that require manager-specific investment 
                                                           
26
 Traditional research in network analysis document that centrality is a source of social power 





(Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).  
Last, more confident people are more likely to form additional social ties, so sizable and/or 
influential CEO personal networks may proxy for CEO (over)confidence, optimism or hubris. 
Since financial research has documented that overconfident (or too optimistic) CEOs tend to 
pursue acquisitions more frequently (e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Roll, 1986), then well-
connected CEOs (who built their personal networks thanks to their confidence and/or optimism) 
may indeed bid more frequently. 
Ultimately, all the three above-discussed potential consequence of being well-connected – 
lower information asymmetry, increased entrenchment due to CEO’s influence or power, and 
CEO overconfidence – should lead to a higher incidence of acquisitions performed by more 
central bidder CEOs. Consequently, the first hypothesis tested in our study is: 
 
H1: Greater bidder CEO centrality should be associated with the higher likelihood of 
completed acquisitions. 
2.3.Bidder CEO Centrality and Acquisition Gains 
Even though bidder CEO centrality should be positively associated with the frequency of 
completed acquisitions, the value impact of the acquisitions – especially for the bidder 
shareholders – should be different for the three consequences of CEO connectedness discussed in 
the previous section. Financial research has traditionally associated lower information 
asymmetry with value improvements and with better managerial decisions, implying that 
acquisitions completed by well-connected bidder CEOs may lead to greater gains to bidder 
shareholders and to greater total takeover synergies (measured as the combined gains to the 
bidder and the target shareholders). Sources of competitive advantage gained from central 





better evaluation of deals and hence acquiring “bargains”.
27
 In addition, social science and 
management research documents the importance of central positions in a network in gaining 
better access to information and knowledge transfer (e.g. Freeman 1979; Tsai 2001).  
On the other hand, potential stronger bidder CEO entrenchment (due to strong CEO power 
and influence) generally leads to poor decision making and value losses (e.g. Masulis et al. 2007, 
Bebchuck et al. 2011). Similarly, bidder CEO overconfidence and hubris have been documented 
to destroy value (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), often leading to forced CEO turnover (Campbell 
et al., 2011). Ultimately, the impact of bidder CEO centrality on bidder shareholder and total 
synergy gains is an empirical issue, and the second hypothesis tested in our study is: 
H2 [H2A]: Greater bidder CEO centrality should be associated with lower [higher] bidder 
shareholder acquisition gains (measured by abnormal acquisition returns) and with lower 
[higher] total takeover synergies (measured as the combined abnormal acquisition returns to the 
bidders and the targets). The bidder shareholder gains and the total takeover synergies should 
be negative [most positive] for the acquisitions completed by most-central bidder CEOs. 
2.4.Bidder CEO Centrality and Internal Corporate Governance 
Financial research has documented the power of corporate governance to monitor CEO 
performance and to limit potentially adverse impact of CEO actions. Faleye et al. (2011) show 
that boards where the majority of independent board members qualify as “intense monitors” (the 
members serve on at least two of the three principal monitoring committees) display superior 
monitoring performance. Yermack (1996) suggests that bigger boards are generally considered 
poorer monitors. Bebchuk et al. (2011) and Masulis et al. (2007) document that entrenched 
managers make more frequent acquisitions. Higher ownership concentration in the form of block 
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holdings (above 5%) or greater share of CEO ownership is generally associated with improved 
monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), though high CEO ownership can also facilitate 
entrenchment (Morck et al., 1988). On the other hand, CEO-Chairman duality leads to greater 
extraction of rents from shareholders (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005). CEO age can have both 
positive (Milbourn, 2003) or detrimental (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998) effect on the quality of 
managerial decisions. 
Strong corporate governance is not needed to mitigate the effects of CEO centrality if 
acquisitions initiated by more central CEOs lead to takeover gains. On the other hand, if greater 
bidder CEO centrality is associated with losses to bidder shareholders and lower takeover 
synergies, strong corporate governance should constrain the CEO actions and to limit the 
acquisition losses. Consequently, the third hypothesis tested in our study is:  
H3: Conditional on greater bidder CEO centrality being associated with lower bidder 
shareholder acquisition gains and with lower total takeover synergies, stronger internal 
corporate governance (intense monitoring and/or smaller board, concentrated share ownership, 
absence of CEO-Chairman duality, longer CEO tenure, absence of anti-takeover provisions in 
firm charter) should be associated with (a) lower likelihood of completed acquisitions and (b) 
less negative takeover gains in acquisitions initiated by bidding firms with more central CEOs. 
2.5.Bidder CEO Centrality and the Market for Corporate Control 
Mitchell and Lehn (1990) show that the market for corporate control can discipline poorly-
performing bidder CEOs. That is, bidder companies involved in acquisitions destroying bidder 
shareholder values are more likely to be acquired during the five year following the completed 
M&A deal. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) document that the bidder abnormal acquisition return is a 





(which means that negative bidder abnormal returns actually increase acquisition likelihood). 
We expect that if the acquisitions completed by well-connected bidder CEOs destroy value 
and if the value losses are due to stronger bidder CEO entrenchment, then the bidder CEOs are 
likely to use their influence and power to insulate themselves from the market for corporate 
control. That means, we expect the sensitivity of bidder abnormal acquisition returns in models 
explaining the subsequent bidder firm acquisition likelihood to decline for the sample of well-
connected bidder CEOs. Consequently, the fourth hypothesis tested in our study is: 
H4: In the sample of bidders with more central CEOs (compared to the sample of bidders 
with less central CEOs), the bidder abnormal acquisition return should be a less positive 
determinant of the likelihood the bidder will be subsequently acquired. 
2.6.Bidder CEO Centrality and the Managerial Labor Market 
Lehn and Zhao (2006) find the disciplining effect of the managerial labor market on bidder 
CEOs. Their key model shows that the bidder acquisition abnormal return is a significantly 
negative determinant forced bidder CEO turnover during the five years following the acquisition 
(which means that negative bidder abnormal returns actually increase the likelihood of forced 
turnover). 
Once again, we expect that if the acquisitions completed by well-connected bidder CEOs 
destroy value and if the value losses are due to stronger bidder CEO entrenchment, then the 
bidder CEOs are likely to use their influence and power to insulate themselves from the 
managerial labor market and reduce the likelihood they will be fired “for a cause” (that is, due to 
a bad merger deal). Thus, for the well-connected bidder CEOs, the bidder abnormal acquisition 
return should be a less significant determinant of the likelihood of the forced CEO turnover after 





On the other hand, the high CEO centrality may be either positively or negatively associated 
with the overall (i.e. not performance-related) probability of the CEO turnover. On the one hand, 
well-connected CEOs can simply utilize their influence and power to limit the board ability to 
fire them for any reason. On the other hand, Liu (2010) shows that terminated well-connected 
CEOs are more likely to find another well-paid, similarly reputable job, regardless the reason of 
their previous dismissal. Ultimately, the impact of bidder CEO centrality on the overall 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover is an empirical issue, and the fifth hypothesis tested in our 
study is: 
H5 [H5A]: In the sample of bidders with more central CEOs (compared to the sample of 
bidders with less central CEOs), the bidder abnormal acquisition return should be a less positive 
determinant of the likelihood of the forced CEO turnover after the completion of the merger. 
[H5B] Higher bidder CEO centrality should increase the likelihood of overall CEO turnover. 
If well-connected bidder CEOs are more likely to be replaced, then they should be more likely to 
find another CEO-equivalent (i.e. CEO or Chairman) job after their dismissal (compared to less 
central CEOs). 
3. Data  
3.1.CEO Centrality Data 
Information about the educational background, prior employment, and other social 
memberships of directors and executives of US public companies is obtained from BoardEx. In 
our main analysis, we construct network based on employment history only in listed firms. This 
information is the most reliable and can be cross-verified in other sources. In addition, we use the 
entire network built from overlaps in education, employment, and social activities to conduct 





The network based on listed firms includes 12 million links formed between 1938 and 2010, 
and a maximum network of 314,416 individuals in 2010.
 28
 We calculate four common measures 
of centrality in the social network literature: Degree centrality, Closeness centrality, 
Betweenness centrality, and Eigenvector centrality (Proctor and Loomis 1951; Sabidussi 1966; 
Freeman 1977; Bonacich 1972). Degree centrality is the sum of direct ties an individual has in 
each year. Closeness centrality is the inverse of the sum of shortest distance between an 
individual and all other individuals in a network.  Betweenness centrality measures how often 
and individual lies on the shortest path between any other members of the network. Eigenvector 
centrality is a measure of the importance of an individual in the network. It takes into account the 
importance of the individuals that are connected in the network. The computation is daunting and 
requires storing information for each and every possible pairs of nodes (nearly 250,000 for year 
2005 and nearly 300,000 for year 2008 and later) in computer memory, and the Matlab program 
for closeness, for example, takes about 7 days to process the graph of 2010, on supercomputers 
with at least 84G of memory
29
.   
We then select the yearly measures of centrality for S&P1500 CEOs for the period spanning 
from 1999 to 2008. The centrality variables are available for 4006 CEOs in 16415 firm-year 
observations.  
The summary statistics for all centrality measures for all S&P 1500 firms are presented in the 
Appendix. We calculate not only the raw centrality measure, but also the percentile rankings of 
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 We conduct robustness checks to alter the network by adding additional restrictions. One 
restriction is to ensure strength of connections, in which we only include links that last 3 years or 
longer. Another restriction is to drop inactive connections, in which any links that have not been 
active in the past 5 years out of the sample. Yet another robustness round combines the two 
restrictions. Our results are mostly unaffected by these restrictions.  
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 This project would not have been possible without the “Star of Arkansas” supercomputer and 





the CEOs based on their position in the network of all (that is, not just S&P 1500) executives and 
directors of US public companies in the whole BoardEx database. The summary tables show a 
considerable differences in centrality measures for the S&P 1500 CEOs, ranging from extremely 
well-connected individuals (The maximum Degree centrality is 1,985) to CEO without any 
significant links (the minimum Degree centrality is 2, the minimum Betweenness and 
Eigenvector is 0). Not surprisingly, though, the typical S&P 1500 CEO is more central compared 
to the typical BoardEx executive. Based on the medians of the four considered centrality 
measures, the S&P 1500 CEOs range from the 73
th
 (Closeness) to the 84
th
 (Betweenness) 
percentile of the overall distribution.  
Table 1 presents the firm statistics for the S&P 1500 companies – both for the full sample 
first and divided into Below versus Above Median groups based on the four centrality measures 
(Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, Eigenvector) of the firm’s CEO. We define Size as the log of 
total assets, Tobin’s Q as the sum of market value of equity (end of year price per share * 
number of shares outstanding at the end of year), short term debt, long term debt and preferred 
stock, all divided by total value of assets. Profitability is measured as the return on total assets, 
leverage as the ratio of book value of debt to total assets, and liquidity as the ratio of operating 
cash flow to total assets. Using all measures of centrality, we find that firms with highly central 
CEOs are significantly larger, have higher Tobin’s Q, are less profitable, and are more leveraged. 
However, there is no statistical significant difference between firms with high or low CEO 
centrality with respect to liquidity.  
3.2.M&A Data 
Our M&A sample contains all completed mergers between S&P1500 acquirers and U.S. 
public targets for the period spanning January 1
st
 2000 to December 1
st





acquirers in 776 deals. We choose deals with publicly listed targets and acquirers because our 
measures of takeover gains (cumulative acquisition abnormal returns) require the availability of 
market prices. The data comes from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. In addition, 
we obtain prices from CRSP and financial data from COMPUSTAT. 
3.3.Internal and External Governance Data 
To get the governance data for the CEOs and the directors in our sample, we merge the 
BoardEx data to Risk Metrics by using an algorithm that matches the names of the CEOs and 
firm’s directors in BoardEx to the names available in Risk Metrics. We then search manually by 
hand for any non-matched names. In addition, we rely primarily on Risk Metrics in computing 
governance variables such as intense monitoring, board size, duality, age, block ownership and 
CEO ownership, but we also fill in any missing values from Execucomp. We also obtain the 
entrenchment index from Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell’s entrenchment index
30
.  We have 
complete governance data available for 3283 CEOs in 13398 firm year observations. 
4. Results 
4.1.Bidder CEO Centrality and the Likelihood of Acquisitions 
Table 2 presents the number of acquisitions of successfully acquired US public targets by the 
464 bidders in the sample classified by year of acquisition announcement. The date of 
acquisition announcement is the original date of announcement as reported by SDC. Our data is 
presented for the full sample (panel A) as well as for the subsamples Below Median vs. Above 
Median based on the centrality of the acquirer’s CEO in the year before the merger 
announcement (panels B-E, based on the four considered centrality variables). (Below/Above 
Median is defined as below/above sample median.) The results of Table 2 suggest that during the 
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sample period, acquirers lead by CEOs with more central networks (based on all four measures) 
complete significantly more deals. 
In Table 3, we present tests of the differences in centrality measures between S&P 1500 
acquirer and non-acquirer CEOs. Our results show that means of centrality measures are 
significantly higher for acquirer CEOs. In terms of percentiles describing the whole BoardEx 
population, the acquirer centrality means for Closeness/Degree/Betweenness/Eigenvector are 
75.69/83.66/84.10/82.61, while the mean centrality for non-acquirers is 67.54/71.08/75.70/73.43. 
These differences are significant at 1% level for all measures of centrality.
31
 This means that 
among S&P 1500 firms, bidder CEO centrality is on average very high, exceeding the centrality 
of other S&P 1500 (non-acquiring) CEOs (who in turn are still more central that the median 
executives in BoardEx sample). 
Previous financial research suggests merger outcomes are impacted by differences in 
variables such as firm size (for example Moeller et al. 2004), market to book value (e.g. Asquith 
et al. 1983), leverage (e.g. Palepu, 1986, Billet et al. 2004), profitability (e.g. Lang et al., 1991), 
or liquidity (e.g. Smith and Kim, 1994). Table 1 suggests that firms ran by CEOs associated with 
different centrality levels may display significant differences in the above mentioned firm 
characteristics. So, to examine whether CEO centrality has an effect on the likelihood of 
acquisitions we control for other financial variables in the following Probit model: 
 
P (Deal=1) = at + B1Centralityt-1 + B2Tobin’sQt-1 + B3Liquidityt-1 + B4Profitability t-1 + B5Sizet-1 + 
B6Leveraget-1+et                                                                                                                                                                                           (1)                                                                  
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 Since the non-acquirers’ group is larger than the acquirers’ group, we conduct a test of unequal 
variances. The F-value for the test of unequal variances is significant when using Degree and 
Betweenness centrality, thus we conduct a Wilcoxon rank test and the Z-values of the test 





Where:  Deal is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer announces an acquisition that is 
successfully completed and zero otherwise, Centrality is the percentile ranking of the acquirer’s 
CEO centrality measured by Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector centrality as 
previously defined in section 3.1. All other variables are as previously defined. All variables in 
the model are lagged one year compared to the acquisition announcement year.  
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 4. Model 1 shows the results of the 
estimation without including the centrality variable. CEO centrality is measured by Closeness in 
Model 2, Degree in Model 3, Betweenness in Model 4, and Eigenvector in Model 5. Model 1 
suggests, consistently with previous research, that large firms with higher growth opportunities, 
more cash flows, and lower leverage are more likely to be the bidders in completed M&As.  
Controlling for firm characteristics, CEO centrality measured by Closeness, Degree, 
Betweenness, and Eigenvector is statistically significant and positive at the 1% level in models 2, 
3, 4, and 5. Our results strongly support Hypothesis H1. Firms with more central CEOs have 
higher probability in conducting acquisitions than firms with less central CEOs. Increasing CEO 
centrality from the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 percentile of the sample increases the relative frequency of 
making acquisitions by 25.3% on average, when using Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and 
Eigenvector as measures of centrality. 
The likelihood of mergers and acquisition should also be related to the quality of governance 
in the bidding firm. Consequently, in models 6-9, we repeat the analysis of Models 2-5, but add 
in governance controls for intense monitoring, board size, duality, entrenchment index, CEO age, 
and block ownership and CEO ownership. Intense_Monitoring is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if more than 50% of the board directors are classified as intense monitors and zero otherwise. An 





committee (Faleye et al., 2011). Board_Size is the size of the board of directors. Duality is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. 
Eindex is Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell’s entrenchment index (2009)
 32
. The E-index is 
constructed by adding 1 for the following six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder 
bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers 
and charter amendments. Age is the CEO’s age. Block_Ownership is a dummy variable that 
equals one if there is at least one block holder that owns 5% or more of the common shares 
outstanding and zero otherwise. CEO_Ownership is the percentage of shares owned by the CEO.  
Our results suggest that several mechanisms typically linked to improved governance 
(namely – Intense Monitoring, absence of CEO-Chairman duality, CEO age, and higher CEO 
ownership) all tend to be associated with lower likelihood of acquisitions. However, even after 
controlling for the governance determinants, the coefficient on Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, 
and Eigenvector remains positive and is significant at the 1% level in models 7, 8, 9, and at the 
10% level in model 6.  
4.2.Bidder CEO Centrality and Acquisition Gains 
To investigate the relation between CEO centrality and merger gains, we employ an event 
study to estimate daily cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the merger announcement 
using the standard market model.
33
 Table 5 reports the CARs over the (-3, +3) day event window 
for the acquirer (Panel A), the combined firm (Panel B) and the target (Panel C).
 34
 We calculate 
CARs for the combined firm (that is, the estimate of total synergies generated by the takeover) as 
                                                           
32
 In unreported analysis, we also consider governance index (Gindex) as reported by Risk 
Metrics. Results remained virtually identical.   
33
 We use the returns to the CRSP equally weighted index as the market portfolio. The results 
utilizing CRSP value weighted index were virtually identical.  
34





the market value weighted average of CARs for the acquirer and CARs for the target. The 
returns are shown for the full sample first then divided into three groups based on the centrality 
of the acquirer’s CEO. Group1 contains observations with the acquirer’s CEO centrality is below 
the sample 25
th





 percentile. Group 3 contains observations with the acquirer’s CEO 
centrality above the sample 75
th
 percentile. 
The mean [median] CARs for the full sample is significantly negative -1.87% [-1.41%] for 
the acquirers, positive 0.68% [0.33%] for the combined firm, and significantly positive 27.39% 
[21.28%] for the target. Those figures are consistent with prior literature documenting significant 
positive abnormal returns to the target and combined firm and either negative or insignificant 
returns to the bidders (e.g. Andrade et al. 2001; Betton et al. 2008). 
Even more importantly, Table 5 shows that that on average, bidding companies ran by well-
connected CEOs (compared to companies with non-central CEOs) generate approximately 
1.67% lower CARs for the bidder shareholders, approximately 2.71% lower combined CARs, 
and over 7.4% higher CARs for the target shareholders. Also, the combined CARs (i.e. the total 
takeover synergies) for the highly central CEOs are negative using all four measures of 
centrality. All differences in combined CARs between Group1 and Group3 are highly 
statistically significant.  
The above results provide strong support for Hypothesis H2 – the high centrality of bidder 
CEOs appears to be value reducing (especially for the bidder shareholders), and potentially 
consistent with CEO entrenchment and/or overconfidence.  
So far, we analyzed simple univariate differences in CARs for the sub-samples of bidding 





in the context of multivariate models to determine if the negative relation between acquirer CEO 
centrality and bidder or combined gains holds even after controlling for determinants of 
acquisition CARs identified by the previous finance research. 
4.2.1. Bidder CEO Centrality and Bidder Acquisition Gains 
To investigate whether bidder CEO centrality impacts bidder acquisition CARs, we estimate 




CAR (-3,+3) = at + B1Centralityt-1 + B2Sizet-1 + B3Profitabilityt-1 + B4Tobin’sQt-1  + B5Leveraget-1 
+ B6Liquidityt-1 + B7Deal_Valuet + B8Same_Industryt + B9Stock_Dealt + et                                             (2)                                                           
 
where the dependent variable CAR (-3,+3) is the cumulative abnormal return for the acquirer 
over the (-3,+3) day event window, Deal_Value is the value of the acquisition as reported by 
SDC divided by the market value of the acquirer, Same_Industry is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the acquirer and the target are in related industries identified by similar 2 digit SIC code 
and zero otherwise, Stock_Deal is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the merger is entirely 
financed by stock and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined and are lagged 
one year. We also add fixed year effects and industry effects in all models. 
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 6. Model 1 includes the typical variables 
that are known to impact the CARs of the acquirers (e.g. Moeller et al. 2004). Centrality of 
acquirer CEO is measured by Closeness in Model 2, Degree in Model 3, Betweenness in Model 
4, and Eigenvector in Model 5. In Models 6-9, we add additional control variables to take into 
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 Controls for deal characteristics and fixed industry and year effects are included as previous 
literature document the impact of form of payment (see for example Fuller et al. 2002), industry 
relatedness (see for example Morck et al. 1990), and merger intensity of the industry (see for 





account the effect of firm’s governance on CARs.  
Most importantly, the coefficient on CEO centrality measures is negative in all models and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Increasing CEO centrality from the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 
percentile of the sample increases the losses to acquirers by -3.38% on average when using 
Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector as measures of centrality in Models 2-5).
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Similarly to our univariate results, the findings in Table 6 provide support for the Hypothesis H2, 
which suggests that bidder CEO centrality is negatively associated with the gains to bidder 
shareholders.  
4.2.2. Bidder CEO Centrality and Total Takeover Synergies 
Losses to acquirers are not necessarily an evidence of negative impact of CEO centrality on 
total takeover synergies, acquirers may be giving up some of their gains in order to attract the 
targets based on bidder’s expectation of large total synergies resulting from those deals (Hietala 
and Kaplan, 2003). Thus, to test if bidder CEO centrality is associated with the total takeover 
combined CARs, we analyze the following OLS model where we regress cumulative abnormal 
returns for the combined firm on measures of CEO centrality of the acquirer and other control 
variables identified by previous research to influence total takeover synergies:  
 
CAR (-3,+3) = at + B1Centralityt-1 + B2Combined_Sizet-1 + B3Combined_Profitabilityt-1 + 
B4Combined_Tobin’sQt-1+B5Combined_Leveraget-1+B6Combined_Liquidityt-1  + B7Deal_Valuet 
+ B8Same_Industryt+B9Stock_Dealt+et                                                                             (3)                                                                                                                                                       
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 The other determinants of bidder acquisition CARs have mostly the expected signs. Most 
importantly, more profitable acquirers are associated with gains to bidder shareholders, while 
stock deals and acquisition of large targets lead to bidder shareholder losses. Once again, 
centrality stays a significantly negative determinant of bidder abnormal returns even when 
controlling for governance determinants in Models 6-9. Interestingly, none of the governance 
mechanisms with the exception of Block Ownership (positive determinant) and CEO Ownership 






The dependent variable CAR (-3,+3) is the cumulative abnormal return over the (-3,+3) day 
event window for the combined firm, calculated as the market value weighted average of CARs 
for the acquirer and CARs for the target. Combined_Size is the log of total employees for the 
combined entity. Combined_Profitability, liquidity, leverage, and Tobin’s Q are asset weighted 
averages of the profitability, liquidity, leverage, and Tobin’s Q of the acquirer and the target. All 
variables are lagged one year and are as previously defined. We also include industry and year 
fixed effects in all of our models. 
The results of our analysis are reported in Table 7. Model 1 includes traditional variables that 
are known to impact the CARs of the combined firm. Centrality of acquirer’s CEO is measured 
by Closeness in Model 2, Degree in Model 3, Betweenness in Model 4, and Eigenvector in 
Model 5. Most importantly, the coefficients on measures of CEO centrality are negative and 
significant in all models at the 1% level. We add controls for governance in Models 6 to 9 and 
our centrality variables remain negative and significant at the 1% level in all models. Increasing 
CEO centrality from the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 sample percentile increases the losses to the combined 
firm by -3.04% on average, when using Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector as 
measures of centrality. Similarly to our univariate results, the findings in Table 7 provide support 
for the Hypothesis H2, which suggests that bidder CEO centrality is negatively associated with 
total takeover synergies. 
4.2.3. Bidder CEO Centrality and Target Acquisition Gains 
To analyze whether bidder CEO centrality is associated with target CARs, we run an OLS 
model similar to equation (2) where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns 





centrality, as well as all other control variables as previously defined, but calculated for the 
target.  
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 8. Most importantly, the coefficients on 
acquirer’s CEO centrality are positive and significant in 3 out of 4 of our models. Increasing 
CEO centrality from the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 sample percentile increases the gains to the target by 
5.56% on average when using Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector as measures of 
centrality. Furthermore, after including controls for the governance of the acquirers in models 6-
9, two of our centrality measures remain significant and positive. Overall, our findings suggest 
that while the well-connected bidder CEOs are associated with value losses for bidder 
shareholders and with declining value of total takeover synergies, target shareholders actually 
benefit during the acquisitions (possibly due to overpayment). 
4.3.Robustness Checks 
4.3.1. Bidder size effect 
Moeller et al. (2004) show that bidder acquisition CARs are significantly related to bidder 
size. Table 1 in our study documents that bidder CEO centrality is also related to bidder size 
(more central CEOs are likely to manage larger firms). To control for the possibility that our 
centrality measure pick the potentially non-linear size effect, in the unreported analysis 
(available upon request) we control for the non-linear size effect utilizing three different 
methods: (a) addition of extra dummy for large bidder sizes, (b) adding a quadratic size variable 
or (c) splitting the sample based on the size of the bidding firm. Regardless the adjustment, the 
centrality variables in Table 4 and Tables 6-8 stayed significant, with unchanged coefficient 






4.3.2. Entrenchment or overconfidence? 
This behavior can be explained by managerial entrenchment. Well-connected CEOs can use 
their power and influence attained through personal network to insulate themselves from internal 
or external monitoring. Bidder CEOs may thus end up pursuing acquisitions benefiting them, but 
harming the shareholders. On the other hand, our results are also consistent with bidder CEO 
overconfidence. Previous finance research has identified CEO overconfidence as a source of 
M&A losses (e.g. Roll 1986, Malmendier and Tate, 2008). If large personal social networks are 
built by overconfident, optimistic individuals, then we can indeed observe a negative relation 
between centrality and M&A gains. In order to differentiate between the two potential 
explanations, in the unreported analysis (available upon request) we specifically add a measure 
of overconfidence to our models in Tables 4-8. The overconfidence is a dummy variable equal to 
one for highly confident CEOs identified by Malmendier and Tate’s (2008) model.
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 In none of 
the models on Tables 4-8, the inclusion of overconfidence measure changed the significance or 
sign of the centrality coefficients. The overconfidence variable dummy, on the other hand, failed 
to be significant if any of the models. Consequently, it is likely that our results regarding CEO 
centrality are less likely due to CEO overconfidence. 
We also studied the direct link between the measures of centrality and overconfidence – both 
in terms of univariate tests and regression analysis of centrality determinants. Our (unreported, 
but available upon request) results suggest that centrality is negatively relate to overconfidence, 
further strengthening our argument that that higher likelihood of acquisition and lower 
acquisition gains are mainly due to connectedness, rather than overconfidence. 
4.3.3. Strength of ties forming CEO centrality 
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 Malmendier and Tate (2008) study CEO’s personal portfolio choices. Confident CEOs tend to 





We studied various alternative determinants of CEO centrality. For example, we considered 
the link between two people valid only if the relationship existed for at least three years, if the 
relationship was/was not based on a particular activity (education only, membership in social 
clubs), etc. Using all those alternative variable definitions lead to nearly identical results when 
compared to those presented in Tables 4-8.   
4.3.4. CEO Centrality and CEO connection to Board Members Inside the Firm 
Existing finance research has already documented the detrimental effect of direct ties 
between CEOs and board members of their firms – in the context of board monitoring (e.g. 
Fracassi and Tate, forthcoming, or Hwang and Kim, 2009) or even for the quality of M&A 
decisions (Cai and Sevilir, forthcoming). If well-connected CEOs are simply managers who have 
more ties to people – including their own board members, then our results may be the effect of 
bilateral ties rather than centrality per se. To address this possibility, we performed several 
robustness checks. First, we studied the incidence of CEO-board links for the subsamples of 
CEOs with high vs. low centrality where the existence of CEO-board links was measured by 
prior joint work experience in listed companies, board memberships, and common education 
experience. We found that the occurrence of CEO-board links was nearly identical between the 
two subsamples. That is – CEOs who are or are not well-connected have roughly the same 
chance to have ties to their own board members. This result implies that the higher likelihood of 
acquisitions combined with inferior bidder gains documented in Tables 4-8 is indeed primarily 
due to CEO centrality, and not CEO-board links. Second, we added the variable measuring the 
incidence of CEO-board links directly to our Probit models analyzing acquisition likelihood 
(Table 4) and Abnormal returns (Tables 5-8). Addition of this variable left the significances of 





presented in Tables 4-8. 
5. The Mitigating Effect of Corporate Governance and Control on CEO Centrality 
So far, our results regarding the link between bidder CEO centrality, the likelihood of 
acquisitions, and acquisition gains suggest that well-connected acquirer CEOs are associated 
with frequent value-destroying (especially for bidder shareholders) acquisitions.
38
 In this section, 
we study whether strong internal governance at the bidder firms and efficient external markets 
for corporate control and executive labor market can mitigate the adverse effects of bidder CEO 
centrality.  
5.1.Internal Corporate Governance on Bidding Likelihood and Acquisition Gains  
Results in prior tables show that CEO centrality is generally negatively related to merger 
performance, in that higher network CEOs initiated more acquisitions, paid more premiums to 
target shareholders, and results in higher discount to their own firms.  In this section, we turn to 
measures of internal corporate governance to study whether such negative outcome can be 
mitigated through better internal corporate governance.  
Table 9 contains the results of multiple Probit models of acquisition frequencies. Each model 
contains all determinants (unrelated to centralities) utilized in Model 1 of Table 4. The 
corresponding regression coefficients are not reported in Table 9. Instead, for each model, we 
report the following three coefficients: (i) High_Centrality dummy (equal to one if the CEO 
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 Our results should not be interpreted to suggest that CEO personal social networks are always 
value destructive. It is possible that due to our sample formation – S&P 1500 CEOs have above-
average centrality and the bidder CEOs among them have even higher centrality, on average 
(Table 3) – our results only reflect the impact of large (rather than smaller, potentially more 
optimal) personal networks. We repeated the regression analysis in Tables 4 and 6-8 where we 
replaced our measures of centrality by “excess centrality” – residuals from the regression of 
centrality on the selected determinants – size, growth opportunities (Tobin’s Q), profitability, 
and optimism (measured following Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Our results – namely the higher 
likelihood of acquisitions and lower acquisition gains – were nearly identical utilizing “excess 





centrality is above the sample median); (ii) “Strong Governance” dummy equal to one if the 
governance factor typically associated with stronger governance - i.e. Intense Monitoring, Small 
Board, Absence of CEO-Chairman Duality, Low E-index, CEO Age, Block Ownership, and 
CEO Ownership - is present (or, in case of continuous variables, higher than the sample median) 
at the bidder company (see Table 4 discussion for the definitions of governance dummies); (iii) 
High Centrality*Strong Governance. We expect the sum of those three coefficients (which 
together measure the joint impact of High Centrality of the Bidder CEO in the environment of 
strong bidder governance to be significantly smaller than the coefficient for High Centrality 
(which measures the effect of highly-central CEO operating in the bidder company with weak 
governance. 
Table 9 results weakly support our expectations for three governance mechanisms – intense 
monitoring, CEO-Chairman separation (the opposite of duality), and (high) CEO Age – appear to 
mitigate the high acquisition tendencies of well-connected CEOs. The economic significance for 
the results are large.  For example, having intensive monitoring boards reduces the likelihood for 
takeovers for high-centrality CEOs by -14.7%, -16.8%, -11.8%, -12.5% using Closeness, Degree, 
Betweenness, and Eigenvector centralities. The probability goes down by 2 to 6% if CEO is not 
the Chairman.  However, we don’t find evidence of CEO or other block owners affecting the 
likelihood of takeovers.  In addition, we find that small boards increase takeover likelihood by 
more than 15% (the most conservative estimates) if CEO has high network centrality.   
In summary, our results suggest that after controlling for the effect of strong governance on 
reducing the overall acquisition likelihood (as we documented in Table 4), board members 
serving as intensive monitors and having non-CEO Chairmen further reduce the influence of 





Table 10 contains the analysis of the impact of interaction between High Centrality and 
Strong Governance on Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns. The design is very similar to 
that presented in Table 9: we analyze series of regression models explaining bidder gains 
utilizing determinants from Model 1 in Table 6 (coefficients not reported) plus (i) 
High_Centrality; (ii) Strong Governance and (iii) High Centrality*Strong Governance. We 
expect that if strong governance mitigates the opportunistic behavior of more central CEOs, the 
sum of the coefficients measuring the joint effect of high centrality and strong governance should 
exceed the coefficient on High Centrality alone. Unfortunately, we only find one variable, Block 
Ownership of 5% or more, increases bidder CAR by about .50%. We do not see this result for 
any other of our considered governance factors. The results suggest that strong governance is 
unable to improve bidder returns on the activities of well-connected CEOs. 
5.2.Bidder CEO Centrality and the Market for Corporate Control 
In this and the next sections, we will examine whether our results suggesting the link 
between acquirer CEO centrality, acquisition likelihood, and acquisition gains may be due to 
CEO entrenchment. If well-connected CEOs have entrenchment power, we should observe that 
those CEOs can be immune from external (market for corporate control), as well as internal 
(board) monitoring. 
Mitchell and Lehn (1990) provide evidence supporting the general disciplinary role of 
corporate takeovers. They show that acquirers that make value-destroying acquisitions measured 
by negative cumulative abnormal returns around merger announcement more likely end up as 
future takeover targets. More specifically, Mitchell and Lehn (1990) show that in the model 
predicting current bidders becoming future targets, the CAR to bidder shareholders becomes a 





likelihood, negative CARs increase the subsequent acquisition chances). Hence, if more central 
CEOs are more likely to be entrenched (as we expect in Hypothesis H4) and are thus insulated 
from the market for corporate control, we should expect the bidder CAR to be a less positive 
determinant of the likelihood the bidder will be subsequently acquired. 
To test whether more central acquirer CEOs are insulated from the market for corporate 
control, we follow Mitchell and Lehn’s (1990) methodology and use a subsample of acquisitions 
announced from January 1
st
 2000 until December 31
st
 2005 so that we can have a 5 year window 
following the acquisition announcement to witness if the firm ended subsequently acquired. 
Moreover, we follow their restriction in limiting the sample to include acquirers that acquire 
targets with at least 5% of acquirer’s market value (i.e. to analyze acquisitions that were 
“material” for the bidder). Finally, if the acquirer has more than one acquisition, we use the sum 
of the abnormal cumulative returns associated with those deals. This led the models to include 
222 observations. To test the likelihood that an acquirer becomes subsequently an acquired 
target, we run the following Probit model: 
 
P(Targeted=1) = at + B1Centrality + B2CAR + B3Centrality*CAR + B4Size + B5Profitability + 
B6Tobin’sQ + B7Leverage + B8Relative_Target_Size + et                                                       (4)                                                                                        
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer was 
successfully acquired within five years of its first acquisition and zero otherwise, Centrality is 
the CEO centrality as defined previously, CAR is the acquirer shareholder cumulative abnormal 
returns computed at the (-3, +3) event window around the merger announcement, 
Centrality*CAR is an interaction term between Centrality and CAR. All other variables are as 
previously defined. All independent and control variables are calculated at the end of year 1999.  





in model 1, Degree in model 2, Betweenness in model 3, and Eigenvector in model 4. Consistent 
with Mitchell and Lehn (1990), CARs are significantly negative (3 out of the 4 models). Bad 
bidders indeed have higher probability in becoming good targets. Most importantly, the 
interaction between Centrality and CAR is positive and statistically significant in all four models. 
The size of the interactive coefficient Centrality*CAR out-balances the negative coefficient on 
CAR, which implies that the likelihood of being acquired is unaffected by the bidder CAR for 
companies ran by well-connected CEO. Consequently, our findings support Hypothesis H3 that 
well-connected bidder CEOs are insulated from external monitoring by the market for corporate 
control. 
5.3.Bidder CEO Centrality and the Managerial Labor Market 
The executive labor market is an important dimension of corporate governance. It disciplines 
managers and forces them not to deviate from value enhancing policies. Well-governed firms 
optimally fire poorly performing CEOs. Warner et al. (1988) and Weisbach (1988) find that the 
likelihood of a top executive turnover is negatively associated with the firm’s stock returns. The 
forced turnover is a serious threat for a CEO, because his/her reputation, future employment 
opportunities and lifetime income stream are significantly adversely affected (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990). However, for centrally positioned CEOs, the threat of forced turnover may not 
be effective, if they are able to utilize their influence and power gained from their personal 
networks to get insulated from the managerial labor market.  
To determine whether more central acquirer CEOs who perform value-destroying 
acquisitions are insulated from the managerial labor market and can protect themselves from 
getting fired, we follow Lehn and Zhao (2006) in modeling the probability of a disciplinary CEO 





during the sample period. Lehn and Zhao (2006) show that in the model predicting CEO 
disciplinary (i.e. forced) turnover, the bidder CAR is a significantly negative determinant. Thus, 
CEOs responsible for poorly-performing acquisitions are more likely to get replaced. 
We perform our analysis on a subsample of acquisitions that are announced from January 1
st
 
2000 to December 31
st
 2005 to observe whether the CEO is replaced after 5 years from the date 
of the first merger announcement. In addition, following Lehn and Zhao (2006), if there is more 
than one acquisition in the sample, we only keep the first acquisition if all acquisitions are 
conducted by the same CEO. If they are conducted by different CEOs, then we keep the first 
acquisition for each different CEO. Finally, we restrict the sample to include only acquisitions 
where the target constitutes at least 10% of the acquirer’s market value (in order to focus on 
mergers that are “material” for the bidder following Lehn and Zhao 2006). Our final sample 
includes 173 CEOs. 
To get data about CEO turnovers, we download the CEOs data from EXECUCOMP and use 
the annual CEO flag (CEOANN) to identify the firm’s CEO right before the first merger 
announcement during the sample period and compare his/her name and ID number (EXECID) to 
the firm’s CEO after 5 years. If they are not the same then we have to decide whether the CEO’s 
replacement is due to a disciplinary turnover. We follow Lehn and Zhao’s (2006) definition for 
disciplinary turnover. Disciplinary turnovers are when CEOs are replaced by internal 
governance, takeovers, or bankruptcy. We investigate the variable (REASON) in EXECUCOMP 
to check the reason behind the CEO’s replacement. If the reason is missing or unknown we use 
age as a proxy for disciplinary turnovers. If the age of the CEO is less than 65 when replaced 
then we consider it a disciplinary turnover. If the firm is acquired or bankrupt during the 5 year 









P(CEO_Turnover=1) = at + B1High_Centrality +B2CAR + B3High_Centrality * CAR + B4Pre-
ROA(3) + B5Post_ROA(3) + B6Age + B7Tenure + B8Stock_Deal + B9Relative_Target_Size + 
B10Firm_Got_Acquired +  et                                                                                           (5)                                                                                                                             
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is a disciplinary CEO 
turnover within a five year window of the first merger announcement and zero otherwise, 
High_Centrality is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO centrality is above sample the 
median and zero otherwise, CAR is the acquirer shareholder cumulative abnormal returns 
computed at the (-3, +3) event window around the merger announcement, High_Centrality*CAR 
is an interaction term between High_Centrality and CAR, Pre_ROA(3) is the average of 3 year 
firm’s return on assets prior to the merger announcement, Post_ROA(3) is the average of 3 year 
firm’s return on assets after the merger announcement, Age is the age of the CEO, Tenure is the 
tenure of the CEO, Stock_Deal is a dummy that equals 1 if the deal is entirely financed by stock 
and zero otherwise, Relative_Target_Size is the market value of the target divided by the market 
value of the acquirer before the first merger announcement, and Firm_Got_Acquired is a dummy 
that equals 1 if the firm got acquired within a 5 year window and zero otherwise. 
The results for this model are presented in Table 12. In models 1, 2, 3, and 4, we add in the 
High_Centrality to Lehn and Zhao’s (2006) model and an interaction term between 
High_Centrality and CARs to show the incremental effect of centrality on disciplinary CEO 
replacements. Lehn and Zhao (2006) show that CARs are significantly negatively related to 
disciplinary turnovers, i.e. bad bidders end up fired , but if more central CEOs are insulated from 
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 Alternatively, we repeated the Probit model using Centrality as a continuous variable and the 





the managerial labor market , then High_Centrality *CAR should be positive.  
Our results show that the interactive coefficient High_Centrality *CAR indeed is positive in 
all models, and significant in three out of four considered centrality specifications. For all of our 
models the interactive coefficient reverses the negative coefficient on CAR. Thus, while for the 
less central bidder CEOs, the poor acquisition performance (resulting in a negative CAR) 
increases the likelihood of forced turnover (consistent with Lehn and Zhao, 2006), the likelihood 
of forced turnover for well-connected CEOs is unaffected by their previous merger performance. 
This result is consistent with Hypothesis H4 – well-connected CEOs are less likely to be fired 
“for a cause” (that is, because of creating a value-destructive merger deal). Consequently, well-
connected CEOs appear to be less affected by managerial labor markets. 
Equally importantly, the coefficient on High_Centrality is positive and significant in all 
models. That is, well-connected bidder CEOs are replaced more likely regardless of company’s 
performance. This is consistent with Liu (2010) who finds (for the sample of CEOs not involved 
in M&A activities) that more central CEOs have higher likelihood of departure due to their 
valuable personal social networks that help them find alternative outside job opportunities. We 
now turn our attention to the analysis of new jobs acquired by replaced bidder CEOs to see 
whether similar supportive personal social networks play the role for CEOs involved in M&As 
as well. 
Our results are presented in Table 13. We found the new job positions and titles for 
previously fired bidder CEOs in our sample utilizing Lexis Nexis database, as well as Internet 
searches. Our final sample contains 67 CEOs. Anytime a fired CEO is able to find a new position 
that carries a CEO or a Chairman title (including combinations such as CEO&Chairman or 





– which includes titles of President, other Executives, Directors, as well as no reported job – are 
classified as “demotions.” Panel A shows that there is a total of 21 (32%) of CEOs “lateral 
shifts” in our sample. Panel B documents that similarly to Liu (2010), well-connected bidder 
CEOs have a greater chance of the “lateral shift” (on average by more than 11%) Overall, the 
findings in Table 13 provide support for Hypothesis H4B. Even though more central CEOs are 
replaced more often, they have relatively richer opportunities to find a reputable, well-paid job 
after their dismissal. Consequently, they are less likely to be disciplined by the threat of 
dismissal. 
6. Conclusion 
Utilizing BoardEx database, we construct four measures of network centrality for CEOs from 
S&P 1500 companies: Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector. Greater CEO 
centrality may help or hurt bidding companies during the acquisition process. On the one hand, 
well-connected CEOs can benefit from better access to information. On the other hand, central 
network position may allow CEOs to utilize their increasing influence and power to entrench 
themselves and withstand both external (market for corporate control) and internal (managerial 
labor market) monitoring. Our results suggest the latter effect to be the more prevalent.  
We find that greater bidder CEO centrality is associated with greater likelihood of 
completing acquisitions, but also with greater losses to bidder shareholders, and declining (and 
ultimately negative) levels of total takeover synergies. Further supporting the connection 
between high centrality and managerial entrenchment, we also find that bidding companies ran 
by well-connected CEOs are less likely (compared to acquirers with less-central CEOs) to be 
taken over following a value-destroying acquisition. In addition, more central bidder CEOs are 





they are terminated, those CEOs are more likely to find another CEO-equivalent job. Our results 
are robust to various alternative model specifications, and they do not appear to be driven by 
potential CEO overconfidence.  
Overall, we contend that our results provide an important intermediate step, which connects 
the two major findings of previous finance research – the concept of “social connections” 
between any two people and the concept of eventual value losses and poor monitoring due to the 
existence of such network ties. Our findings suggest that well-connected CEOs may become 
powerful enough to be able to pursue any corporate activities, regardless of their potentially 




















Appendix: CEO Centrality Measures 
Table A-1 presents summary statistics on the four measures of CEO centrality for the S&P 
1500 CEOs in the sample in Panel A and on the percentile rankings of those CEOs based on their 
position in the network of all executives and directors of US public companies in Panel B. This 
table shows how different measures of centrality represent different aspects of social-
connectedness. By looking at degree, we can simply know the number of relations a CEO has 
within this large network of all executives and directors. The minimum number of relations is 2. 
However , the minimum Betweenness and Eigenvector centrality measures is zero , which 
suggests that there are some CEOs who have general relations with other executives and 
directors but those relations do not control the flow of information between other CEOs or are 
relations not associated with other important CEOs in the network. By looking at percentile 















)  percentile rank of the network of all executives and directors 
when using Closeness , Degree , Betweenness, and Eigenvector as measures of centrality, 
respectively. Overall, this suggests that the S&P1500 CEOs are central compared to the other 
directors and executives of US public companies.  
    Table A2 classifies the S&P 1500 firms in the sample into Fama and French 12 industry 
classifications. we present the full sample first in Panel A. The largest industry group is Business 
Equipment which represents 18.68% of the sample. It doesn’t seem that there is any certain 
industry clustering in the sample. Then, we break the sample up into Below Median versus 
Above Median sub-groups in Panels B-E based on the CEO’s centrality. Below Median is when 
the CEO centrality is below sample median. Above Median is when the CEO centrality is above 












This table presents summary statistics on the four centrality measures for the CEOs in the sample. The 
sample covers S&P 1500 CEOs in the period spanning from January 1
st
 1999 to December 31
st
 2008. 
Centrality measures are as defined in section 2.1. The statistics are presented for the centrality measures 
in panel A and for the percentile ranks for the sample of CEOs based on the social network of all 
directors and executives of US public companies in panel B.  
 
Panel A : Using Centrality Measures  
    
 
N Mean Median Std. Min. Max. 
Closeness 16415 0.364 0.361 0.049 0.197 1 
Degree 16415 153.85 76 205.870 2 1985 
Betweenness 16415 0.0001 0.000 0.0001 0 0.0037 
Eigenvector 16415 176.27 2.581 1162.986 0 14085.49 












































Table A-2 : Classification by Industry 
 
This table classifies the sample of S&P 1500 firms by industry. Industry classifications are based on Fama and French 12 industry classifications. 
The full sample is presented first in panel A and then broken up into Below Median vs. Above Median sub-groups in panels B-E based on the 
centrality of the firm’s CEO. Below Median is when the CEO centrality is below the sample median. Above Median is when the CEO centrality is 
























Industry N N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Consumer 
Non-Durables 
989 481 49% 508 51% 511 52% 478 48% 541 55% 448 45% 539 54% 450 46% 
Consumer 
Durables 
434 211 49% 223 51% 225 52% 209 48% 192 44% 242 56% 197 45% 237 55% 
Manufacturing 2,022 932 46% 1,090 54% 915 45% 1,107 55% 912 45% 1,110 55% 1,012 50% 1,010 50% 
Oil, Gas and 
Coal 
650 396 61% 254 39% 367 56% 283 44% 312 48% 338 52% 457 70% 193 30% 
Chemical 
Products 
505 134 27% 371 73% 149 30% 356 70% 185 37% 320 63% 196 39% 309 61% 
Business 
Equipment 
3,067 1,261 41% 1,806 59% 1,330 43% 1,737 57% 1,512 49% 1,555 51% 866 28% 2,201 72% 
Telephone and 
Television 
348 159 46% 189 54% 165 47% 183 53% 154 44% 194 56% 167 48% 181 52% 
Utilities 841 458 54% 383 46% 400 48% 441 52% 408 49% 433 51% 488 58% 353 42% 
Wholesale and 
Retail 
1,934 1,119 58% 815 42% 1,117 58% 817 42% 1,116 58% 818 42% 1,171 61% 763 39% 
Healthcare 1,285 627 49% 658 51% 606 47% 679 53% 597 46% 688 54% 685 53% 600 47% 
Finance 2,403 1,546 64% 857 36% 1,456 61% 947 39% 1,483 62% 920 38% 1,575 66% 828 34% 
Other 1,937 1,054 54% 883 46% 1,078 56% 859 44% 1,025 53% 912 47% 1,084 56% 853 44% 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics for Firms’ Financials  
 
This table presents the summary statistics for the S&P 1500 firms and the bidder sample covered in the 
paper, in Panel A and B, respectively. The statistics are presented for the full sample first and then 
classified into Below vs. Above median. Below Median is when the CEO centrality is below the sample 
median. Above Median is when the CEO centrality is above sample median. Each subpanel contains the 
statistics when using Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector as measures of centrality, 
respectively. Size is measured as the log of total assets. Tobin’s Q is measured as the sum of market 
value of equity (end of year price per share * number of shares outstanding at the end of year ), short 
term debt, long term debt, and preferred stock divided by total value of assets. Profitability is measured 
as the return on total assets. Leverage is measured as the ratio of book value of debt to total assets. 
Liquidity is measured as the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets. * **, ** Denotes statistically 
significant difference between means of Below and Above centrality groups at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: S&P 1500 Sample 
A1: Using Closeness Centrality 
  Full Sample Below Median Above Median Difference 
N Mean Median  Mean Median Mean Median 
Below-
Above 
Size 16415 7.607 7.469 7.085 6.954 8.151 8.050 -1.066*** 
Tobin's Q 16415 1.667 1.168 1.609 1.153 1.727 1.184 -0.117*** 
Profitability 16415 0.034 0.041 0.037 0.041 0.030 0.041 0.007*** 
Leverage 16415 0.229 0.211 0.220 0.193 0.239 0.227 -0.019*** 
Liquidity 16415 0.090 0.086 0.090 0.085 0.090 0.088 -0.001 
A2: Using Degree Centrality 
     
Size 16415 7.607 7.469 7.025 6.893 8.205 8.122 -1.180*** 
Tobin's Q 16415 1.667 1.168 1.634 1.171 1.700 1.167 -0.066** 
Profitability 16415 0.034 0.041 0.037 0.042 0.030 0.041 0.007*** 
Leverage 16415 0.229 0.211 0.217 0.193 0.242 0.228 -0.025*** 
Liquidity 16415 0.090 0.086 0.091 0.086 0.089 0.087 0.001 
A3: Using Betweenness Centrality 
     
Size 16415 7.607 7.469 7.215 7.040 8.021 7.920 -0.806*** 
Tobin's Q 16415 1.667 1.168 1.680 1.178 1.653 1.158 0.027 
Profitability 16415 0.034 0.041 0.036 0.042 0.031 0.041 0.005*** 
Leverage 16415 0.229 0.211 0.216 0.190 0.243 0.231 -0.027*** 
Liquidity 16415 0.090 0.086 0.090 0.085 0.090 0.087 -0.000 
A4: Using Eigenvector Centrality 
     
Size 16415 7.607 7.469 7.267 7.133 7.966 7.863 -0.700*** 
Tobin's Q 16415 1.667 1.168 1.549 1.128 1.791 1.223 -0.242*** 
Profitability 16415 0.034 0.041 0.039 0.042 0.029 0.041 0.010*** 
Leverage 16415 0.229 0.211 0.231 0.209 0.227 0.214 0.003 








Panel B :  Bidder Sample  
 
B1: Using Closeness Centrality  
  Full Sample Below Median Above Median Difference 
N Mean Median  Mean Median Mean Median 
Below-
Above 
Size 776 8.754 8.686 8.138 8.013 9.01 9.088 -0.872*** 
Tobin's Q 776 1.935 1.348 1.412 0.985 2.152 1.495 -0.741*** 
Profitability 776 0.052 0.05 0.043 0.028 0.055 0.057 -0.013* 
Leverage 776 0.201 0.189 0.228 0.232 0.19 0.178 0.038*** 
Liquidity 776 0.101 0.096 0.081 0.058 0.109 0.113 -0.028*** 
A2: Using Degree Centrality 
     
Size 776 8.754 8.686 7.797 7.722 9.129 9.253 1.332*** 
Tobin's Q 776 1.935 1.348 1.622 1.097 2.058 1.449 -0.436** 
Profitability 776 0.052 0.05 0.04 0.032 0.056 0.055 -0.016** 
Leverage 776 0.201 0.189 0.232 0.238 0.189 0.179 0.043*** 
Liquidity 776 0.101 0.096 0.085 0.067 0.107 0.108 -0.022*** 
A3: Using Betweenness Centrality 
     
Size 776 8.754 8.686 8.346 8.325 8.99 8.987 -0.644*** 
Tobin's Q 776 1.935 1.348 1.808 1.133 2.009 1.456 -0.201 
Profitability 776 0.052 0.05 0.049 0.035 0.053 0.056 -0.004 
Leverage 776 0.201 0.189 0.215 0.205 0.193 0.182 0.022* 
Liquidity 776 0.101 0.096 0.088 0.074 0.108 0.11 -0.020*** 
A4: Using Eigenvector Centrality 
     
Size 776 8.754 8.686 8.426 8.398 8.901 8.973 -0.475*** 
Tobin's Q 776 1.935 1.348 1.409 1.024 2.171 1.559 -0.762*** 
Profitability 776 0.052 0.05 0.045 0.031 0.055 0.057 -0.009 
Leverage 776 0.201 0.189 0.238 0.233 0.184 0.175 0.054*** 















This table presents the number of acquisitions in the sample classified by year of merger announcement. Date of merger announcement is the 
original date of announcement as reported by SDC. The acquirers are members of S&P 1500 and the targets are U.S. public companies. All 
acquisitions are successfully completed acquisitions. Panel A presents the number of acquisitions for the full sample. Panels B-E divides the 
number of acquisitions into two groups based on the centrality of the acquirer's CEO. Below Median is when the CEO centrality is below sample 
median.  Above Median is when the CEO centrality is above sample median. Panels B, C, D, and E presents the number of acquisitions when 
using Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector as measures of CEO centrality, respectively.    
 
Panel A Panel B : Closeness Panel C : Degree Panel D : Betweenness Panel E : Eigenvector 
Full Sample Below Median Above Median Below Median Above Median Below Median Above Median Below Median Above Median 
Year N N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
2000 114 28 25% 86 75% 31 27% 83 73% 43 38% 71 62% 31 27% 83 73% 
2001 108 25 23% 83 77% 25 23% 83 77% 36 33% 72 67% 30 28% 78 72% 
2002 62 22 35% 40 65% 20 32% 42 68% 21 34% 41 66% 22 35% 40 65% 
2003 69 23 33% 46 67% 23 33% 46 67% 28 41% 41 59% 25 36% 44 64% 
2004 77 27 35% 50 65% 22 31% 55 71% 25 32% 52 68% 29 38% 48 62% 
2005 79 21 27% 58 73% 18 23% 61 77% 29 37% 50 63% 27 34% 52 66% 
2006 82 26 32% 56 68% 24 29% 58 71% 31 38% 51 62% 22 27% 60 73% 
2007 78 21 27% 57 73% 21 27% 57 73% 25 32% 53 68% 23 29% 55 71% 
2008 50 12 24% 38 76% 12 24% 38 76% 19 38% 31 62% 10 20% 40 80% 
2009 57 15 26% 42 74% 16 28% 41 72% 15 26% 42 74% 13 23% 44 77% 








Table 3: Difference in CEO Centrality between Acquirers and Non-Acquirers 
This table presents the univariate tests for difference between centrality of acquirer CEOs versus non-acquirer CEOs. Acquirers are members of S&P 
1500 firms that successfully completed acquisitions of public US targets. The results of the tests are presented using centrality measures in panel A and 
using centrality percentiles in panel B. *** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A : Using Centrality Measures  
 
 











Closeness 16415 0.364 0.361 0.049 776 0.386 0.387 0.047 15639 0.363 0.360 0.049 -12.86*** -13.16*** 
Degree 16415 153.85 76 153.85 776 266.99 151 288.38 15639 148.74 75 199.85 -10.81*** -14.58*** 
Betweenness 16415 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 776 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 15639 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 -7.73*** -11.99*** 
Eigenvector 16415 176.269 2.581 1163.0 776 436.088 17.644 1862.092 15639 164.523 2.285 1119.8 -3.86*** -12.48*** 
 
Panel B: Using Centrality Percentiles  
Closeness 16415 73.00 67.90 21.73 776 75.69 82.00 19.89 15639 67.54 73.00 21.75 -10.63*** -11.11*** 
Degree 16415 71.62 78.00 24.23 776 83.66 91.00 18.42 15639 71.08 78.00 24.33 -17.52*** -15.03*** 
Betweenness 16415 76.06 84.00 24.50 776 84.10 91.00 21.00 15639 75.70 84.00 24.58 -10.34 -11.97*** 









Table 4: Probit Model of Acquisitions 





2009. The dependent variable is the probability that the firm announced a successfully completed acquisition of a US public target. Centrality is the CEO’s 
centrality measured by Closeness in models 2 and 6, Degree in models 3 and 7, Betweenness in models 4 and 8, and Eigenvector in models 5 and 9. 
Intense_Monitoring is a dummy variable that equals 1 if more than 50% of the board directors are classified as intense monitors and zero otherwise, 
Board_Size is the size of the board of directors, Duality is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise, 
Eindex is Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell’s (2009) entrenchment index, age is the CEO’s age, Block_Ownership is a dummy variable that equals one if there is at 
least one block holder that owns 5% or more of the common shares outstanding and zero otherwise, CEO_Ownership is the percentage of shares owned by the 
CEO , and all other variables are as previously defined. All independent variables and controls are lagged one year. P-values are in parentheses.  
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Centrality 0.3156*** 0.6755*** 0.4168*** 0.6162*** 0.2073* 0.5920*** 0.3723*** 0.5004*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0385*** 0.0362*** 0.0326*** 0.0361*** 0.0323*** 0.0338*** 0.0300*** 0.0330*** 0.0305*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Liquidity 0.3903 0.2654 0.1504 0.2648 0.1900 0.3581 0.2201 0.3281 0.2710 
(0.164) (0.348) (0.596) (0.348) (0.502) (0.261) (0.491) (0.302) (0.395) 
Profitability 0.2698 0.3513 0.4491* 0.3472 0.4523* 0.4232 0.5111 0.4420 0.5028 
(0.312) (0.190) (0.096) (0.196) (0.092) (0.173) (0.102) (0.156) (0.106) 
Size 0.2147*** 0.2000*** 0.1775*** 0.1999*** 0.1929*** 0.1840*** 0.1636*** 0.1815*** 0.1760*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.7684*** -0.7653*** -0.7635*** -0.7844*** -0.7360*** -0.8187*** -0.8155*** -0.8304*** -0.7957*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Intense_Monitoring -0.1956*** -0.1902*** -0.1979*** -0.1883*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Board_Size 0.0106 0.0102 0.0105 0.0120 












Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Duality 0.0887** 0.0756* 0.0798* 0.0830* 
(0.043) (0.087) (0.070) (0.059) 
Eindex -0.0126 -0.0122 -0.0119 -0.0094 
(0.400) (0.418) (0.429) (0.535) 
Age -0.0122*** -0.0121*** -0.0128*** -0.0115*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Block_Ownership 0.0328 0.0432 0.0376 0.0397 
(0.561) (0.446) (0.506) (0.482) 
CEO_Ownership -1.0826** -0.8714* -1.0550** -0.9596* 
(0.036) (0.091) (0.042) (0.063) 
Constant -3.3949*** -3.4891*** -3.5908*** -3.5908*** -3.6820*** -2.6182*** -2.7513*** -2.7060*** -2.8540*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 16,415 16,415 16,415 16,415 16,415 13,398 13,398 13,398 13,398 
Pseudo R
2
 7.49% 7.68% 8.33% 7.87% 8.16% 8.42% 8.93% 8.62% 8.75% 














Table 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Merger Announcement 
 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns around the merger announcement over the three day event window (-3, +3) for the acquirer, the combined firm, and the 
target in panels A, B and C, respectively. In each panel, numbers are presented first for the full sample and then divided into three groups based on the centrality of the 
acquirer’s CEO. Group 1 is when the acquirer’s CEO centrality is below the 25
th





 percentile of the sample, and Group3 is when CEO Centrality is above the 75
th
 percentile of the sample. In each panel, the four measures of centrality, Closeness, 
Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector are used to classify the sample into those groups of centrality. The CAR for the combined firm is calculated as the market value 
weighted average of CAR for the acquirer and CAR for the target.  *** . **, * Denotes statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (a), 
(b),(c) denotes that the difference between Group1 and Group3 is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Acquirer CARs  
Full Sample Group1 Group2 Group3 1-3 
 
CAR (-3,+3) N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Diff 
Closeness 776 -1.87%*** -1.41%*** 202 -0.69% -0.84% 405 -2.23%*** -1.77%*** 169 -2.39%*** -1.25%*** 1.7%(b) 
Degree 776 -1.87%*** -1.41%*** 206 -0.51% -1.17% 410 -2.26%*** -1.42%*** 160 -2.61%*** -1.47%*** 2.1%(b) 
Betweenness 776 -1.87%*** -1.41%*** 206 -1.29%*** -1.12%** 411 -2.04%*** -1.77%*** 159 -2.17%*** -1.26%*** 0.9% 
Eigenvector 776 -1.87%*** -1.41%*** 207 -0.48% -0.32% 403 -2.33%*** -1.86%*** 166 -2.48%*** -1.41%*** 2.0%(b) 
Panel B: Combined CARs 
Closeness 776 0.68%** 0.33%** 202 2.25%*** 1.61%*** 405 0.39% 0.07% 169 -0.50% -0.20% 2.8%(a) 
 Degree 776 0.68%** 0.33%** 206 2.68%*** 1.61%*** 410 0.27% 0.20% 160 -0.82%* -0.48% 3.5%(a) 
Betweenness 776 0.68%** 0.33%** 206 1.68%*** 1.22%*** 411 0.62% 0.23% 159 -0.45% -0.20% 2.1%(a) 
Eigenvector 776 0.68%** 0.33%** 207 2.11%*** 1.64%*** 403 0.38% 0.18% 166 -0.35% -0.30% 2.5%(a) 
Panel C : Target CARs 
Closeness 776 27.39%*** 21.28%*** 202 22.20%*** 19.28%*** 405 28.59%*** 22.09%*** 169 30.74%*** 23.69%*** -8.5%(a) 
Degree 776 27.39%*** 21.28%*** 206 23.59%*** 19.71%*** 410 28.59%*** 22.58%*** 160 29.22%*** 23.27%*** -5.6%(c) 
Betweenness 776 27.39%*** 21.28%*** 206 23.22%*** 19.90%*** 411 28.16%*** 21.35%*** 159 30.81%*** 24.07%*** -7.6%(b) 












Table 6 : Effect of Acquirer’s CEO centrality on Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
This table presents the estimates of OLS regression for acquirer cumulative abnormal returns on measures of centrality for acquirer CEO and other control 
variables. The dependent variable is the acquirer CAR over the three day window surrounding the merger announcement. Centrality of acquirer CEO is 
measured by Closeness in models 2 and 6, Degree in models 3 and 7, Betweenness in models 4 and 8, and Eigenvector in models 5 and 9.  Deal Value is the 
deal value as reported by SDC divided by the market value of the acquirer. Same_Industry is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer and target have 
the same 2 digit SIC code and zero otherwise. Stock_Deal is a dummy variable that equals one if the transaction is financed entirely by stock and zero 
otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined. All independent variables and controls are lagged one year. All models include industry and fixed year 
effects. P-values are in parentheses. 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Centrality -0.0763*** -0.0682*** -0.0458*** -0.0798*** -0.0816*** -0.0771*** -0.0548*** -0.0857*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Size -0.0006 0.0034 0.0036 0.0014 0.0029 0.0030 0.0030 0.0008 0.0023 
(0.779) (0.131) (0.130) (0.534) (0.189) (0.284) (0.292) (0.764) (0.408) 
Profitability 0.1629*** 0.1484*** 0.1499*** 0.1567*** 0.1494*** 0.1439*** 0.1440*** 0.1502*** 0.1445*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Tobin's Q -0.0031** -0.0027* -0.0029* -0.0033** -0.0025* -0.0035** -0.0036** -0.0042*** -0.0033** 
(0.038) (0.072) (0.051) (0.027) (0.097) (0.020) (0.019) (0.006) (0.029) 
Leverage 0.0679*** 0.0628*** 0.0585*** 0.0646*** 0.0620*** 0.0656*** 0.0621*** 0.0687*** 0.0649*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Liquidity 0.0326 0.0504 0.0477 0.0430 0.0471 0.0185 0.0187 0.0145 0.0155 
(0.523) (0.319) (0.348) (0.398) (0.351) (0.723) (0.721) (0.782) (0.766) 
Deal_Value -0.0328*** -0.0343*** -0.0345*** -0.0356*** -0.0339*** -0.0398*** -0.0392*** -0.0412*** -0.0391*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Same_Industry 0.0034 -0.0004 0.0013 0.0029 -0.0001 -0.0009 0.0007 0.0024 -0.0010 









Table 6 : Effect of Acquirer’s CEO centrality on Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns (contd.) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Stock_Deal -0.0174** -0.0194*** -0.0173** -0.0170** -0.0182** -0.0141* -0.0123 -0.0120 -0.0132* 
(0.018) (0.008) (0.018) (0.021) (0.012) (0.060) (0.101) (0.110) (0.077) 
Intense_Monitoring -0.0058 -0.0044 -0.0043 -0.0058 
(0.425) (0.548) (0.561) (0.420) 
Board_Size 0.0004 0.0009 0.0007 0.0005 
(0.772) (0.479) (0.562) (0.676) 
Duality 0.0077 0.0083 0.0078 0.0077 
(0.252) (0.221) (0.249) (0.254) 
Eindex 0.0016 0.0023 0.0023 0.0015 
(0.518) (0.359) (0.349) (0.537) 
Age 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
(0.822) (0.827) (0.682) (0.854) 
Block_Ownership 0.0149* 0.0148* 0.0160* 0.0144 
(0.095) (0.099) (0.074) (0.105) 
CEO_Ownership -0.1770** -0.1799** -0.1588** -0.1698** 
(0.027) (0.025) (0.048) (0.033) 
Constant -0.0480* -0.0194 -0.0265 -0.0244 -0.0101 -0.0398 -0.0496 -0.0528 -0.0287 
(0.061) (0.459) (0.309) (0.360) (0.705) (0.321) (0.216) (0.188) (0.480) 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 776 776 776 776 776 685 685 685 685 
Adjusted R
2









Table 7 : Effect of Acquirer’s CEO Centrality on Combined Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
This table presents the estimates of OLS regression for combined cumulative abnormal returns on measures of centrality for acquirer CEO and other control 
variables. The dependent variable is the combined CAR over the three day window surrounding the merger announcement calculated as the weighted market 
value of acquirer CAR and target CAR. Centrality of acquirer CEO is measured by Closeness in models 2 and 6, Degree in models 3 and 7, Betweenness in 
models 4 and 8, and Eigenvector in models 5 and 9. Combined_Size is the total number of employees of both target and acquirer, Combined_Profitability is the 
asset weighted average of acquirer and target return on assets, Combined_Tobin’s Q is the asset weighted average of the acquirer and target Tobin’s Q, 
Combined_Leverage is the asset weighted average of acquirer and target debt to assets ratio, and Combined _Liquidity is the asset weighted average of ratio of 
operating cash flow to assets of acquirer and target. Deal Value is the deal value as reported by SDC divided by the market value of the combined entity. 
Same_Industry is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer and target have the same 2 digit SIC code and zero otherwise. Stock_Deal is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the transaction is financed entirely by stock and zero otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined. All independent 
variables and controls are lagged one year. All models include industry and fixed year effects. P-values are in parentheses. 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)         (6)        (7)         (8)       (9) 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Centrality -0.0696*** -0.0641*** -0.0400*** -0.0696*** -0.0690*** -0.0667*** -0.0444*** -0.0707*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) 
Combined_Size -0.0013 0.0022 0.0019 0.0002 0.0017 0.0012 0.0008 -0.0006 0.0007 
(0.508) (0.312) (0.383) (0.908) (0.411) (0.654) (0.774) (0.822) (0.792) 
Combined_Profitability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.474) (0.414) (0.436) (0.396) (0.375) (0.295) (0.311) (0.292) (0.283) 
Combined_Tobin's Q -0.0028* -0.0022 -0.0025 -0.0029* -0.0020 -0.0034** -0.0034** -0.0041** -0.0032* 
(0.072) (0.162) (0.107) (0.061) (0.194) (0.045) (0.041) (0.016) (0.055) 
Combined_Leverage 0.0502** 0.0456** 0.0420* 0.0470** 0.0440** 0.0548** 0.0515** 0.0563** 0.0532** 
(0.023) (0.037) (0.057) (0.033) (0.045) (0.021) (0.031) (0.018) (0.025) 
Combined_liquidity 0.1191*** 0.1178*** 0.1174*** 0.1206*** 0.1159*** 0.1232*** 0.1250*** 0.1254*** 0.1214*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Same_Industry 0.0072 0.0042 0.0059 0.0070 0.0045 0.0026 0.0040 0.0052 0.0026 
(0.248) (0.495) (0.341) (0.256) (0.469) (0.692) (0.551) (0.431) (0.701) 
Deal_Value 0.0374*** 0.0335** 0.0313** 0.0320** 0.0349*** 0.0230 0.0232 0.0223 0.0247* 
(0.005) (0.012) (0.020) (0.018) (0.009) (0.121) (0.120) (0.140) (0.096) 
Stock_Deal -0.0163** -0.0183*** -0.0160** -0.0161** -0.0173** -0.0158** -0.0142* -0.0140* -0.0151** 
(0.022) (0.009) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014) (0.036) (0.060) (0.065) (0.045) 
Intense_Monitoring 0.0000 0.0011 0.0011 0.0000 
(0.999) (0.883) (0.8800) (0.995) 
Board_Size 0.0004 0.0010 0.0006 0.0004 










Table 7 : Effect of Acquirer’s CEO Centrality on Combined Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(contd.) 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)         (6)        (7)        (8)        (9) 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Duality 0.0060 0.0068 0.0060 0.0059 
(0.377) (0.321) (0.379) (0.385) 
Eindex 0.0021 0.0026 0.0028 0.0021 
(0.385) (0.289) (0.253) (0.386) 
Age  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 
(0.667) (0.682) (0.806) (0.640) 
Block_Ownership 0.0046 0.0043 0.006 0.0044 
(0.606) (0.633) (0.529) (0.621) 
CEO_Ownership -0.1554* -0.1586* -0.1371* -0.1481* 
(0.054) (0.050) (0.090) (0.066) 
Constant -0.0268* 0.0167 0.0180 0.0022 0.0194 0.0061 0.0005 -.01510 0.0102 





















Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 776 776 776 776 776 685 685 685 685 
Adjusted R
2
 4.78% 6.76% 6.25% 5.57% 6.54% 7.55% 7.14% 7.58% 7.45% 













Table 8 : Effect of Acquirer’s CEO Centrality on Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
This table presents the estimates of OLS regression for target cumulative abnormal returns on measures of centrality for acquirer CEO and control variables. The 
dependent variable is the target CAR over the three day window surrounding the merger announcement. Centrality of the acquirer CEO is measured by Closeness in 
models 2 and 6, Degree in models 3 and 7, Betweenness in models 4 and 8, and Eigenvector in models 5 and 9. All other variables are as previously defined. The 
size, profitability, Tobin’s Q, leverage, and liquidity are calculated for the target firm. All independent variables and controls are lagged one year. All models 
include industry and fixed year effects. P-values are in parentheses. 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
 
Centrality 0.1120* 0.1376** 0.0646 0.1306** 0.1063 0.1263* 0.0550 0.1279* 
(0.068) (0.035) (0.244) (0.047) (0.110) (0.082) (0.365) (0.072) 
Size -0.0192** -0.0220*** -0.0232*** -0.0203*** -0.0218*** -0.0210** -0.0212** -0.0195** -0.0209** 
(0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.022) (0.021) (0.033) (0.023) 
Profitability -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.991) (0.943) (0.950) (0.952) (0.917) (0.921) (0.903) (0.877) (0.951) 
Tobin's Q -0.0099* -0.0125** -0.0126** -0.0108* -0.0126** -0.0130** -0.0131** -0.0115* -0.0131** 
(0.098) (0.043) (0.039) (0.075) (0.041) (0.046) (0.044) (0.072) (0.042) 
Leverage 0.0051 0.0144 0.0212 0.0093 0.0169 0.0474 0.0534 0.0418 0.0499 
(0.930) (0.804) (0.715) (0.872) (0.771) (0.447) (0.394) (0.502) (0.424) 
Liquidity -0.2784*** -0.2598*** -0.2592*** -0.2732*** -0.2598*** -0.1957*** -0.1956*** -0.2068*** -0.1943*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) 
Deal_Value -0.0754** -0.0656** -0.0604** -0.0682** -0.0668** -0.0514 -0.0500 -0.0555 -0.0523 
(0.012) (0.031) (0.050) (0.026) (0.027) (0.164) (0.176) (0.136) (0.155) 
Same_Industry 0.0076 0.0154 0.0146 0.0092 0.0157 0.0090 0.0073 0.0031 0.0099 
(0.751) (0.527) (0.545) (0.702) (0.517) (0.733) (0.781) (0.906) (0.709) 
Stock_Deal -0.0802*** -0.0723*** -0.0752*** -0.0785*** -0.0739*** -0.0884*** -0.0905*** -0.0942*** -0.0894*** 
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Intense_Monitoring 0.0050 0.0023 0.0024 0.0051 
(0.865) (0.937) (0.934) (0.862) 
Board_Size 0.0019 0.0007 0.0016 0.0018 
(0.670) (0.877) (0.726) (0.679) 
Duality -0.0272 -0.0293 -0.0265 -0.0271 
(0.311) (0.277) (0.326) (0.313) 
Eindex -0.0048 -0.0054 -0.0065 -0.0045 










Table 8 : Effect of Acquirer’s CEO Centrality on Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(contd.) 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Age  0.0011 0.0011 0.0009 0.0012 
(0.583) (0.577) (0.633) (0.545) 
Block_Ownership -0.0654* -0.0647* -0.0669* -0.0649* 
(0.068) (0.071) (0.062) (0.070) 
CEO_Ownership 0.1523 0.1631 0.1257 0.1388 
(0.636) (0.613) (0.696) (0.666) 
Constant 0.5045*** 0.4277*** 0.4073*** 0.4542*** 0.4103*** 0.3527** 0.3469** 0.4032*** 0.3270** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.017) (0.004) (0.028) 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 776 776 776 776 776 685 685 685 685 
Adjusted R
2
 9.05% 9.34% 9.47% 9.10% 9.41% 7.72% 7.79% 7.48% 7.82% 
 
***, **, * Denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  












Table 9: Effect of Board Constraints and CEO Characteristics on Likelihood of Acquisition  
This table summarizes the coefficients of the explanatory variables of the Probit model of acquisitions while 
considering the effect of board constraints and CEO characteristics. The dependent variable is the probability 
that the firm announced a successfully completed acquisition of a US public target. High_Centrality is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the CEO centrality is above the sample median and zero otherwise. The 
centrality is measured using Closeness in column 1, Degree in column 2, Betweenness in column 3, and 
Eigenvector in column 4. Intense_Monitoring is a dummy variable that equals 1 if more than 50% of the board 
directors are classified as intense monitors and zero otherwise, High_Centrality * Intense_Monitoring is an 
interaction term between High_Centrality and Intense_Monitoring, Small_Board is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the board size is less than eight and zero otherwise, High_Centrality * Small_Board is an interaction 
term between High_Centrality and Small_Board, CEO_not_Chair is a dummy that  equals one if the CEO is 
not the chairman of the board and zero otherwise, High_Centrality * CEO_not_Chair is an interaction term 
between High_Centrality and CEO_not_Chair, Low_ Eindex is a dummy variable that equals 1 if  Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrell’s (2009) entrenchment index is lower than the sample median and zero otherwise,  
High_Centrality * Low_Eindex is an interaction term between High_Centrality and Low_Eindex , Older_CEO  
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO’s age is above the sample median and zero otherwise, 
High_Centrality * Older_CEO is an interaction term between High_Centrality and Older_CEO, 
Block_Ownership is a dummy variable that equals one if there is at least one block holder that owns 5% or 
more of the common shares outstanding and zero otherwise, High_Centrality * Block_Ownership is an 
interaction term between High_Centrality and Block_Ownership, High_CEO_Ownership is a  dummy variable 
that equals one if the CEO’s percentage ownership of firm’s common stock is higher than the sample median 
and zero otherwise , High_Centrality * High_CEO_Ownership is an interaction term between High_Centrality 
and High_CEO_Ownership. The models include controls for size, profitability, Tobin’s q, leverage, and 
liquidity. All independent variables and controls are lagged one year. P-values are in parentheses. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 











(0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) 
Intense_Monitoring -0.2889*** -0.2507*** -0.3610*** -0.3181*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High_Centrality * 
Intense_Monitoring 
0.1422* 0.0827 0.2583*** 0.1927** 
(0.090) (0.323) (0.001) (0.010) 
High_Centrality 0.1078** 0.1490*** 0.0612 0.1440*** 
(0.031) (0.004) (0.194) (0.003) 
Small_Board -0.1461** -0.0588 -0.0477 -0.1142* 
(0.031) (0.377) (0.453) (0.093) 
High_Centrality * 
Small_Board 
0.3572*** 0.2050** 0.1986** 0.2886*** 
(0.000) (0.012) (0.012) (0.001) 
High_Centrality 0.2427*** 0.2866*** 0.1044** 0.2353*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
CEO_Not_Chair 0.0220 0.0912 -0.0773 -0.0321 
(0.716) (0.135) (0.152) (0.551) 





CEO_Not_Chair (0.586) (0.053) (0.053) (0.545) 
High_Centrality 0.1713** 0.1983*** 0.0329 0.1800*** 
(0.017) (0.006) (0.463) (0.000) 
Low_Eindex 0.0232 0.0558 -0.0632 -0.0120 
(0.731) (0.416) (0.244) (0.826) 
High_Centrality * 
Low_Eindex 
0.0891 0.0369 0.2354*** 0.1374** 
(0.298) (0.668) (0.000) (0.018) 
High_Centrality 0.1833*** 0.1748*** 0.0911** 0.2043*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.029) (0.000) 
Older_CEO -0.1991*** -0.2237*** -0.2784*** -0.2214*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High_Centrality * 
Older_CEO 
0.1035 0.1297* 0.2185*** 0.1419** 
(0.183) (0.099) (0.001) (0.035) 
High_Centrality 0.1990*** 0.1933*** 0.0890** 0.2096*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) 
Block_Ownership -0.1195* -0.1041 -0.1980*** -0.1386** 
(0.082) (0.126) (0.002) (0.036) 
High_Centrality * 
Block_Ownership 
0.1400 0.1151 0.2699*** 0.1843** 
(0.119) (0.200) (0.001) (0.028) 
High_Centrality 0.2293*** 0.2173*** 0.0829* 0.2108*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) 
High_ 
CEO_Ownership 
-0.0360 -0.0458 -0.1451*** -0.0868 
(0.576) (0.478) (0.008) (0.123) 
High_Centrality * 
High_ CEO_Ownership 
0.0282 0.0343 0.1960*** 0.1169* 
(0.729) (0.674) (0.003) (0.079) 









Table 10: Effect of Board Constraints and CEO Characteristics on Acquirer Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns  
This table summarizes the coefficients of the explanatory variables in the OLS regression for acquirer 
cumulative abnormal returns on measures of centrality for acquirer CEO, board constraints, CEO 
characteristics, and other control variables. The dependent variable is the acquirer CAR over the three day 
window surrounding the merger announcement. All models include controls for bidder’s size, profitability, 
Tobin’s q, leverage, and liquidity. The centrality is measured using Closeness in column 1, Degree in column2, 
Betweenness in column3, and Eigenvector in column 4. All independent variables and controls are lagged one 











Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
 
High_Centrality -0.0108 -0.0189*** -0.0051 -0.0143** 
(0.109) (0.006) (0.427) (0.035) 
Intense_Monitoring 0.0017 -0.0029 -0.0111 0.0043 
 
(0.884) (0.801) (0.312) (0.694) 
High_Centrality * 
Intense_Monitoring 
-0.0116 -0.0027 0.0059 -0.0161 
(0.369) (0.832) (0.647) (0.211) 
High_Centrality -0.0197*** -0.0147* -0.0104 -0.0167** 
(0.010) (0.054) (0.132) (0.027) 
Small_Board -0.0190** -0.0008 -0.0176* -0.0050 
(0.043) (0.930) (0.064) (0.602) 
High_Centrality * 
Small_Board 
0.0270** -0.0132 0.0216* -0.0026 
(0.039) (0.308) (0.091) (0.844) 
High_Centrality -0.0125 -0.0136* -0.0017 -0.0182** 
(0.119) -0.09 (0.822) (0.022) 
CEO_Not_Chair 0.0022 0.0053 0.0027 0.0025 
(0.791) (0.520) (0.751) (0.771) 
High_Centrality * 
CEO_Not_Chair 
-0.0092 -0.0174 -0.0087 -0.0079 
(0.443) (0.149) (0.473) (0.509) 
High_Centrality -0.0137 -0.0072 -0.0013 -0.0119 
(0.161) (0.466) (0.893) (0.219) 
Low_Eindex -0.0128 -0.0022 -0.0094 -0.0067 
(0.118) (0.786) (0.254) (0.406) 
High_Centrality * 
Low_Eindex 
0.0034 -0.0191 -0.0048 -0.0107 
(0.778) (0.113) (0.687) (0.367) 
High_Centrality -0.0136 -0.0181** 0.0013 -0.0234*** 
(0.119) (0.041) (0.881) (0.009) 
Older_CEO 0.0067 0.0072 -0.0050 0.0016 
(0.417) (0.390) (0.563) (0.842) 
High_Centrality * 
Older_CEO 
-0.0041 -0.0032 0.0116 0.0052 












          High_Centrality -0.0137* -0.0220*** -0.0059 -0.0195*** 
(0.053) (0.002) (0.363) (0.006) 
Block_Ownership -0.0036 -0.0062 -0.0018 -0.0035 
(0.703) (0.517) (0.861) (0.720) 
High_Centrality * 
Block_Ownership 0.0098 0.0154 0.0063 0.0085 
(0.485) (0.271) (0.652) (0.547) 
High_Centrality -0.0134 -0.0193** -0.0136 -0.0101 
(0.152) (0.039) (0.262) (0.269) 
High_ 
CEO_Ownership 
0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0006 0.0105 
(0.858) (0.935) (0.944) (0.221) 
High_Centrality * 
High_ CEO_Ownership 
-0.0054 -0.0011 0.0009 -0.0237* 
(0.659) (0.930) (0.940) (0.052) 








Table 11: Effect of Acquirer’s CEO Centrality on Probability of the Bidder Being 
Subsequently Acquired 
 
This table presents the estimates of the Probit model of likelihood of bidder becoming a successfully acquired 
target. The model is conducted on a subsample of successfully completed acquisitions by S&P 1500 bidders of 
US public targets within the first six years of the sample (January 1
st
 2000- December 31
st
 2005) . Deals are 
restricted to include acquisitions where targets represent at least 5% of the market value of the bidders. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the bidder becomes a successfully acquired target 
within a five year window of the date of merger announcement and zero otherwise. Centrality of the acquirer’s 
CEO is measured by Closeness, Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
CAR is the Cumulative abnormal returns for the acquirer surrounding a three day window of the merger 
announcement. If the bidder has more than one deal during this subsample, then CAR represents the sum of the 
CARs of those deals. Centrality * CAR is an interaction term between the acquirer CEO Centrality and CAR. 
Relative_Target_Size is the market value of the target divided by the market value of the bidder. All other 
variables are as previously defined. All independent variables and controls are calculated at one year before the 
beginning of the sample. P-values are in parentheses.  
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
Centrality 0.6777 0.3231 0.5380 0.3462 
(0.174) (0.511) (0.168) (0.488) 
CAR -6.6713** -7.4001* -6.5628 -7.4226* 
(0.042) (0.066) (0.121) (0.059) 
Centrality * CAR 10.4878** 9.9764** 8.2805* 9.7070** 
(0.030) (0.049) (0.092) (0.048) 
Size -0.1521*** -0.1393** -0.1388** -0.1419** 
(0.009) (0.021) (0.016) (0.013) 
Profitability -2.7693** -2.5605** -2.6226** -2.9475** 
(0.021) (0.030) (0.027) (0.015) 
Tobin's Q -0.0096 -0.0087 -0.0097 -0.0086 
(0.601) (0.636) (0.598) (0.636) 
Leverage 0.1183 0.0876 0.0992 0.0428 
(0.842) (0.883) (0.866) (0.942) 
Relative_Target_Size -1.2930** -1.4130*** -1.2432** -1.2286** 
(0.014) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018) 
Constant 0.7087 0.8259 0.5938 0.8153 
(0.195) (0.129) (0.290) (0.178) 
N 222 222 222 222 
Pseudo R
2
 7.63% 7.57% 7.55% 7.07% 
 







Table 12 : CEO Turnover Analysis 
 
This table presents the results of Probit estimation applied on the subsample of acquirers that announced 
completed acquisitions of US public targets between January 1
st
 2000 and December 30
th
 2005. This 
sample is also restricted to include targets that represent at least 10% of the market value of acquirer. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is a disciplinary CEO turnover within a 5 
year window from the date of first merger announcement and zero otherwise. Disciplinary turnover is as 
defined in section 5.3. High_Centrality is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the centrality is above the 
sample median and zero otherwise. Centrality is measured using Closeness in model 1, Degree in model 2, 
Betweenness in model 3, and Eigenvector in model 4. CAR is the 3 day cumulative abnormal returns 
around the first merger announcement. High_Centrality * CAR is an interaction term between 
High_Centrality and CAR. Pre_ROA (3) is the average of 3 year firm’s return on assets prior to the merger 
announcement. Post_ROA (3) is the average of 3 year firm’s return on assets after the merger 
announcement. Age is the age of the CEO. Tenure is the tenure of the CEO. Stock_Deal is a dummy that 
equals 1 if the deal is entirely financed by stock and zero otherwise. Relative_Target_Size is the market 
value of the target divided by the market value of the acquirer before the first merger announcement. 
Firm_Got_Acquired is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm got acquired within a 5 years window 
and zero otherwise. P-values are included in parentheses. 
 
 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Closeness Degree Betweenness Eigenvector 
High_Centrality 0.7738*** 0.7284*** 0.4477* 0.3387 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.051) (0.122) 
CAR -2.4099 -2.2915 -2.7514* -0.5192 
 
(0.206) (0.215) (0.099) (0.750) 
High_Centrality * CAR 4.4347* 4.3782* 5.3283** 0.9627 
 
(0.071) (0.073) (0.023) (0.666) 
Pre_ROA(3) -1.5726 -1.7082 -1.1153 -1.1217 
 
(0.258) (0.221) (0.412) (0.401) 
Post_ROA(3) -0.5763 -0.4995 -0.5244 -0.4807 
 
(0.220) (0.291) (0.281) (0.312) 
Age 0.0052 0.0057 0.0052 0.0099 
 
(0.732) (0.705) (0.731) (0.508) 
Tenure 0.0215 0.0188 0.0150 0.0160 
 
(0.227) (0.288) (0.396) (0.360) 
Stock_Deal -0.2928 -0.2354 -0.2272 -0.1870 
 
(0.208) (0.304) (0.317) (0.405) 
Relative_Target_Size 0.0588 0.1752 0.0536 0.1065 
 
(0.917) (0.760) (0.925) (0.847) 
Firm_Got_Acquired 0.7772*** 0.7548*** 0.6857*** 0.7980*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
Constant -1.2551 -1.2648 -1.0697 -1.3201 
 
(0.133) (0.132) (0.189) (0.111) 
N 173 173 173 173 
Pseudo R
2
 13.58% 13.16% 11.38% 9.51% 







Table 13: Departed CEOs New Jobs 
 
This table presents statistics on the jobs of the departed CEOs. Those CEOs constitute a subsample of 
bidders that announced completed acquisitions of US public targets between January 1
st
 2000 and 
December 30
th
 2005 and whose targets represent 10% of the market value of the bidder. Matching the 
bidder sample to ExecuComp results in 173 CEOs out of which 67 CEOs were forced to leave their 
position. Panel A classifies those CEOs based on their position in the new firm. Panel B compares 
the lateral shift in the new position of the CEO based on his centrality. Low Centrality is when the 
CEO’s centrality is below the median’s sample and High Centrality is when the CEO’s centrality is 
above the sample’s median.  
 
  
Panel A : Distribution of CEOs new jobs  
 
New position Number of CEOs % of Total departed CEOs 
CEO 6 9% 
CEO & Chairman 3 5% 
CEO & President 4 6% 
Chairman 8 12% 
President 2 3% 
Other in same company 7 10% 
Executive in other 
companies 11 16% 
Director in other 
companies 16 24% 
No future job 10 15% 
Total departed  CEOs 67 100% 
  
Panel B :  Lateral shift in CEO's new position based on CEO centrality 
 
 
Low Centrality High Centrality 
 
% of CEOs that had lateral shift in  position 
Closeness 24% 35% 
Degree 26% 33% 
Betweenness 26% 34% 








IV. THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM IN MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS 
Abstract: We document that shareholder activism significantly affects takeover outcomes. Firms 
receiving shareholder proposals are 30% more likely to become a target of a subsequent 
completed acquisition. At the same time, target companies with previous shareholder proposals 
earn approximately 6% lower abnormal acquisition returns compared to the targets with no 
proposals. The higher acquisition likelihood and lower target returns are both more significant 
for the “relevant” shareholder proposals – those that are more recent and/or frequent, motivated 
by the removal of antitakeover provisions, as well as associated with the larger voting 
participation and/or larger proportion of votes cast in favor of the proposal. The above findings 
suggest shareholder activism facilitates functioning of the market for corporate control. 
Shareholder proposals may assist bidders in identification of targets suitable for (possibly 
disciplining) takeovers and/or signal the willingness to sell the shares held by potentially 
concerned target shareholders. One potential information channel that enables acquisitions is the 
common share ownership. We show that takeover likelihood increases the most for targets where 
the proposal sponsor also holds shares in the bidder firm. 
1. Introduction  
Support for shareholder proposals has increased dramatically since the shareholder 
proposal rule came into existence in 1943. Extensive finance research has been conducted on the 
trends of shareholder proposals over time, the support from management and the effect of such 
proposals on internal governance issues such as CEO turnover, executive compensation, as well 





Thomas and Cotter 2007; Ertimur et al. 2010; Renneboog and Szilagyi 2011). While proposal 
implementation by directors has grown over time (Brownstein and Kirman 2004; Morgan and 
Wolf 2006; Thomas and Cotter 2007), the evidence on the creation of shareholder value has been 
mixed. Some studies document little or no evidence of improvement in long-term stock returns 
performance or operating performance after activism (Karpoff et al. 1996; Song and Szewczyk 
2003; Thomas and Cotter 2007), while others find improvement in long run operating 
performance or positive market returns (Brav et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009; Buchanan et al. 
2010).
40,41 
There is relatively little empirical evidence on the impact of shareholder activism on 
takeover outcomes, even though many shareholder proposals are motivated by the removal of 
various antitakeover provisions such as poison pills, classified boards, supermajority 
requirements, etc.
42
 This lack of evidence is particularly notable given that shareholder activism 
often represents a form of concern or outright dissatisfaction with the activities of firm’s 
management (Gillan and Starks, 2000). As such, the existence of shareholder proposals should 
have the potential to influence the likelihood of the company becoming a takeover target, as they 
can be considered a factor facilitating external governance mechanisms designed to correct 
                                                           
40
 Some researchers further document positive short-term market reaction to the announcement 
of certain types of shareholder activism (Strickland et al. 1996; Smith 1996). However, Gillan 
and Starks (2000) argue that no definitive conclusions can be made using short-term stock 
market reaction to measure the impact of activism. 
41
 Shareholder activism tends to be associated with improved internal governance. For example, 
Buchanan et al. (2010) show that firms with active shareholders are more likely to force CEO 
turnovers and have more independent boards. Del Guercio et al. (2008) explore "just vote no" 
campaigns, where active shareholders show their dissatisfaction by abstaining from director 
elections. The authors document improvements in operating performance and involuntary CEO 
turnovers.  
42
 Several studies expect the link between shareholder proposals and acquisition outcomes. For 
example, Greenwood and Schor (2009) argue that the lack of evidence of significant value 






internal governance problems. If managers commit to value-enhancing policies as the response 
to the proposal, the likelihood of the subsequent acquisition declines.
43
 On the other hand, 
shareholder proposals may increase the chances of subsequent acquisitions if the management is 
unable or unwilling to commit to value-improving activities. Shareholder activism – both the 
existence of proposals and the subsequent voting outcome - can help potential bidders to identify 
the suitable targets of acquisitions - especially disciplining takeovers designed to reverse internal 
governance failures and discipline target managements (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Jensen 1986, 
1988).
44
 Levit and Malenko (2011) in fact argue that shareholder proposal voting has a signaling 
value not only for the firm’s management, but also for the potential bidders. 
The existence of shareholder proposals should also influence the abnormal returns 
accrued to targets of completed acquisitions. Target shareholders may benefit from potentially 
higher incidence of multiple bidders attracted by the existence of the proposal. On the other 
hand, shareholder proposals may signal the existence of the group of target shareholders willing 
to sell (and thus having low reservation values) and/or may limit the power of target 
management to negotiate higher premiums. Both of the above reasons have been associated with 
lower target acquisition gains (Stulz, et al., 1990; Song and Walkling, 1993). 
In this paper, we utilize the comprehensive sample of corporate-governance-oriented 
shareholders proposals from Georgeson’s annual reviews to study the link between shareholder 
activism and takeover outcomes. Our sample covers S&P 1500 firms from 1996 to 2009, during 
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 The same effect would be observed even in cases when the management adopts policies 
designed to further entrench itself as the response to the takeover proposal. We do not consider 
this outcome likely given the recent evidence of non-confrontational attitude of managers toward 
shareholder activism (Brownstein and Kirman, 2004). 
44
 Disciplining takeovers occur to eliminate inefficient target management who do not maximize 
shareholder wealth, and are generally associated with both gains to target shareholders and 






which 755 companies received 3,631 shareholder proposals.  Unlike previous studies that focus 
on the types of shareholder proposals (e.g. Ertimur et al. 2010; Renneboog et al. 2011) we 
examine the impact of shareholder-voter turnout (or voting participation), the percentage of 
favorable votes, and the “relevance” of each proposal, and associate proposal characteristics and 
voting outcomes to the future probability of corporate control market activities. More 
specifically, we study the impact of proposals motivated by the removal of antitakeover 
provisions, the role of the frequency and timing of proposals, as well as the influence of voter 
participation and voter preference (proportion of votes cast in favor of the proposal) on takeover 
outcomes. In order to test the possible information communication channels that facilitate 
acquisition processes, we also study the effects of shareholder proposals by sponsors who hold 
shares in both the target and the bidder firms.  
Based on the analysis of the sample of 3,631 proposals received by 755 firms, the main 
results of our study are: 
- Controlling for known determinants of takeover likelihood,
45
 shareholder activism 
significantly increases chances of subsequent completed acquisition. Firms receiving 
shareholder proposals are associated with approximately 30% relatively higher 
chance of becoming a target of a subsequent completed acquisition. 
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 Factors typically used in the literature to investigate the probability of takeover include 
company specific characteristics such as : inefficiency of management (measured by firm 
performance; firms that underperform are more likely to be acquired), asset undervaluation 
(measured by market to book value ; firms with low market to book ratios represent bargains to 
bidders), firm size (larger firms are more costly to acquire) and leverage (leverage disciplines 
management) and industry effects (firms in industries with intense merger activity will more 
likely get acquired). See for example, Palepu (1986); Ambrose and Megginson (1992); Billet 





- Shareholder activism is associated with significantly smaller target abnormal 
acquisition returns. Target companies with previous shareholder proposals earn 
approximately 6% lower abnormal acquisition returns compared to the targets with no 
proposals. 
- The higher acquisition likelihood and the lower target abnormal gains are primarily 
associated with proposals that are more recent, more frequent, motivated by the 
removal of antitakeover provisions, as well as proposals associated with the larger 
voting participation and the larger proportions of votes cast for the proposal. 
- Takeover likelihood increases the most for targets where the proposal sponsor also 
holds shares in the bidder firm. 
Overall, the results of our study suggest that shareholder activism facilitates functioning 
of the market for corporate control. Since corporate takeovers have the power to limit value-
destroying self-serving activities of management (Grossman and Hart, 1980), our study implies 
that shareholder proposals support external governance, in addition to improved internal 
governance documented by the previous research. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Hypotheses are presented in Section 2. 
Section 3 describes data and methodology. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Hypotheses 
2.1. Takeover Likelihood  
 Shareholder activism is often the consequence of concerns or dissatisfaction of firm 
owners with the activities of the management (Gillan and Starks, 2000). Since shareholder 





that they affect external corporate governance and influence the takeover likelihood. If managers 
consider the proposal a “warning” that a (disciplining) takeover is possible (in which case they 
are likely to get replaced, see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, or Grossman and Hart, 1980), they 
may be willing to commit to value enhancing activities, rendering the actual takeover less 
necessary, and less likely.
46
 If, however, the managers are unable or unwilling to improve 
corporate values, shareholder activism – both the existence and the strength of support behind 
the proposals – may help bidders to identify prospective (disciplining) acquisition targets, 
leading to higher takeover likelihood. Levit and Malenko (2011) support this assumption – they 
show that shareholder proposal voting affects activities of the potential bidders. Ultimately, the 
impact of shareholder proposals on takeover likelihood is an empirical issue. 
Hypothesis 1 [1A]: Shareholder activism is associated with increased [decreased] takeover 
likelihood.  
2.2. Target Abnormal Acquisition Returns 
 Target abnormal returns increase in case of multiple bidder auctions (e.g. Stulz et al., 
1990). Since shareholder activism is easily observable, firms receiving shareholder proposals 
may attract multiple bidders, and thus may experience larger target shareholder gains. However, 
Stulz et al. (1990) and Song and Walkling (1993) argue that in order to extract higher target 
abnormal returns, target managers must have strong power to negotiate with the bidders and 
target shareholders must have the ability to signal the high reservation price required for them to 
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 Safieddine and Titman (1999) show that managers of companies with ample free cash flows 
and lack of growth opportunities often pre-commit to leverage increases in order to defeat 
imminent takeover threat. The target shareholders still reap substantial gains, because the higher 
debt levels lead to optimal payment of the cash flows to the investors rather than suboptimal 





tender their shares. Since shareholder activism can leave target management weakened and can 
serve as a signal that potentially dissatisfied target investors are willing to sell for a relatively 
low price, target abnormal returns may be lower in case of firms affected by shareholder 
proposals. Ultimately, the impact of shareholder proposals on target abnormal acquisition gains 
is an empirical issue. 
Hypothesis 2 [2A]: Shareholder activism is associated with lower [higher] target abnormal 
acquisition returns. 
2.3. The Impact of Shareholder Proposal Characteristics and of the Support for the Proposal 
 Previous finance research documents that shareholder proposals have many motives. 
They can be driven by concerns over internal governance issues (such as executive 
compensation, board structure and independence, voting procedures), desires to affect firm 
activities (such as asset sales), or attempts to remove antitakeover barriers. Out of all the above 
reasons, we expect that proposals motivated by the removal of antitakeover provisions to be the 
most significantly related to the changes in takeover likelihood and abnormal target returns. 
Also, we predict that shareholder proposals should affect acquisition decisions if they were 
submitted more recently or if there were multiple shareholder proposals put forward. Ertimur et 
al. (2010) also show sponsors of shareholder proposals range from reputable investors and 
institutions with substantial investment experience to activist shareholders with non-business 
agendas or even individual investors without considerable business knowledge. We expect that 
more substantive proposals – that is those that draw larger shareholder voting participation and 
or larger fraction of votes in support – should be primarily associated with changes in takeover 





Hypothesis 3: Changes in takeover likelihood and target acquisition abnormal returns should be 
more statistically significant for firms receiving shareholder proposals that are more recent, 
submitted by multiple sponsors, motivated by the removal of antitakeover provisions, as well as 
associated with larger shareholder participation and larger fraction of votes cast in favor of the 
proposal. 
2.4. The Impact of Share Cross-Ownership by Shareholder Proposal Sponsors 
      Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) show that ownership of shares in both the target and the 
bidder (share cross-ownership) is associated with greater target abnormal returns and greater 
voting support of cross-holding investors in favor of the acquisition.
47
 If shareholder proposals 
are used by the market to identify possible takeover targets, we expect that cross-ownership by 
shareholder proposal sponsors can serve as a valuable information channel that helps the bidder 
to assess the suitability of a potential target firm. Alternatively, the cross-holding shareholder 
proposal sponsor may submit the proposal in the target company in anticipation of the 
subsequent takeover attempt, in order to reduce the cost of acquisition for the bidder. 
Hypothesis 4: Changes in takeover likelihood and target acquisition abnormal returns should be 
more statistically significant for firms receiving shareholder proposals from sponsors holding 
shares both in the target and the bidder firms. 
3. Data  
3.1. Shareholder Proposals 
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 Harford, Jenter, and Li (2011) further document that the incidence of share cross-holdings 
increased rapidly over the last 20 years, mostly due to indexing and quasi-indexing. In contrast to 
Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008), though, Harford et al. (2011) find less evidence of meaningful 





We collect data on shareholder proposals from Georgeson’s annual reviews from 1996 to 
2009, which covers the companies from the S&P 1500 index. We obtain companies’ names, the 
proposals, type of sponsors, votes cast for and against as a percentage of shares voted, and the 
votes cast for and against and abstentions as a percentage of the company’s total voting power. 
Our sample contains 3631 proposals on 755 companies for the period spanning 1996 until 2009. 
Following Gillan and Starks 2000, we manually classify all shareholder proposals into 6 groups. 
In the Appendix Table A1, we list the types of proposals included under each of the six groups: 
1) proposals related to repealing antitakeover devices; 2) voting issues; 3) board and committee 
independent issues; 4) other governance issues; 5) selling the company; and 6) other non-
governance issues.  
      We conduct a number of univariate exercises to validate our data. The tables are included 
in the Appendix to improve the presentation and readability of the main paper. Table A2 reports 
the numbers of companies receiving proposals across the sample period (Panel A) and within a 
given year (Panel B). Similarly to Gillan and Starks (2000), about 61% of the 755 companies 
receiving proposals received more than one proposal over the sample period time. Moreover, 
companies do receive multiple proposals in one year. In attempts to understand what areas in 
governance are receiving the shareholders’ interest and how this interest is evolving across time; 
we classify the proposals according to proposal type and year of submission in Table A3. Note 
first that the number of shareholder proposals submitted peaked in 2003. Goergeson reports that 
the reason for the decline in the 2004 proxy season is due to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s access proposal that was published in October 2003 and which provides 
shareholders a method to add their nominees for director to company proxy statements. Another 





governance where receiving the greatest interest, at the beginning of the sample period, the 
shareholder proposals mainly focused on repealing anti-takeover devices (55%) and board 
independence issues (35%), while moving towards the end of the sample period time, proposals 
related to other issues increased dramatically (almost doubled starting from year 2003). This 
could be explained due to the emergence of debates surrounding issues related to executive 
compensation, especially equity based pay, in that time period. Another possible explanation for 
the different type of proposals submitted across the time is the identity of the proposal sponsor. 
Gillan and Starks (2000) point out that institution tend to address general governance problems 
(like repealing antitakeover provisions) arising from conflict of interest between management 
and shareholders, while individuals are the one who emphasize specific corporate governance 
issues like issues of executive compensation.   
To describe the identity of proposal sponsors, we manually classify the proposal sponsors 
into 5 groups based on the information provided by Georgeson on names of sponsors as follows: 
Labor unions, public pensions, religious organizations, other shareholder groups and individuals. 
Table A4 presents the number of proposals over the sample period classified by sponsor type. 
Overall, the largest percentage of proposals (about 43%) is sponsored by individuals, followed 
by labor unions (37%). Consistent with Gillan and Starks (2000), there is a variation in the 
number of proposals submitted by institutions. In the period 1996-1999, both labor unions and 
public pensions were sponsoring more proposals, but starting from 2000, the proposals 
sponsored by pension fund decreases dramatically and the sponsors sponsored by labor unions 
decreased in 2000, increased in 2003 and then decreased again in 2004. The percentage of 
proposals sponsored by individuals was varying until year 2006 when that percentage became 





Overall, the above exercises confirm that our data is consistent with those used in prior 
studies, even though we hand collected the data from a different data source, Georgeson, who 
specializes in tracking corporate governance proposals, and hand classified the data according to 
prior research. 
We now introduce our main variables in this study.  Table 1 tallies total shareholder-voter 
participation, defined as voter turnout divided by all voting shares outstanding. Those statistics 
are broken down based on sample year (Panel A), sponsor type (Panel B), and proposal type 
(Panel C). Table 2 repeats Table 1, but with “Favorable Votes”, calculated as the number of 
“Yes” vote a percentage of all votes casted. On average, voter turnout is around 87%, with no 
detectable fluctuations over time, and favorable votes are around 36%. This proportion is higher 
than the 23% mean of votes in favor reported by Gillan and Starks (2000) for proposals 
submitted during 1987- 1994, but is consistent with Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) who report a 
mean of 34% for proposals submitted between 1996 and 2005. Table 2 Panel B classifies the 
votes in favor by proposal sponsor. Proposals sponsored by public pensions are those with the 
highest mean votes in favor (42.9%), followed by proposals sponsored by individuals (37.5%). 
Panel C classifies the votes in favor by proposal type. Proposals repealing anti-takeover devices 
are those with the highest mean votes in favor (56%), followed by proposals related to voting 
issues (40.7%). In unreported analysis, we decompose panels B and C by year but no significant 
variation occurs in the pattern of voting across time based on either proposal type or sponsor.  
3.2. Takeover Targets 
We use Securities Data Company (SDC) database to download all successful (completed) 





and have US public targets where the date of original announcement is between January 1996 
and December 2009. We also use COMPUSTAT to download the related financial data, Risk 
Metrics to download the related governance data, CRSP to download the stock prices, and 
Thomson Reuters to download ownership data.  
We merge the SDC’s universe of successful (completed) takeover bids spanning from 
January 1996 until December 2009, with the Georgeson sample of S&P 1500 firms with 
shareholder proposal and the COMPUSTAT data on all S&P 1500 firms. (Georgeson does not 
report CUSIPS, so we manually assign company CUSIPS by matching using company names). 
In that matching process, 48 of the 755 shareholder proposal firms did not have COMPUSTAT 
data, so we dropped them out of the sample.  
 Ultimately, we get four subsamples: 
1- S&P 1500 firms with shareholder proposals that became targets of completed takeover 
bids. 
2- S&P 1500 firms with shareholder proposals that did not become targets of completed 
takeover bids. 
3- S&P 1500 control sample of firms with no shareholder proposals that became targets of 
completed takeover bids. 
4- S&P 1500 control sample of firms with no shareholder proposals that did not become 
targets of completed takeover bids.  
     The final total sample of firms with shareholder proposals and control firms is 2600 firms 
with 18028 firm year observations. Analysis on voting outcome or participation includes 





Table 3 presents the results of matching the shareholder proposal firms to SDC 
completed bids classified by the year of original announcement of takeover. 201 firms out of 755 
firms end up as targets of completed takeovers. Those 201 firms have received a total of 697 
proposals over the sample period of time. A firm that got acquired in the time period 2005-2009   
received much more proposals compared to the firms that got acquired in earlier years. To 
further investigate the connection between the timing of the proposals and the acquisition event, 
we present in Table 4 the difference between the shareholder proposal date and the merger 
announcement date (elapsed time). Shareholder proposal date is the date of the annual corporate 
governance review as reported by Georgeson Inc. Merger announcement date is the original date 
of announcement as reported by SDC. If firms get successfully acquired, we shouldn’t find 
proposals related to them after the date of merger announcement, but we actually find 93 
proposals with dates after dates of merger announcement. Hence, we manually checked the 
narrative (“Deal Synopsis” variable in SDC) describing the takeover bids of those companies and 
found that those are companies that kept the target’s name after the acquisition. Thus we drop 
those shareholder proposals out of the sample when conducting the analysis. 54.4% of the total 
proposals that matched with completed takeover bids occur between 0 and 36 months before the 
announcement of the takeover. This suggests that we could use a three year window before the 
merger announcement date to identify the proposals that are more relevant in explaining the 
likelihood and outcomes of takeover.  
4. Results 





 To model the impact of presence of shareholder activism on the probability of being 
acquired, we use a Probit model relating firm i’s probability of takeover at time t, as a function of 




TARGET i,t = a + B1PROPOSALi,t-1 + B2SIZEi,t-1 + B3TOBIN’S Q i,t-1 + B4PROFITABILITYi,t-1 
+ B5LEVERAGEi,t-1+ B6INDUSTRYt + ei,t                                                                                                                       (1)                                                                                                 
Where: TARGETi,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 for a company i that receives a bid in the 
year of announcement t and this takeover bid is successfully completed and 0 otherwise, 
PROPOSALi,t-1 is a dummy variable that equals one, if a company i has at least one proposal in 
the whole sample period until one year before date of takeover  announcement t and 0 otherwise, 
SIZEi,t-1 is the size of a company i at time t-1 measured as log of total sales, TOBIN’S Qi,t-1 is the 
market to book ratio of a company i at time t-1, PROFITABILITY i,t-1 is the net income before 
depreciation divided by average total equity (ROE) for a company i at time t-1, LEVERAGE i,t-1 
is the ratio of book value of total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by 
the market value of assets( book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market 
value of equity), and INDUSTRYt  is the proportion of companies targeted in the same industry 
(2- digit SIC code) and same year t divided by all COMPUSTAT S&P1500 firms targeted in the 
same year t.  
 In addition, we measure the effect of shareholder activism by either employing 
shareholder votes in favor or the level of shareholder participation in votes as explanatory 
variables. We measure those variables as follows: VOTES_FOR: The mean of votes in favor for 
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 The model we use is based on the previous studies of determinants of acquisition likelihood: 





all shareholder proposals issued by the company during the sample period until one year before 
the announcement of the takeover bid, where votes in favor is a ratio of all the votes in favor 
divided by all votes casted. PARTICIPATION: The mean of participation in voting of all 
shareholder proposals issued by the company during the sample period until one year before the 
announcement of the takeover bid, where the participation is all votes cast at the meeting divided 
by the total voting power of the company.  
 Next, to model the influence of specific proposals characteristics such as multiple 
proposals, recent proposals, and proposals motivated by antitakeover provision removal, we 
employ a model similar to model (1). However we apply this model only on the universe of firms 
with shareholder proposals. The reason we do not include those variables in the general model 
above is that no control firms can have those characteristics, thus the power of the model will be 
reduced. In addition, focusing only on firms with shareholder proposals will eliminate any 
endogeneity problems that result from the fact that firms with shareholder proposals are different 
from other firms. We use variable MULTIPLE that is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company has multiple shareholder proposals during the sample period and 0 otherwise to 
measure the frequency of proposals. We also use a variable TAKEOVER – RELATED  that is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has at least one proposal that is related to the five 
most influential takeover related proposals (repeal classified board, eliminate poison pill, 
eliminate supermajority requirement , cumulative voting and sell the company) and 0 otherwise 
to measure the proposal type. To examine the impact of proposals submitted more recently 
before the takeover announcement, we use a dummy variable RECENT equal to 1 if the 
shareholder proposal is in a window of 3 years before the announcement of the takeover bid and 





      Table 5 reports the results of the Probit estimation of model (1). Column 1 includes only 
firm characteristics and control variables at time t-1 as in the classical models of takeover 
prediction (Palepu, 1986; Billet, 1996; Billet and Xue, 2007). Columns 2, 3 and 4 include 
shareholder activism as an explanatory variable. Shareholder activism is measured by the 
existence of shareholder proposals (Column 2), the voting results in favor of the proposal 
(Column3), and the participation in the voting on the proposal (Column4).  
Regarding the impact of shareholder activism on the likelihood of takeovers, the results 
strongly support Hypotheses 1 and 3. Firms with active shareholders have higher probability of 
being taken over, if shareholder activism is measured by the proposal existence, shareholder 
votes in favor for a proposal, or shareholder participation in voting on a proposal. The 
(statistically highly significant) marginal effect on PROPOSAL in models 2, 3, and 4 is 1.5%, 
2.5%, and 1.7%, respectively. Since the unconditional probability of an acquisition of a firm in 
the sample equals 5.25% in a given year, a firm with shareholder proposals has relatively 28.4% 
higher likelihood of being successfully taken over compared to firms with no proposals. In 
addition, the successful voting outcome and participation in voting result in 47.3% and 31.8% 
higher probability of being successfully taken over, respectively. 
The control variables in Table 5 have generally similar signs and significance compared 
to the previous models testing the determinants of acquisition likelihood. Smaller, more 
profitable, less levered firms with low Tobin’s Qs have the higher chance of being taken over. In 
addition, the takeover likelihood for a given firm increases if other firms in the same industry are 





Table 6 reports the results of the Probit estimation on the universe of firms with 
shareholder proposals as reported by Georgeson. Each of the first 3 models tests for the influence 
of the characteristics of the proposals on the takeover probability. The marginal coefficients on 
MULTIPLE, TAKEOVER-RELATED, and RECENT in models 1, 2, and 3 are 3.5%, 3.7%, and 
4.4%, respectively. In the universe of firms with shareholder proposals, the unconditional 
probability of an acquisition of a firm is 2.6%. Consequently, having multiple proposals, 
takeover-related proposals, and proposals in a 3 year window prior to the announcement of a 
merger leads to a 134%, 142%, and 168% higher probability of a firm being acquired in a given 
year. 
Model 4 controls for the possibility that the coefficient on RECENT is positive primarily 
due to the recent quality of firm’s governance. Therefore, we add the measure of governance – 
the G-INDEX (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick governance index) as reported by Risk Metrics. Even 
after controlling for this variable, RECENT stays statistically significant.  
Finally, Models 5 and 6 test for the possibility that the takeover likelihood for firms with 
shareholder proposals aimed on the removal of antitakeover provisions increases solely due to 
the mere removal of given provisions following the passage of proposal or extraordinary large 
shareholder participation (which likely forces the management to remove the antitakeover 
provisions even if the original proposal does not pass). We thus include variables WIN and 
LARGE PARTICIPATION. WIN is a dummy variable that equals one if the company has on 
average 50% or more of the votes supporting the proposal and zero otherwise and 
LARGE_PARTICIPATION is a dummy variable that equals one if the company has on average 





otherwise. About 31% of the shareholder proposal firms have 50% or more of the votes 
supporting the proposal and 29% of the sample are greater than 75% distribution of the sample 
with respect to participation in voting on the proposals. Models 5 and 6 show that even after 
controlling for high support from shareholders (WIN) or large participation in voting 
(LARGE_PARTICIPATION); the presence of any antitakeover-related shareholder proposal is 
still significant: hence shareholder activism itself serves as a signal that increases the possibility 
of takeover, not just the presence of winning proposals. 
4.2. Shareholder Activism and Target Abnormal Acquisition Returns 
 We employ a standard event study methodology based on the market model and using 
returns on the CRSP equally – weighted portfolio to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) for targets surrounding the merger announcement. We then utilize an Ordinary Least 
Square Regression (OLS) to regress the CARs on the existence of shareholder activism and other 
control variables (as defined previously). The model is as follows: 
CAR (-5, +5) = a + B1PROPOSAL + B2SIZE +B3TOBINS’Q + B4PROFITABILITY +e           (2)  
Where CAR (-5, +5) are the cross-sectional daily cumulative abnormal returns in a five day 
window surrounding merger announcement and all other variables as previously defined.  We 
also apply this model using VOTES-FOR, PARTICIPATION, RECENT, WIN, and 
LARGE_PARTICIPATION as explanatory variables, to identify the effect of shareholder’s 






 Table 7 presents the results of the OLS regression relating the cumulative abnormal 
returns surrounding a merger announcement to the existence of shareholder proposals (model 1), 
the support from shareholders for the proposals (model 2), the participation of the shareholders 
in voting on a proposal (model 3), the existence of shareholder proposals in a three year window 
prior to the announcement of the merger (model 4), the existence of shareholder proposals after 
controlling for high voting support (model 5) , and the existence of shareholder proposals after 
controlling for high participation in voting (model 6). The results provide strong support for 
Hypotheses 2 and 3. All six models show significant negative cumulative abnormal returns 
associated with firms that have shareholder proposals. Based on Model 1, target companies with 
previous shareholder proposals earn approximately 6% lower abnormal acquisition returns 
compared to the targets with no proposals. This could be due to the signaling value of the target 
shareholders’ willingness to sell and/or weaker position of target management during 
negotiations over the distribution of takeover synergies. Models 2 and 3 suggest that lower 
abnormal returns to target shareholders are primarily due to previous proposals with large 
shareholder support and/or large shareholder voting participation. Model 4 shows that recent 
shareholder proposals are associated with low target gains. Last, based on Models 5 and 6, the 
lower target abnormal returns are not solely due to proposals that pass and/or draw extraordinary 
voting participation. Once again, it appears to be the mere existence of previous shareholder 
proposals that affects acquisition outcomes. 
 The coefficients for control variables in Table 7 have generally expected signs. 
Consistent with previous research, large targets, as well as targets with higher Tobin’s Qs are 





4.3. Shareholder Activism and Share Cross-Holdings of Proposal Sponsors 
 Previous finance research (e.g. Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2008) shows that companies 
holding shares in both the bidder and the target are more likely to vote in support of the 
acquisition. Cross-holdings are also expected to lead to higher target gains. We test whether 
cross-holdings may serve as the information link through which shareholder activism impacts 
takeover likelihood – if the existence of shareholder proposal serves as a signal that a company 
may be a possible target, the actual suitability for acquisition can be arguably best determined by 
investors who are familiar with both the bidder and the target thanks to the share cross-
ownership. To test the impact of cross-holding on the takeover likelihood, we use a Probit model 
similar to model (1) but we add information links as an explanatory variable. We apply this 
model to a subset of the sample comprised of targets acquired by US public bidders and other 
shareholder proposal control firms, because one can observe share cross-holdings only if both the 
bidder and the target are publicly-held. We obtain ownership data for targets and bidders from 
13-F reports provided by Thomson Reuters.  
 In the Probit model (1), we use INFO_LINK (1) as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
shareholder proposal sponsor in the target is also an owner in the bidder and zero otherwise. We 
further study another type of information link INFO_LINK (2) which is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the shareholder proposal sponsor in the target is an owner in the bidder and is also an 
active shareholder proposal sponsor in the bidder (measured by the existence of shareholder 
proposals in the bidder) and zero otherwise. To study the direct impact of cross-holdings, we also 
control for COMMON_OWNERSHIP which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target and 





 Table 8 presents the results of Probit model of takeover likelihood after accounting for 
information links that result due to having shareholder proposal sponsors of targets as other 
owners in bidders. The results support Hypothesis 4. The effect of information links is 
statistically positively significant when included as an explanatory variable (Model 1), when 
interacted with proposals that are related to anti-takeover provisions (Model 2) , when interacted 
with support of shareholders to the proposals (Model 3) , when interacted with participation of 
shareholders in voting on proposals (Model 4) , and after considering the alternative form of 
information link (INFO_LINK(2)) which shows that shareholder proposal sponsors in targets are 
owners and also active shareholder proposal sponsors in bidders (Model 5). In addition, Models 
1-4 suggest that the higher takeover likelihood for companies with previous shareholder 
proposals (documented in Tables 5 and 6) is indeed mainly due to the target companies with 
owners holding share positions in the future bidders. After the inclusion of the information link, 
the presence of anti-takeover proposals (TAKEOVER-RELATED) keeps significance only when 
interacted with the presence of the information link.
49
 The same effect can be found in the model 
examining the shareholder voting support for the proposal (VOTES_FOR), while participation in 
voting ( PARTICIPATION ) remains significant, but its coefficient is still smaller compared to 
the coefficient for PARTICIPATION interacted with the information link.  
 We also examine the impact of cross-holding on target abnormal acquisition gains. In 
Model 7 of Table 7, we add INFO_LINK (1) as the explanatory variable. This link can be 
observed only in case of acquisitions by publicly-traded US bidders. Therefore, we also include 
variable PUBLIC_US_BIDDER which is a dummy variable equal 1 if the bidder is a public US 
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bidder and zero otherwise to specifically control for the potentially different abnormal returns 
accrued to targets of US public bidders. Model 7 results show that cross-holdings is not 
significantly related to target abnormal acquisition gains. Utilizing the alternative definition of 
information link, INFO_LINK (2), or restricting the sample to only firms acquired by public US 
bidders leads to similar, statistically insignificant results.  
5. Conclusion  
 The support for shareholder activism has increased substantially over time. Shareholder 
proposals have the power to improve internal governance, and there is some evidence that they 
lead to positive changes in corporate performance. So far, there has been little direct evidence 
that shareholder activism in future targets affects takeover outcomes– either via changes in the 
takeover likelihood or via different abnormal returns accrued by target companies that previously 
received shareholder proposals. 
 This study present evidence that shareholder activism both increases the likelihood of 
being taken over and lowers abnormal acquisition returns in case the company affected by the 
shareholder proposal becomes the target of ultimately completed acquisition. The results further 
suggest that the most significant changes in takeover likelihood and target gains are associated 
with proposals that were submitted more recently, by multiple sponsors, motivated by the 
removal of antitakeover provisions, as well as with proposals that received either large 
shareholder voting support of sizable voting participation. Takeover likelihood increases are 
further associated with acquisition where the sponsors of proposals in targets also hold bidder 
shares – suggesting that share cross-holdings may play an important role of information channel 





 Overall, the results of the study imply that shareholder activism affects functioning of the 
market for corporate control. Since the threat of takeovers disciplines managers and induces 
them to pursue policies enhancing investors’ wealth, the existence of shareholder proposals 
improves the functioning of external governance factors (such as takeovers) in addition to the 
beneficial changes in internal governance documented by previous research.  
Future research opportunities includes examining the relation between shareholder 
activism and changes in governance measured by changes in G-index, changes in ownership 
concentration, changes in adoption of poison pills, removals of anti-takeover amendments, and 
changes in leverage. In addition, another direction of future research may lead to the 
investigation of the impact of shareholder proposals taking into account the presence of 
significant debt holders including: banks, mutual funds, hedge funds, and pension funds. 
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Table 1: Shareholder-Voter Turnout 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the percentage (%) of shareholders who participated in voting 
for shareholder-initiated proposals. Sample includes 3587 proposals for which voting data is available. 
Panel B reports the percentages of support as Panel A, but the proposals are classified by sponsor type, for 
which data is available for 3574 proposals. Panel C classifies the 3587 proposals into 6 categories and 
presents similar statistics for each proposal type.  
Panel A 
 
N Mean Median Min Max 
1996 111 90.66 91.3 63.3 100 
1997 78 88.931 90.05 68.9 100 
1998 62 90.90 92.8 57.2 100 
1999 88 91.13 91 77.2 100 
2000 83 87.93 88 69.1 100 
2001 237 86.91 88.2 39.2 100 
2002 271 85.79 86.9 55.6 100 
2003 427 86.35 86.4 52.1 100 
2004 412 86.21 87 55.7 100 
2005 366 85.34 87.15 39.9 100 
2006 382 87.07 87.7 54.1 100 
2007 369 87.31 88.3 71.7 100 
2008 334 88.22 89 68.6 100 
2009 367 87.30 88.2 53.7 100 
Total 3587 87.09 87.9 39.2 100 
 
     Panel B 
 
N Mean Median Min Max 
Proposals Sponsored by Labor Unions  
Total  1332 87.74      88.9       52.1 100 
 
Proposals Sponsored by Public Pensions 
Total  192 86.86       88.65 57.2 100 
 
Proposals Sponsored by Religious Organizations 
Total 167 88.36      88.1 57.2 100 
 
Proposals Sponsored by Other Shareholder Groups 
Total 341 88.56      88.3 63.3 100 
 
Proposals Sponsored by Individuals  




N Mean Median Min Max 
Anti-takeover devices  1075 87.34 88.5 39.2 100 
Voting issues  487 87.52 88.8 39.9 100 
Board & committee 
independence issues  598 87.13 87.3 39.9 100 
Other governance issues  1346 86.71 87.2 50.1 100 
Sell the company  68 87.54 89.25 65.6 100 





Table 2: Favorable Votes 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the percentage (%) of shareholder votes in favor of shareholder-initiated 
proposals. Sample includes 3594 proposals for which voting data is available. Panel B reports the percentages of 
support as Panel A, but the proposals are classified by sponsor type, for which data is available for 2581 proposals. 
Panel C classifies the 3594 proposals into 6 categories and presents similar statistics for each proposal type. 
Panel A                                         N Mean  Median  Min Max 
1996 111 35.1 36.4 1.6 84.1 
1997 82 28.1 26.9 1.6 67.8 
1998 62 27.2 25.3 2.8 73.0 
1999 88 33.7 30.9 1.9 95.8 
2000 83 36.1 35.0 2.0 87.7 
2001 238 29.1 26.7 0.9 97.1 
2002 269 36.1 34.6 0.1 90.7 
2003 427 36.0 33.9 2.3 90.1 
2004 413 33.5 29.4 1.7 97.2 
2005 366 35.7 36.3 0.0 97.6 
2006 383 40.4 39.6 1.5 98.2 
2007 371 36.6 36.5 0.3 91.1 
2008 334 38.1 38.3 0.7 92.6 
2009 367 43.4 42.9 1.3 98.9 
Total 3594 36.3 36.3 0.0 98.9 
 
Panel B N Mean  Median  Min Max 
Proposals Sponsored by Labor Unions  
Total  1335 36.9      37.5       0.1 95.1 
 
Proposals Sponsored by Public Pensions 
Total  193 42.9       42.5 3.8 95.8 
 
Proposals Sponsored by Religious Organizations 
Total 170 20.6      11.4 1.6 83.3 
 
Proposals Sponsored by Other Shareholder Groups 
Total 342 32.8      32.9 0.3 97.1 
 
Proposals Sponsored by Individuals  
Total 1541 37.5      36.9 0.0 98.2 
Panel C N Mean  Median  Min Max 
Anti-takeover devices  1075 56.0 57.9 2.1 98.9 
Voting issues  490 40.7 40.1 1.3 97.6 
Board & committee 
independence issues  599 22.2 20.4 0.0 95.8 
Other governance issues  1349 26.6 24.8 0.0 97.1 
Sell the company  68 16.2 13.8 0.1 59.8 





Table 3: Companies with Shareholder Proposals that are Targeted and Acquired during 
1996-2009 
This table reports the number of proposals that are matched to a completed takeover bid on the date of takeover 
announcement and the number of companies receiving that much of proposals. This table is based on a one - many 
merge where one takeover bid can be matched to many proposals. 
Year takeover is 
announced 
Frequency of Proposals 
matched to takeover bid 




1996 6 0.9% 4 
1997 15 2.1% 3 
1998 41 6% 11 
1999 27 3.9% 15 
2000 48 7% 16 
2001 16 2.3% 9 
2002 4 0.6% 2 
2003 22 3.2% 9 
2004 22 3.2% 8 
2005 150 21.4% 25 
2006 101 14.3% 33 
2007 91 12.8% 31 
2008 91 13% 19 
2009 63 9.2% 16 
Total 697  201 
 
 
Table 4: Elapsed Time between Shareholder Proposal Date and Merger Announcement 
Date for Companies with Shareholder Proposals that are Targeted and Acquired 
This table reports the difference in months between the shareholder proposals date and merger 
announcement date for shareholder proposals of companies that had complete takeover bids. Elapsed time 
is shareholder proposal date – merger announcement date. Shareholder proposal date is the date of the 
annual corporate governance review as reported by Georgeson Inc.  Merger announcement date is the 
original date of announcement as reported by SDC.   
Elapsed Time Frequency of Proposals Percent 
< 0 93 13.3% 
0-12 months 191 27.4% 
12-24 months 101 14.5% 
24-36 months 87 12.5% 
36-48 months 72 10.3% 
48-60 months 43 6.2% 
> 60 months 110 15.8% 








Table 5: Takeover Probability Estimation 
 
This table reports the estimation results of the probability that a firm will become a takeover target, by 
estimating a probit model. We use the firm’s characteristics as of the end of year t-1 and the observation 
of whether a firm becomes a target of a takeover attempt in year t to estimate the firm’s takeover 
probability. The sample is from 1996-2009. The dependent variable TARGET is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm is a target of a successful takeover , and zero otherwise; PROPOSAL is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the company had at least one proposal in the sample period until one year before 
the takeover announcement and zero otherwise; VOTES_FOR is the mean  of all votes in favor  divided 
by all votes cast for shareholder proposals occurring until one year before the takeover announcement; 
PARTICIPATION  is the mean of all votes cast divided by total voting power for shareholder proposals 
occurring until one year before the takeover announcement;  SIZE is the log of total sales; TOBIN’S Q is 
the market to book ratio; PROFITABILITY is the net income before depreciation divided by average total 
equity; LEVERAGE is  the book value of debt divided by the market value of assets; INDUSTRY is the 
proportion of firms with the same two-digit sic code and targeted in the same year divided by all 
COMPUSTAT S&P1500 firms targeted in the same year. Standard errors are included in parentheses. 
Economic significance is included in italics.  
   (1)                (2)         (3)        (4) 
             
PROPOSAL  0.135***   
          (0.049)   
          0.2842   
VOTES_FOR   0.244**  
         (0.112)  
         0.4734  
PARTICIPATION    0.164*** 
         (0.056) 
         0.3184 
SIZE -0.077 *** -0.083*** -0.082*** -0.085*** 
      (0.013)         (0.013)      (0.013)      (0.013) 
TOBIN’S Q -0.059 *** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.057*** 
      (0.016)         (0.016)      (0.016)       (0.016) 
PROFITABILITY       0.109* 0.112**       0.109*       0.110* 
      (0.057)         (0.057)      (0.057)       (0.057) 
LEVERAGE -0.842*** -0.880*** -0.863*** -0.889*** 
      (0.301)         (0.304)      (0.305)       (0.306) 
INDUSTRY 0.825 *** 0.817*** 0.821*** 0.822*** 
      (0.139)         (0.139)      (0.139)       (0.139) 
Constant -1.030*** -1.003*** -1.001*** -0.990*** 
      (0.099)         (0.099)       (0.099)       (0.010) 
N       18028          18028       17985 17985 
N(TARGET)         946            946         945 945 
Pseudo R
2
        0.02            0.02                                    0.02    0.02 
Prob > chi
2
        0.000           0.000       0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood    -3643.79         -3640.12      -3635.26 -3633.38 






Table 6: Takeover Probability Estimation – Only Firms with Shareholder Proposals 
This table reports the estimation results of the probability that a firm will become a takeover target, by estimating a 
probit model. We use the firm’s characteristics and proposals characteristics as of the end of year t-1 and the 
observation of whether a firm becomes a target of a takeover attempt in year t to estimate the firm’s takeover 
probability. The sample is from 1996-2009 and includes only firms with shareholder proposals. The dependent 
variable TARGET is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is a target of a successful takeover, and zero 
otherwise; MULTIPLE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company has more than one proposal in the sample 
period until one year before the takeover announcement and zero otherwise; TAKEOVER-RELATED  is a dummy 
variable the equals 1 if the company has at least one proposal that is related to repeal classified board, eliminate 
poison pill, eliminate supermajority requirement, cumulative voting and sell the company, and zero otherwise; 
RECENT  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the proposal is within a 3 year window before the announcement of 
the takeover , and zero otherwise; G-INDEX is  the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) governance index as reported 
by Risk Metrics  of the company at time t-1; WIN is a dummy variable that equals one when the VOTES_FOR for a 
company is above 50% and zero otherwise; LARGE_PARTICIPATION is a dummy variable that equals one when 
the PARTICIPATION is greater than 75%  of the distribution of the sample and zero otherwise; all other variables 
are defined in Table 5. Standard errors are in parentheses. Economic significance is in italics.  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
       
MULTIPLE 0.504***      
 (0.075)      
 1.34      
TAKEOVER 
RELATED                 
                        
 0.537***   0.520*** 0.491*** 
 (0.073)   (0.082) (0.076) 
 1.42   1.36 1.25 
RECENT   0.767*** 1.031***   
   (0.080) (0.272)   
   1.68 1.40   
WIN     0.049  
     (0.105)  
     1.00  
LARGE 
PARTICIPATION  
     0.227** 
     (0.093) 
     0.53 
G-INDEX    0.050   
    (0.053)   
SIZE -0.072 *** -0.048* -0.049* -0.003 -0.047* -0.044 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.088) (0.029) (0.029) 
TOBIN’S Q -0.111*** -0.094** -0.091** -0.478* -0.094** -0.092** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.257) (0.044) (0.044) 
PROFITABILITY 0.007 -0.012 0.049 -0.688 -0.012 -0.022 
(0.151) (0.151) (0.153) (0.620) (0.151) (0.151) 
LEVERAGE -0.093 -0.093 -0.076 0.070 -0.079 -0.065 
(0.262) (0.260) (0.267) (0.777) (0.261) (0.259) 
INDUSTRY 0.822 *** 0.833*** 0.736** 0.048 0.827*** 0.852*** 
 (0.302) (0.302) (0.307) (0.814) (0.302) (0.303) 
Constant  -1.398*** -1.642*** -1.880*** -1.998** -1.648*** -1.696*** 
 (0.240) (0.242) (0.253) (0.942) (0.242) (0.243) 
N 5742 5742 5742 451 5742 5742 
N(event) 150 150 150 19 150 150 
Pseudo R
2
 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.18 0.05 0.06 
Prob > chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -662.76 -657.90 -631.62 -64.52 -657.80 -655.05 







  Table 7: Shareholder Activism and Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Target Shareholders Surrounding Merger 
Announcement 
This table contains the estimated coefficients for an OLS regression relating the cumulative abnormal return surrounding a merger 
announcement, the existence of shareholder proposals, the support from shareholders for the proposals, the participation of the 
shareholders in voting on a proposal, and the existence of shareholder proposal sponsors that have ownership in bidder firms. The 
cumulative abnormal return is calculated over the (-5, +5) window surrounding the merger announcement. PROPOSAL is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the company had at least one proposal in the sample period until one year before the takeover announcement 
and zero otherwise; VOTES_FOR is the mean  of all votes in favor  divided by all votes cast for shareholder proposals occurring until 
one year before the takeover announcement; PARTICIPATION  is the mean of all votes cast divided by total voting power  for 
shareholder proposals occurring until one year before the takeover announcement; RECENT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
proposal is within a 3 year window before the announcement of the takeover , and zero otherwise; WIN is a dummy variable that 
equals one if VOTES_FOR a company is more than 50% and zero otherwise; LARGE_PARTICIPATION is a dummy variable that 
equals one if PARTICIPATION is greater than 75%  of the distribution of the sample and zero otherwise; PUBLIC_US_BIDDER is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the bidder is a public US firm and zero otherwise; INFO_LINK(1)* PUBLIC_US_BIDDER is an 
interaction between INFO_LINK(1) which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the shareholder proposal sponsor is an owner in the 
bidder and zero otherwise and PUBLIC_US_BIDDER; OWNERSHIP is a dummy variable that equals 1 is the bidder and the target 
have common owners and zero otherwise; and all other variables as previously defined. Standard errors are included in parentheses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PROPOSAL -0.058**    -0.056*   -0.059* -0.150 
 (0.030)    (0.034)     (0.036) (0.151) 
VOTES_FOR  -0.152**      
  (0.068)      
PARTICIPATION   -0.064**     
   (0.033)     
RECENT     -0.053*   0.109 
    (0.030)   (0.152) 
WIN      -0.006   
     (0.060)   
LARGE_PARTICIPATION        0.003  
         (0.052)  
PUBLIC_US_BIDDER       -0.008 
       (0.020) 
INFO_LINK(1) * 
PUBLIC_US_BIDDER 
      -0.081 
(0.074) 
OWNERSHIP 
      0.0001 
      (0.010) 







SIZE -0.014** -0.014** -0.014* -0.014** -0.014* -0.014* -0.013* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
TOBIN’S Q -0.033*** -0.033 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 *** -0.031*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
PROFITABILITY  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
CONSTANT 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.383*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
N 749 749 749 749 749 749 749 
Adjusted R
2
 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
F 4.91 5.22 4.91 4.75 3.93 3.92 2.69 





Table 8: The Impact of Cross Holding on the Likelihood of Takeover 
 
This table reports a Probit model which estimates the effect of having a shareholder proposal sponsor in a 
target firm as an owner in the acquirer, in addition to other firm and proposal characteristics as of the end 
of year t-1 on the probability that a firm will become a takeover target in year t. The sample is from 1996-
2009 and includes only firms with shareholder proposals that were acquired by public US bidders. The 
dependent variable TARGET is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is a target of a successful 
takeover, and zero otherwise; INFO_LINK (1) is a dummy variable that equal 1 if the shareholder 
proposal sponsor in the target firm is also an owner in the bidder firm and zero otherwise;  
INFO_LINK(2) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the shareholder proposal sponsor is an owner in the 
bidder and is also an active shareholder proposal sponsor in the bidder and zero otherwise; 
COMMON_OWNERSHIP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target firm and bidder firm have any 
common owners and zero otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
INFO_LINK (1) 1.73*** 1.25*** 0.91** -0.38 1.70*** 
    (0.18)      (0.27)      (0.38)   (1.34)      (0.18) 
TAKEOVER_RELATED        -0.04    
 
       (0.13)    
INFO_LINK(1)* 
TAKEOVER-RELATED 
 1.12***    
       (0.39)    
VOTES_FOR 
  0.14   
  (0.31)   
INFO_LINK(1)* 
VOTES_FOR 
       2.68***   
  (0.98)   
PARTICIPATION 
   0.84**  
         (0.38)  
INFO_LINK(1) * 
PARTICIPATION 
   2.87*  
          (1.53)  
INFO_LINK(2) 
       1.09*** 
          (0.25) 
COMMON_OWNERSHIP 
    1.32***      1.32***      1.32***    1.27***    1.19*** 
(0.23)         (0.23) (0.23)       (0.23)       (0.24) 
RECENT 
     0.63***       0.60***       0.51*** -0.19     0.57*** 
(0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.34) (0.11) 
SIZE -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
TOBIN’S Q -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
PROFITABILITY 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.16 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
LEVERAGE -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.12 -0.03 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) 
INDUSTRY 0.77** 0.80** 0.80** 0.88** 0.82** 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37) 
CONSTANT -2.31*** -2.25*** -2.23*** -2.23*** -2.23*** 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.35) 
N 5153 5153 5119 5119 5153 
N(event) 80 80 80 80 80 
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Log Likelihood 164.05 172.65 174.36 185.33 181.52 







Table A1: Shareholder Proposals by Type 
1- Issues related to antitakeover devices:                
Repeal classified board   
Eliminate poison pill    
Approve golden parachutes   
Eliminate supermajority requirement  
Opt-out of state antitakeover law  
Prohibit greenmail payments   
Targeted share placement   
Fair price provision  
  
2- Voting issues:    
Cumulative    
Confidential    
Majority vote to elect directors  
 
3- Board and committee independence issues:  
Director ownership    
Prohibit dual CEO/Chair   
Increase board independence   
Limit director terms    
Nomination of directors   
Director compensation   
Director attendance at meetings  
Other related to directors   
 
4- Other Governance issues:   
Executive compensation   
Annual meeting    
Restore preemptive rights   
Audit-related    
Restrict options    
Equal access to proxy   
Establish shareholder committee 
 
5- Sell the Company  
 






Table A2: Companies with Corporate-Governance-Oriented Shareholder Proposals 
This table reports the number of shareholder proposals that S&P 1500 companies received over the  
1996-2009 sample period as reported by Georgeson, Inc. Panel A reports the total number of 
corporate-governance-oriented proposals a company receives during the entire sample period and  
panel B reports the total numbers of proposals received during a one-year window. 
Pa   Panel A: Frequency of proposals from 1996 to 2009   
 
Number of proposals 
received over sample period 
Number of companies 
 receiving this many  
proposals 
Total proposals received 
1 295 295 
2 118 236 
3 77 231 
4 42 168 
5 43 215 
6 34 204 
7 20 140 
8 15 120 
9 10 90 
10 17 170 
11 to 15  38 492 
above 15  47 1270 
Total  755 3631 
 
Panel B: Number of corporate governance proposals in any given year 
Number of proposals in any given year Number of companies Total number of proposals 
1 1446 1446 
2 418 836 
3 162 486 
4 91 364 
5 46 230 
6 16 96 
7 8                       56 
8 9 72 















Table A3: Shareholder Proposals Submitted According to Proposal Type 
 
This table presents the shareholder proposals submitted each year from 1996-2009 by proposal type. Each year’s entry shows the total 
number (and percentage) of proposals from each proposal category for that year.  
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Anti-takeover devices 61 31 17 37 37 87 122 148 124 103 101 76 71 77 1092 
% 55% 38% 27% 42% 45% 36% 44% 34% 30% 27% 26% 20% 21% 21% 30% 
Voting Issues 6 4 4 6 6 24 28 20 39 78 111 59 43 66 494 
% 5% 5% 6% 7% 7% 10% 10% 5% 9% 21% 29% 16% 13% 18% 14% 
Board & Committee 
Independence Issues 
39 24 20 16 15 51 61 51 69 50 74 57 43 34 604 
% 35% 29% 32% 18% 18% 21% 22% 12% 17% 13% 19% 15% 13% 9% 17% 
Other Governance 
Issues 
4 10 17 25 16 59 65 213 179 139 98 180 168 185 1358 
% 4% 12% 27% 28% 19% 25% 23% 49% 43% 37% 25% 48% 50% 50% 37% 
Sell Company 1 13 4 4 9 19 2 2 3 5 1 1 3 2 69 
% 1% 16% 6% 5% 11% 8% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 
Non governance issues 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 4   14 
% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 1% 0% 









Table A4: Proposals by Sponsor Type 
This table reports the number (and percentage) of proposals submitted by the labor unions, pension funds, religious organizations, other shareholder 
groups, and individuals for each year in the sample.   
 
Sponsor  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Labor Unions  40 30 27 44 30 40 74 206 178 157 148 151 105 118 1,348 
% 36% 37% 44% 50% 36% 17% 27% 47% 43% 42% 38% 40% 31% 32% 37% 
Public 
Pensions  9 6 11 11 12 10 18 9 14 16 19 19 18 26 198 
% 8% 7% 18% 13% 14% 4% 6% 2% 3% 4% 5% 5% 5% 7% 5% 
Religious  
Organizations 5 16 11 15 19 9 6 7 12 24 15 13 8 10 170 
% 5% 20% 18% 17% 23% 4% 2% 2% 3% 6% 4% 3% 2% 3% 5% 
Other 
Shareholder 
Groups  57 30 13 18 22 24 15 27 16 18 22 12 40 31 345 
% 51% 37% 21% 20% 27% 10% 5% 6% 4% 5% 6% 3% 12% 8% 10% 
Individuals 0 0 0 0 0 157 165 185 191 158 180 176 163 179 1,554 
% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 65% 59% 43% 46% 42% 47% 47% 48% 49% 43% 
Not Available  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 2 4 4 16 
% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 






     In my first essay, studying a cross section of 3033 CEOs in 1964 different S&P 1500 firms, I 
show that attending an elite university for education, having work experience in a publicly listed 
firm, serving as a director on public and S&P 1500 boards, and being overall successful in the 
career path, helps the CEO gain more central position in the social network of all US executives 
and directors. This increased centrality translates on average into significantly higher market 
valuation, higher (but insignificant) accounting performance, and significantly higher CEO 
compensation. The results of this essay support the private information hypothesis; central CEOs 
can access and exchange information more easily and hence the CEOs leverage on those 
advantages in a positive manner. 
     However, in my second essay, I also show how the CEO network centrality can also be value 
destroying if the CEO exploits the power she gains from being central in the network to 
maximize her own wealth, and hence destroying shareholders value. By studying 464 S&P 1500 
acquirers from the period 1999 to 2008, I find that higher CEO network centrality is associated 
with higher tendency to conduct value destroying acquisitions that not only creates losses to the 
acquirers but also reduces overall synergies. This evidence is consistent with the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis; I show first that those bidders have extremely high centralities and 
they also self select themselves to conduct acquisitions although they are aware of the negative 
impacts of mergers on acquirer shareholders, moreover, I present evidence that those powerful 






     Finally, in my third essay, I show studying 755 S&P 1500 firms during the 1996-2009 
periods, that shareholder activism, measured by receiving shareholder proposals, shareholders’ 
support, and shareholders’ participation in voting on those proposals, increases the probability of 
firm to get acquired by 30% on average. This increased probability of takeover can be explained 
by the signaling effect of shareholder proposals to the external market for corporate control. 
However, this increased likelihood in takeovers is accompanied by 6% less cumulative abnormal 
returns for the target’s shareholders around the merger announcement, compared to firms not 
receiving shareholder proposals. The increase in takeover likelihood is the most in firms where 
shareholder sponsors are also owners in bidders, providing evidence that information still proves 
to be an important element impacting both internal and external governance.
 
 
 
 
 
